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Youngwoo Koh
This dissertation consists of three essays on market design and auction theory. In the first
chapter, we develop a model of decentralized college admissions in which students’ prefer-
ences for colleges are uncertain, and colleges must incur costs when their enrollments exceed
their capacities. Colleges’ admission decisions then become a tool for strategic yield manage-
ment, because the enrollment at a college depends on not only students’ uncertain preferences
but also other colleges’ admission decisions. We find that colleges’ equilibrium admission
decisions exhibit “strategic targeting”—colleges may forgo admitting (even good) students
likely sought after by the others and may admit (not as good) students likely overlooked by
the others. Randomization in admissions may also emerge. The resulting assignment fails
to be efficient (among students, among colleges and among all parties including colleges and
students) and leads to justified envy among students. When the colleges consider multiple
dimensions of students merits, their evaluations are unlikely to be perfectly correlated. In
such a case, colleges may avoid head-on competition by distorting their evaluation to place
excessive weight on less correlated dimensions, such as extra curricular activities and non-
academic aspects of students’ application portfolios. Restricting the number of applications
or allowing for wait-listing might alleviate colleges’ yield management problem, but the re-
sulting assignments are still inefficient and admit justified envy. Centralized matching via
Gale and Shapley’s Deferred Acceptance algorithm eliminates colleges’ yield management
problem and justified envy among students and attains efficiency. It also attains the out-
come that is jointly optimal among colleges, but some colleges may be worse off relative to
decentralized matching.
The second chapter studies a keyword auction model where bidders have constrained
budgets. In the absence of budget constraints, Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007)
and Varian (2007) analyze “locally envy-free equilibrium” or “symmetric Nash equilibrium”
bidding strategies in generalized second-price (GSP) auctions. However, bidders often have
to set their daily budgets when they participate in an auction; once a bidder’s payment
reaches his budget, he drops out of the auction. This raises an important strategic issue
that has been overlooked in the previous literature: Bidders may change their bids to inflict
higher prices on their competitors because under GSP, the per-click price paid by a bidder
is the next highest bid. We provide budget thresholds under which equilibria analyzed in
Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007) and Varian (2007) are sustained as “equilibria with
budget constraints” in our setting. We then consider a simple environment with one position
and two bidders and show that a search engine’s revenue with budget constraints may be
larger than its revenue without budget constraints.
In the third chapter, we study the procurement of an innovation in which firms exert
effort and create innovations, where the quality of innovation is stochastic. Both the effort
level and the quality of innovation are unverifiable, and the procurer cannot extract up-front
payment from the firms. Given the uncertainty of quality realization, there is a trade-
off regarding the number of participating firms in the procurement process: If many firms
participate in the process, they may be discouraged from expending their initial investment
because each of them has a small chance of winning (we call this incentive effect). At
the same time, as the number of participants increases, the procurer has a growing chance
of getting a higher quality because of the randomness of the quality realization (sampling
effect). Therefore, the procurer faces a nontrivial problem of how many firms to invite
in the procurement process. We consider two prominent contest mechanisms, a first-price
auction and a fixed-prize tournament. We show that if the randomness is large enough,
it is optimal for the buyer to invite as many firms as possible in both mechanisms, and
the fixed-prize tournament outperforms the first-price auction. In the limit at which the
randomness vanishes, inviting only two firms is optimal in both mechanisms, and the first-
price auction outperforms the fixed-prize tournament. Under the first-price auction, we show
that any equilibrium converges to an equilibrium as the randomness diminishes and provide
a characterization of the limit equilibrium. We also provide a constructive example of a
mixed-strategy equilibrium with two firms when the randomness is moderate.
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21.1 Introduction
The standard market design research on matching focuses on how best to design a central-
ized matching mechanism, taking the societal consensus on centralization as a given. While
such a consensus exists in a number of markets (e.g., medical residency matching and public
school matching), many markets remain decentralized (e.g., college admissions and graduate
school admissions). Decentralized markets often exhibit congestion and do not operate effi-
ciently (Roth and Xing, 1997). Although it is widely believed that these markets will benefit
from improved coordination or centralization, it is not well understood why they remain
decentralized and what welfare benefits would be gained by improving coordination or by
centralizing them.
At least part of the problem is the lack of an analytical grasp of decentralized matching
markets. Often treated as a black box, the equilibrium and welfare implications of decen-
tralized matching markets have not been understood well in the literature. Indeed, we have
yet to develop a workhorse model of decentralized matching that could serve as a useful
benchmark for comparison with a centralized system.1
The current paper develops an analytical framework for understanding decentralized
matching markets in the context of college admissions. In essence, college admissions are
a case of two-sided, many-to-one matching, and much is understood about how best to
organize such a market using a central clearinghouse.2 However, in many countries, such as
the US, Korea and Japan, college admissions are organized similarly to decentralized labor
markets, with exploding and binding admissions made by schools during a short window of
1The main exceptions are two excellent works by Chade and Smith (2006) and Chade, Lewis, and Smith
(2011). As we discuss more fully later, they focus on the portfolio decisions students face in application and
colleges’ inference of students’ abilities based on imperfect signals. By contrast, the current paper focuses on
the matching implications of college admissions, paying special attention to the yield management problem
arising from (aggregately) uncertain students’ preferences.
2See Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2012) for an excellent survey.
3time, among other things.3
With limited offers and acceptances to clear the markets, decentralized matching pro-
vides only a limited chance for colleges to learn students’ preferences and to condition their
admission decisions on them. This presents a challenge for colleges in managing its yield.
Inability to forecast yield accurately could result in too many or too few students enrolling
a college relative to its capacity. Either mistake is costly. For instance, 1,415 freshmen
accepted Yale’s invitation to join its incoming class in 1995-96, although the university had
aimed for a class of 1,335. At the same year, Princeton also reported 1,100 entering students,
the largest in its history. The college sets up mobile homes in fields and built new dorms to
accommodate the students (Avery, Fairbanks, and Zeckhauser, 2003).4
The yield management problem becomes increasingly important in many countries. In
Korea, for example, students apply for departments not for colleges. Since each department
has a small quota and there are many potential choices for students, departments try to
predict yield rates in order to ensure that they fill their capacities. In the US, most colleges
continue to experience increase in the number of applications they receive,5 and the average
yield rate of four-year colleges in the US has declined significantly over the past decade, from
49 percent in 2001 to 38 percent in 2011. Declining rates signal greatly increased uncertainty
for colleges.
Importantly, the uncertainty facing a college with respect to a student’s enrollment de-
pends not just on her preference but also on what other set of admissions she receives. This
makes a college’s admission policy a strategic yield management decision. We provide a
3College admissions are centralized in varying degrees in Australia, China, Taiwan, Turkey and the UK.
4The cost may also take the form of an explicit sanction imposed on the admitting unit (e.g., department)
by the government (as in Korea) or by the college (as in Australia).
5The application increase in recent years is due partly to the increased number of high school graduate
but also to an increase in applications submitted per student. Seventy-nine percent of Fall 2011 freshmen
applied to three or more colleges, and twenty-nine percent of them submitted seven or more applications.
(Clinedinst, Hurley, and Hawkins, 2012)
4simple model of colleges’ strategic yield management problems and characterize the equilib-
rium outcomes of these strategic decisions. The explicit analysis of equilibrium allows us to
evaluate the resulting assignment in terms of welfare and fairness and to compare this with
outcomes that arise from other coordinated admissions and centralized matching.
In our baseline model, there are two colleges, each with limited capacity, and a unit mass
of students with “scores” that are common for both colleges (e.g., high school GPA or SAT
scores). Students apply to colleges at no cost. Colleges prefer students according to their
scores, but they do not know students’ preferences toward them. This uncertainty takes an
aggregate form: the mass of students preferring one college over the other varies across states
that are unknown to the colleges. Over-enrollment is costly for a college in that it incurs a
sufficiently high cost for each incremental enrollment in excess of its capacity. Our baseline
model involves a simple time line: Initially, students simultaneously apply to colleges. Each
college observes only the scores of those students who apply to them. Next, the two colleges
simultaneously offer admissions to sets of students. Finally, the students who are admitted
by either or both colleges decide on which admission they will accept.
Given that application is costless, students have a (weak) dominant strategy of applying
to both colleges. Hence, the main focus of the analysis is the college’s admission decisions.
Our main finding in this regard is characterized by “strategic targeting:” Since the students
who attract competing admissions from the other college presents a greater enrollment un-
certainty and add to a higher capacity cost, a college seeks to systematically avoid such
students. Hence, in equilibrium, each college may forgo good students who are sought after
by the other college and may admit less attractive students who appear overlooked by the
other college. Randomization in admissions for students may also emerge. We then provide
the existence of these equilibria. Next, we study the welfare and fairness properties of the
equilibrium assignments and show that the assignment is typically unfair, that is, it entails
justified envy among students, and fails to achieve efficiency among students, among colleges
5and among all parties including colleges and students.
These results can be illustrated via a simple example. Suppose there are only two stu-
dents, 1 and 2, applying to colleges A and B. Each college has one seat to fill and faces
a prohibitively high cost of having two students. Student i has score vi, i = 1, 2, where
0 < v2 < v1 < 2v2. Each student has an equal probability of preferring either school, which
is private information (unknown to the other student and to the colleges). Each college
values having student i at vi. The applications are free of cost, and the timing is the same
as that explained above.
Given the large cost of over-enrollment, each college admits only one of the students.
Their payoffs are described as follow.














This game has a battle of the sexes’ structure (with asymmetric payoffs), so it is not
difficult to see that there are two different types of equilibria. First, there are two asymmetric
pure-strategy equilibria in which one college admits student 1 and the other admits student 2.
There is also a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which each college admits 1 with probability
γ := 2v1−v2
v1+v2
> 1/2 and admits 2 with probability 1−γ, where γ is chosen such that the other
college is indifferent. Both types of equilibria show the pattern of strategic targeting. In
the pure-strategy equilibria, colleges manage to avoid competition and thus randomness in
enrollment by targeting different students. In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, when a college
misses student 1 with probability 1 − γ, the other college may admit the student. Thus, it
also exhibits targeting as colleges seek to avoid head-to-head competition, while it does not
result in perfect coordination.
This example, while extremely simple, suggests problems with decentralized matching
6in terms of welfare and fairness. First, the student with high score (student 1) may be
assigned to a less preferred school (in both types of equilibria) even though both colleges
prefer the high scoring student; that is, justified envy arises. Second, it could be the case
that student 1 prefers A and student 2 prefers B, but the former is assigned to B and the
latter is assigned to A, showing that the equilibrium outcome is inefficient among students.
Lastly, the mixed-strategy equilibrium is Pareto inefficient because both colleges may admit
the same student, in which case one college is unmatched and would rather match with the
other student.
We next study admissions problem when students have multidimensional types. Some
measures, such as students’ academic performances, are highly correlated among colleges,
but others measures, such as students’ extra curricular activities, are less correlated among
them. In this case, colleges may evaluate students based not only on academic abilities
but also other extra-curricular activities, or they may put different weights on different
dimensions of students performance measures. In Japan and Korea, for instance, students
take a nationwide exam and also often take essay tests/oral exams for the school of choice.
Clinedinst, Hurley, and Hawkins (2012) reports some evidence that selective colleges places
more emphasis on many factors, such as essay/writing sample and extracurricular activities,
than less selective schools. We show that colleges’ desires to avoid head-on competition,
and thus to lessen enrollment uncertainty, lead them to bias their evaluation in favor of less
correlated measures by placing excessive weight on theses dimensions.
We also study two common ways for colleges to alleviate their yield management problem.
One common way is “self-targeting,” whereby colleges coordinate to restrict the number
of applications each student can submit. This form of coordination is observed in many
countries; for instance, students in the UK cannot apply to both Cambridge and Oxford,
students in Japan can apply to at most one public university, and students in Korea face
a similar restriction. Self-targeting reduces the enrollment uncertainty for the colleges, and
7thus alleviates their yield management burden. Yet, we show that this method may not
completely eliminate the yield management problem and justified envy, and it may also fail
to achieve efficiency.
Another way to cope with the enrollment uncertainty is to employ a sequential admissions
strategy: Colleges admit some students and place others in the waiting lists in each of
multiple rounds and later extend further admissions to those in the waiting list when seats
open up from the previous round. This method is also observed in many countries, including
France and Korea. Sequential admissions may alleviate colleges’ yield management problem,
since colleges may adjust their admission offers based on the students’ acceptance behavior
and the information the colleges may learn over the course of the process. We show, however,
that colleges may still engage in strategic targeting under this mechanism, and the welfare
and fairness problems still remain.
Finally, we consider a centralized matching via Gale and Shapley’s Deferred Acceptance
algorithm (DA in short). This eliminates colleges’ yield management problem and justified
envy completely and attains efficiency. At the same time, it is possible for one college to be
worse off relative to the decentralized matching. For instance, in the above example, suppose
a pure-strategy equilibrium in which college i always gets student 1 is played. Then, that
college will clearly be worse off from a switch to a centralization via DA because the college
will not always attract student 1. This may explain a possible lack of consensus toward
centralization and may underscore why college admissions remain decentralized in many
countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1.1 discusses the related literature. The
model is introduced in Section 3.2. Equilibrium is characterized in Section 1.3. Section 1.3.1
establishes existence of equilibrium. Section 1.3.2 discusses welfare and fairness implications
of equilibria. Section 1.4 studies admissions problem when students’ types are multidi-
mensional. In Section 1.5, self-targeting via restriction on application is studied, and in
8Section 1.6, sequential admissions are studied. Centralized matching via DA is considered
in Section 1.7. Section 3.5 concludes the paper. Proofs are provided in the Appendix unless
stated otherwise. The Appendix also extends the baseline model to allow for more than two
colleges and shows that our analysis in the two-college model carries over.
1.1.1 Related Literature
Several papers in the matching literature have considered decentralized matching markets.
Roth and Xing (1997) study the entry-level market for clinical psychologists in which firms
make offers to workers sequentially within a day and workers can accept, reject or hold an
offer. They find that, mainly based on simulations, such a decentralized (but coordinated)
market exhibits congestion, i.e., not enough offers and acceptances could be made to clear
the market, and the resulting outcome is unstable. Neiderle and Yariv (2009) also study a
decentralized (one-to-one matching) market in which firms make offers sequentially through
multiple periods. They provide sufficient conditions under which such decentralized markets
generate stable outcomes in equilibrium in the presence of market friction (namely, time
discounting) and preference uncertainty. Like these models, our model concerns about the
consequence of congestion arising from decentralized matching, but unlike Roth and Xing
(1997), we have an analytical model that allows us to characterize both the equilibrium
admission decisions and their welfare and fairness properties. In particular, the current
framework develops a new theme of strategic targeting. Moreover, the explicit analysis of
equilibria permits a clear comparison with the outcome that would arise from a centralized
matching.
The college admissions problem has recently received attention in the economics liter-
ature. Chade and Smith (2006) study students’ application decision as a portfolio choice
problem. Chade, Lewis, and Smith (2011) analyze colleges’ admission decisions together
9with the students’ application decisions. In their model, students with heterogeneous abili-
ties make application decisions subject to application costs, and colleges set admission stan-
dards based on noisy signals on students’ abilities. Avery and Levin (2010) and Lee (2009)
study early admissions. Unlike our model, these models have no aggregate uncertainty with
respect to students’ preferences, which means that the colleges in their model do not face
any enrollment uncertainty. Hence, colleges do not employ strategic targeting; they instead
use cutoff strategies.
Some aspects of our equilibrium are related to political lobbying behavior studied by
Lizzeri and Persico (2001, 2005). Just as colleges target students in our model, politicians
in these models target voters for distributing their favors. In their models, voters are homo-
geneous, and a voter votes for the candidate that offers her the largest favor. In our model,
however, students have heterogeneous abilities and preferences. Thus, colleges’ admission
decisions are more complicated—admission probabilities vary according to students’ scores.
Our model also shares some similarities with directed search models, such as Montgomery
(1991) and Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001). In these studies, each firm (seller) posts a wage
(price), and each worker (buyer) decides which job to apply for. Firms have a fixed number of
job openings and cannot hire more than the capacity, and workers can only apply to one firm.
Workers’ inability to precisely coordinate their search decisions causes a “search friction,”
so they randomize on application decisions. Just like the workers in these models, colleges
in our model can be seen to engage in “directed searches” on students. The difference is




Our model is described as follows. There is a unit mass of students with score v distributed
on [0, 1] according to an absolutely continuous distribution G(·). There are two colleges,
A and B, each with capacity κ < 1
2
. (Section A.8 will extend the model to include more
than two colleges, showing that our main results carry over to that extension.) Each college
values a student with score v at v and faces a cost λ ≥ 1 for each incremental enrollment
exceeding the quota. Each student has a preference over the two colleges, which is private
information. A state of nature, s ∈ [0, 1], determines the fraction of students who prefer A
over B: The state s is drawn from [0, 1] according to the uniform distribution. In state s,
a fraction µ(s) ∈ [0, 1] of students prefers A to B, where µ(·) is strictly increasing and
continuous in s.6 While we shall consider a general environment with respect to µ(·), some
result will consider a symmetric environment in which µ(s) = 1−µ(1−s) for all s ∈ [0, 1].
In a symmetric environment, the measure of students who prefer A over B is symmetric
around s = 1
2
.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, Nature draws the (aggregate uncertainty)
state s. Next, all students simultaneously apply to colleges. Each college observes the scores
of only those students who apply to it. Next, colleges simultaneously decide which applicants
to admit. Last, those students who have received at least one admission offer decide on which
offer to accept.
We assume that there is no application cost for the students, so it is a weak dominant
strategy for each student to apply to both colleges. Throughout this paper, we focus on a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which students play the weak dominant strategy.7
6There is no loss of generality to assume the uniform distribution, because for a distribution F (·) of s,
we can simply relabel s and the popularity of a college over the other is captured by µ(·).
7The strategy of applying to both colleges can be made a strictly dominant strategy if students have
some uncertainty about their scores, which is realistic in case the scores are either not publicly observable
11
Colleges distribute admissions based on students’ scores. Let α : [0, 1] → [0, 1] and
β : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be college A and B’s admission strategies, respectively, in terms of the
probability of offering an admission to each type v.
For given α(·) and β(·), let VA := {v ∈ [0, 1]|α(v) > 0} and VB := {v ∈ [0, 1]|β(v) > 0}
be the set of students to whom colleges A and B, respectively, make an admission offer with
positive probability. Let VAB := VA ∩ VB. If VAB has a positive measure in an equilibrium,
this means that a positive measure of students has admissions from both colleges. We call
such an equilibrium competitive. An equilibrium in which VAB has zero measure is called
non-competitive.
Consider a student with score v. The student will attend college A if either she is admitted
only by A, which happens with probability α(v)[1− β(v)], or admitted by both colleges but
prefers A to B, which happens with probability µ(s)α(v)β(v) in state s. Thus, the mass of




α(v)[1− β(v) + µ(s)β(v)] dG(v).




β(v)[1− α(v) + (1− µ(s))α(v)] dG(v).
Each college realizes the scores of enrolled students as its gross payoff and incurs cost λ for




vα(v)[1− β(v) + µ(s)β(v)] dG(v)− λmax {mA(s)− κ, 0}
]






vβ(v)[1− α(v) + (1− µ(s))α(v)] dG(v)− λmax {mB(s)− κ, 0}
]
.
One immediate observation is that each college’s payoff is concave in its own admission
strategy,8 that is, piA(ηα + (1 − η)α′) ≥ η piA(α) + (1 − η)piA(α′) for any feasible strategies
α and α′ and for any η ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, mixing over α’s is unprofitable for college A
(similarly β’s for college B). For this reason, any equilibrium is characterized by a pair
(α, β). Of course, this does not mean that the equilibrium is in pure-strategies; the values
of α and/or β may be strictly interior, in which case the admission strategies would involve
randomization.
In the following sections, we characterize different types of equilibria and establish their
existence. We then provide welfare and fairness properties of equilibria.
1.3 Characterization of Equilibrium
We analyze colleges’ admission decisions in this section. To this end, we fix any equilibrium
(α, β) and explore the properties the equilibrium satisfies. Later, we shall establish existence
of the equilibria. We begin with the following observations, whose proofs are in Section A.1.
Lemma 1.1. In any equilibrium (α, β), the follows hold.
(i) mA(0) ≤ κ ≤ mA(1) and mB(1) ≤ κ ≤ mB(0).
(ii) VA ∪ VB is a connected interval with sup {VA ∪ VB} = 1 and inf {VA ∪ VB} > 0.
(iii) If the equilibrium is competitive (i.e., VAB has a positive measure), then there exists
a unique (sˆA, sˆB) ∈ (0, 1)2 such that mA(sˆA) = κ and mB(sˆB) = κ.
8See Lemma A.2 in Section A.4 for the proof.
13
(iv) If the equilibrium is non-competitive (i.e., VAB has zero measure), then mA(s) =
mB(s) = κ for all s ∈ [0, 1]. Further, almost every student with v ≥ G−1(1 − 2κ) receives
an admission offer from exactly one college. That is, α(v) = 1 for almost every v ∈ VA and
β(v) = 1 for almost every v ∈ VB.
Part (i) of the lemma states that in equilibrium, colleges cannot have strict over-enrollment
and/or strict under-enrollment in all states. This is obvious since if there were over-enrollment
in all states for a college, then since λ ≥ 1, it will profitably deviate by rejecting some stu-
dents with v < 1, and if there were under-enrollment in all states, a college will likewise
profitably deviate by accepting more students. Part (ii) suggests that if a student with
score v is admitted by either college, then all students with scores higher than such v must
be admitted by some college at least with positive probability, and there is a positive mass of
students in the low tail who are never admitted by either college. Part (iii) suggests that in
a competitive equilibrium, the colleges will suffer from under-enrollment in some states and
over-enrollment in other states. This is intuitive since given (aggregately) uncertain prefer-
ences on the part of students, the presence of students who receive admissions from both
colleges presents non-trivial enrollment uncertainty. Each college will deal with uncertainty
by optimally trading off the cost of over-enrollment with the loss from under-enrollment,
thus entailing both types of mistakes depending on the states. Part (iv) states that in a
non-competitive equilibrium colleges avoid the over- and under-enrollment problems, and al-
most every top 2κ students receive admissions from only one college. This is, again, intuitive
since the colleges in this case face no enrollment uncertainty, so they will fill their capacities
exactly in all states with students who have the top 2κ scores.
In what follows, we shall focus on competitive equilibria. There are several reasons for
this. It will be seen that competitive equilibria always exist (see Theorem 1.3). By contrast,
non-competitive equilibria can be ruled out if either λ is not too large or κ is not too small
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(see Section A.2). Finally, even if a noncompetitive equilibrium exists, the characterization
provided in Lemma 1.1-(iv) is sufficient for our welfare and fairness statements, as will be
seen later.
Therefore, fix any competitive equilibrium (α, β). For ease of notation, let µ+(s) :=









α(v)Hα(v, β(v)) dG(v) + λ (1− sˆA)κ,
where µ := E[µ(s)], sˆA ∈ (0, 1) is such that mA(sˆA) = κ (as defined in Lemma 1.1-(iii)), and
Hα(v, β(v)) := v[1− β(v) + µβ(v)]− λ(1− sˆA)[1− β(v) + µ+(sˆA)β(v)]




is A’s marginal payoff from admitting a student with v for given β(·) and sˆA in equilibrium.
(We shall suppress its dependence on sˆA unless it is important.) This captures A’s local
incentive, that is, what A gains by admitting v, holding fixed its opponent’s decision and its
own decisions for the rest of the students at α(·).
Notice that the first and the second square brackets in (1.1) are the marginal payoffs
of college A from admitting type-v student when she does not receive admission from B
and when she does, respectively. Recall that the college incurs capacity cost only when
there is over-enrollment. Suppose first that a type-v student does not receive a competing
offer from B. Then, she accepts A’s admission for sure. Hence, over-enrollment occurs with
probability (1−sˆA), so the marginal cost of admitting the student is λ(1−sˆA), which explains
the second term of the first square bracket in (1.1). Suppose next that the student receives
15
0 vA vA v
“Not Admit” “Admit”“Admit only if B does not”
Hα(v, 0) < 0 Hα(v, 1) > 0Hα(v, 1) < 0 < Hα(v, 0)
Figure 1.1: A’s Admission Decision
a competing offer form B. Then, she accepts A’s offer only when she prefers A to B. Hence,
conditional on acceptance, the over-enrollment arises with probability (1− sˆA)µ+(sˆA)µ , so its
marginal cost is λ(1− sˆA)µ+(sˆA)µ , the second term in the second square bracket in (1.1).
Observe also that the likelihood of over-enrollment (conditional on acceptance) is higher




where the strict inequality follows since sˆA ∈ (0, 1) (by Lemma 1.1-(iii) and since µ+(sˆA) > µ
for sˆA > 0). That is, when the student receives an offer from B but accepts A’s offer, the
state is more likely to be high (since she is more likely to accept A’s offer when µ(s) is high
than when it is not) comparing to the case that she does not receive a competing offer.
This observation implies that Hα(v, β(v)) partitions the students’ type space into three
intervals, as depicted in Figure 1.1. For a student with v > vA := λ(1− sˆA)µ+(sˆA)µ , we have
Hα(v, 1) > 0, so college A admits such a student even if college B admits the student in
equilibrium. For a student with v < vA := λ(1 − sˆA), we have Hα(v, 0) < 0, so college A
has no incentive to admit such a student even if college B does not admits the student. For
a student with v ∈ (vA, vA), we have Hα(v, 0) > 0 but Hα(v, 1) < 0. Hence, college A has
an incentive to admit such a student if B does not admit the student, but not if college B
admits that student. Intuitively, each college considers the enrollment uncertainty worth
taking on only when the student has a sufficiently high score, and for a student with a lower
score (but above the lower cutoff), the college finds admission is worthwhile only when it is
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assured of facing no competition and thus no uncertainty in enrollment. As will be seen, the
presence of this intermediate range of scores leads to non-cutoff equilibria.
The characterization of B’s admission strategy is completely symmetric. As before, B’s




β(v)Hβ(v, α(v))dG(v) + λ sˆB κ,
where
Hβ(v, α(v)) := v[1− α(v) + (1− µ)α(v)]− λsˆB[1− α(v) + (1− µ−(sˆB))α(v)]
is B’s marginal payoff from admitting a student with score v, holding fixed A’s admission
decision and its own decisions for the remaining students at β(·). Just as before, Hβ(v, α(v))
partitions the students’ type space into three intervals separated by two threshold values
vB and vB, where vB := λ sˆB < vB := λ sˆB
1−µ−(sˆB)
1−µ , such that B admits all students with
v > vB and rejects all students with v < vB for sure, and accepts students with v ∈ (vB, vB)
if they are not admitted by A but rejects them when they are admitted by A.
Combining the two colleges’ admission decisions leads to the following characterization
of equilibria.
Theorem 1.1. In any competitive equilibrium, there exist vi < vi, i = A,B, such that
college i admits students with v > vi and students with v ∈ [vi, vj] and rejects students with
v < vi and students v ∈ [vj, vi], where j 6= i. Students with v ∈ [max {vA, vB} ,min {vA, vB}]
are admitted by at least one college with positive probability.
Theorem 1.1 describes the structure of any competitive equilibrium. Figure 1.2 depicts
a typical pure-strategy equilibrium. Here, top students with v > vA = max {vA, vB} receive




0 vB vA vB vA 1 v
1
β(v)
0 vB vA vB vA 1 v
Figure 1.2: Pure-Strategy Equilibirum
The next tier students with v ∈ (vB, vA) receive offers only from B, since A finds them
admission-worthy only if B does not admit them, but in this case, B is interested in admitting
them no matter what A does. Each of the students in the intermediate range of scores, i.e.,
[vA, vB], receives an admission offer from only one college. Obviously, how the two colleges
coordinate exactly on these students are indeterminate, and the figure depicts one possible
coordination. The students with scores v ∈ [vB, vA] receive offers only from B, since it is
the only college that finds them admission-worthy given that they are not admitted by A.
Finally, the students at the bottom below vB = min {vA, vB} do not receive any offers.
Clearly, strategic targeting occurs in this equilibrium: A college does not admit good
students because they are sought after by the other college, and it admits less attractive
students because they are not sought after by the other college. This feature stands in stark
contrast with the cutoff strategy equilibrium found by the existing literature (see Chade,




0 vB vA vB vA 1 v
1
β(v)
0 vB vA vB vA 1 v
Figure 1.3: Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium
As noted, there may be many ways for colleges to coordinate their admissions for students
with v ∈ [v˜, v˜], where v˜ := max {vA, vB} and v˜ := min {vA, vB}. The range of different
pure-strategy equilibria can be summarized by two extreme types of equilibria. We call a
competitive equilibrium an A-priority equilibrium if α(v) = 1 for all v ∈ [v˜, v˜], and a
B-priority equilibrium if β(v) = 1 for all v ∈ [v˜, v˜]. In words, in an i-priority equilibrium,
the coordination is tilted in favor of college i. Clearly, between these two equilibria, one can
construct (infinitely) many equilibria.
In practice, it is implausible for colleges to achieve the kind of precise coordination de-
scribed in the pure-strategy equilibria. It seems much more plausible for colleges to random-
ize over students with the intermediate range of scores v ∈ [v˜, v˜].9 A typical mixed-strategy
equilibrium is depicted in Figure 1.3.
9It is important to note that the thresholds are not necessarily the same as in the pure-strategies, since
different equilibria involve different cutoff states, (sˆA, sˆB), which affect the marginal payoff functions Hα
and Hβ .
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Notice that the admission strategies outside the intermediate range is similar to that in
the above pure-strategy equilibrium, as this is completely pinned down by Theorem 1.1. For
the intermediate range of scores, interior-valued admissions strategies can be structured so
as to keep each college indifferent, as follows. For each v ∈ [v˜, v˜], let α(v) = α0(v) and
β(v) = β0(v), where
Hα(v, β0(v)) = 0 and Hβ(v, α0(v)) = 0,
or equivalently,
α0(v) :=
v − λ sˆB
v µ− λ sˆB µ−(sˆB) (1.2)
and
β0(v) :=
v − λ(1− sˆA)
v(1− µ)− λ(1− sˆA)µ+(sˆA) . (1.3)
One can easily check that α0(v), β0(v) ∈ [0, 1] for v ∈ [v˜, v˜]. If college B adopts β0(v)
for a student v, then college A’s marginal gain from admitting that student is zero, so it is
indifferent about admitting that student. Here, it is college A’s best response to randomize
according to α0(·). Since Hβ(v, α0(v)) = 0, college B is indifferent, making its randomization
a best response. Observe that both α0(·) and β0(·) are increasing in v, which means that
colleges admit students with higher scores with higher probabilities. This is intuitive: A
higher score student is more valuable all else equal, so a high probability of admission for a
high score student is necessary to keep the opponent college indifferent. It is also interesting
to observe discrete jumps in this figure — α0(vA) > 0 and β0(vB) < 1. The former follows
from the fact that vA > vB which implies Hβ(vA, 0) > 0, and the latter follows from vA > vB
which implies Hα(vB, 1) < 0.
There could be many ways for colleges to play mixed-strategies: For instance, colleges
could coordinate to use a pure-strategy for some students, say [vˆ, v˜] for some vˆ ∈ (v˜, v˜), and




0 vB vB vA vA 1 v
1
β(v)
0 vB vB vA vA 1 v
Figure 1.4: Cutoff-Strategy Equilibrium
mixed equilibrium (MME, in short) in which both colleges play mixed-strategies (α0, β0)
for students with v ∈ [v˜, v˜] and according to Theorem 1.1 for outside that range.
The characterization of equilibria has so far rested on the necessary conditions for com-
petitive equilibria, particularly the “local” incentive compatibility with respect to each type
of students. Whether the preceding characterizations based on MME and i-priority equi-
libria admit a well-defined strategy profile and, if so, whether they constitute competitive
equilibria are not clear. We shall address these issues in the next subsection.
Before proceeding, though, it is important to recognize that the randomization by colleges
results from their attempts to avoid competition for students in the intermediate range of
scores. In this sense, as long as a competitive equilibrium admits the intermediate region, i.e.,
if v˜ < v˜, one can say that equilibrium involves strategic targeting, regardless of whether the
colleges play a mixed-strategy or a pure-strategy. Formally, we say an competitive equilibrium
exhibits strategic targeting if v˜ < v˜.
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When do competitive equilibria exhibit strategic targeting and when do not? Certainly,
Theorem 1.1 does not preclude a competitive equilibrium in which v˜ = min {vA, vB} <
max {vA, vB} = v˜. Figure 1.4 depicts such a possibility with vB < vB < vA < vA. As before,
college i admits students with v > vi and rejects those with v < vi. Observe that college A
does not admit any student with v ∈ [vA, vA], since college B admits them for sure (because
vB < vA). Even though colleges have targeting incentives in this example, the resulting
equilibrium is indistinguishable from the cutoff equilibria featured in the existing research.
A natural question is when such an equilibrium can be ruled out. The exact condition
for its existence appears difficult to find, but we show next that the symmetric environment
is sufficient to guarantee strategic targeting behavior.
Theorem 1.2. If the environment is symmetric (i.e., µ(s) = 1 − µ(1 − s) for all s), then
every competitive equilibrium exhibits strategic targeting.
Proof. See Section A.3. 
1.3.1 Existence of MME and i-Priority Equilibrium
We now show that there exists an equilibrium in which α(·) and β(·) involve maximal mixing,
or A- or B-priority.10
Theorem 1.3. There exists a competitive equilibrium with maximal mixing, or A- or B-
priority.
Sketch of Proof. The proof involves three steps. The first step shows the existence of
admission strategies that provide optimal local incentives for each other college. The second
10Note that a general equilibrium existence follows from the Glicksberg-Fan theorem, since each college’s
strategy space is compact and convex, and each college’s payoff function is concave in its own strategy. That
is, if one does not insist on the particular structure of behavior we impose on MME (or A- or B-priority), it
is easy to show the existence of equilibrium admission strategies.
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step shows that VAB has a positive measure in the identified strategy profile. The last step
shows that the identified strategies are indeed mutual (global) best responses.
Step 1: For the first step, we prove that there exists (α, β) : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2 such that
for each v ∈ [0, 1],
α(v; sˆ) =

1 if Hα(v, 1; sˆ) > 0
0 if Hα(v, 1; sˆ) < 0, Hβ(v, 1; sˆ) > 0
α0(v; sˆ) if Hα(v, 1; sˆ) < 0 < Hα(v, 0; sˆ), Hβ(v, 1; sˆ) < 0 < Hβ(v, 0; sˆ)
1 if Hα(v, 0; sˆ) > 0, Hβ(v, 0; sˆ) < 0





1 if Hβ(v, 1; sˆ) > 0
0 if Hβ(v, 1; sˆ) < 0, Hα(v, 1) > 0
β0(v; sˆ) if Hβ(v, 1; sˆ) < 0 < Hβ(v, 0; sˆ), Hα(v, 1; sˆ) < 0 < Hα(v, 0; sˆ)
1 if Hβ(v, 0; sˆ) > 0, Hα(v, 0; sˆ) < 0
0 if Hβ(v, 0; sˆ) < 0
, (1.5)
where α0(·) satisfies Hβ(v, α0(v)) = 0 for v ∈ [v˜, v˜], as given by (1.2), and β0(·) satisfies
Hα(v, β0(v)) = 0 for v ∈ [v˜, v˜], as given by (1.3), and sˆ = (sˆA, sˆB) satisfies
sˆA = inf {s ∈ [0, 1]|mA(s)− κ > 0} ,
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if the set in the RHS is nonempty, or else sˆA ≡ 1, and
sˆB = sup {s ∈ [0, 1]|mB(s)− κ > 0} ,
if the set in the RHS is nonempty, or else sˆB ≡ 0.
In other words, the strategy profile is required to satisfy the conditions of MME based on
the local incentives Hα and Hβ. One can also easily structure the strategy profile to satisfy
the requirements of an A-priority equilibrium by replacing α0(·) and β0(·) with 1 and 0,
respectively, and of a B-priority equilibrium by replacing them with 0 and 1, respectively.
To prove the existence of such a strategy profile, we construct a mapping T : S → S,
where S := [0, 1]2, and show that its fixed point exists, and given its fixed point (sˆ∗A, sˆ
∗
B),
the profile (α(·; sˆ∗A, sˆ∗B), β(·; sˆ∗A, sˆ∗B)) satisfies (1.4) and (1.5).
To begin, fix any sˆ = (sˆA, sˆB) ∈ S, and consider the resulting profile (α(·; sˆ), β(·; sˆ)).
This strategy profile in turn induces the mass of students enrolling in colleges A and B.




α(v; sˆ)[1− β(v; sˆ) + µ(s)β(v; sˆ)] dG(v)




β(v; sˆ)[1− α(v; sˆ) + (1− µ(s))α(v; sˆ)] dG(v).
Observe that mA(·; sˆ) and mB(·; sˆ) in turn yield a new profile of cutoff states:
s˜A = inf {s ∈ [0, 1]|mA(s; sˆ)− κ > 0} ,
24
if the set in the RHS is nonempty, or else s˜A ≡ 1, and similarly s˜B for college B.
s˜B = sup {s ∈ [0, 1]|mB(s; sˆ)− κ > 0} ,
if the set in the RHS is nonempty, or else s˜B ≡ 0.
We then define T such that T (sˆ) = s˜. We show in Section A.4 that T is a continuous map.
Therefore, it has a fixed point by the Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. From the construction
of T , it is immediate that, given the fixed point sˆ∗, s˜ = sˆ∗, the profile (α(·; sˆ∗), β(·; sˆ∗))
satisfies (1.4) and (1.5).
Step 2: For the second step, we show that VAB has a positive measure in the strategy
profile identified in Step 1. To prove, suppose to the contrary that VAB has measure zero.
Then, sˆ∗B = 0 and sˆ
∗
A = 1. But in that case, Hα(v, 1) > 0 and Hβ(v, 1) > 0 for all v. Hence,
vA = vB = 0. Thus, we cannot have a non-competitive equilibrium.
Step 3: Observe that the strategy profile (α, β) identified in Step 1 forms best responses
but based on the local incentives of the colleges — namely, (α, β) entails no incentive for
each college to unilaterally deviate in its admission decision on each student, holding constant
its own admission strategies with respect to the other students. Hence, it does not rule out
profitable deviation in its admission decisions on a mass of students. The third step shows
that such deviation is not profitable; that is, the identified strategies are mutual (global)
best responses.
To this end, let α˜(v) ∈ [0, 1] be an arbitrary strategy for v ∈ [0, 1], and consider a
variation of α(·) such that for any t ∈ [0, 1],
α(v; t) := tα˜(v) + (1− t)α(v).
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where sˆA(t) is the threshold state given by α(v; t).
Observe that piA(α˜) = V (1) and piA(α) = V (0). Therefore, the proof is completed by
showing that V (1) ≤ V (0). Because α˜(·) is arbitrary, this will prove that α(·) is a best
response for a given β(·).
To see this, observe first that V (·) is concave in t since piA is concave in α (which follows
from the enrollment uncertainty) and α(v; t) is linear in t (see Lemma A.3). Therefore, we
have
piA(α˜; β) = V (1) ≤ V (0) + V ′(0). (1.6)




[α˜(v)− α(v)]Hα(v, β(v)) dG(v) ≤ 0, (1.7)
where the inequality holds since if Hα(v, β(v)) > 0 for some v, then α(v) = 1 and α˜(v) ≤ 1
for such v; if Hα(v, β(v)) < 0 for some v, then α(v) = 0 and α˜(v) ≥ 0 for such v; and
Hα(v, β(v)) = 0 otherwise.
Combining (1.6) and (1.7), we conclude that
piA(α˜) = V (1) ≤ V (0) + V ′(0) ≤ V (0) = piA(α),
and this completes the proof.
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1.3.2 Properties of Equilibria
We have seen that the equilibrium outcome involves strategic targeting. We now consider
the implications of the equilibria in welfare and fairness.
Let us first define assignment and outcome. For a fixed s, an assignment is a mapping
from V × {A,B} to {A,B} ∪ {∅}, where V = [0, 1] is the students’ score space. That is,
an assignment is an allocation of students to colleges where each student has a score and
preference over A and B and no student is assigned to more than one college. An outcome
is a mapping from a state to an assignment, i.e., the realized allocation in state s.
We say that a student has a justified envy if she prefers a college to the one he enrolls
in, even though the former enrolls a student with a lower score. An outcome is said to be
fair if for almost every state, the assignment it selects has no justified envy for almost all
students. Next, an outcome is Pareto efficient if for almost every state, the assignment
it selects is not Pareto dominated, i.e., there is no other assignment in which both colleges
and all students are weakly better off and either there is a college that is strictly better
off or there is a positive measure of students who are strictly better off, relative to the
initial assignment. One may be interested in students’ welfare taking colleges as exogenous
resources of the society. We say that an outcome is student efficient if for almost every
state, there is no other assignment in which all students are weakly better off and a positive
measure of students are strictly better off relative to the initial assignment that the outcome
selects. Finally, we may consider college’s welfare only. An outcome is said to be college
efficient if for almost every state, no other assignment can make both colleges weakly better
off and at lease one college strictly better off relative to the assignment that the outcome
selects.
The next theorem states properties of equilibria that arise in decentralized matching.
Theorem 1.4. (i) Any non-competitive equilibrium is unfair, student inefficient, but college
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efficient.
(ii) Any non-competitive equilibrium is Pareto inefficient unless almost every student
admitted by one college has higher score than those admitted by the other college.
(iii) Any competitive equilibrium is college inefficient and Pareto inefficient.
(iv) Any MME with v˜ < v˜ is unfair and student inefficient.
(v) Any competitive equilibrium with v˜ < v˜ is fair and student efficient.
Proof. Consider non-competitive equilibrium first.
Proof of (i). Consider any non-competitive equilibrium. For each state s except µ(s) = 0
or 1, the equilibrium must admit a positive measure of students who prefer A but are assigned
to B, and a positive measure of students who are assigned to A but have scores lower than
those of the first group of students; that is, justified envy arises. Since justified envy arises
for a positive measure of students for almost every state,11 the outcome is unfair. Also, for
almost every state, there must be a positive measure of students assigned to A but prefer B
and a positive measure of students assigned to B but prefer A. Thus, the outcome is student
inefficient. Next, the equilibrium is college efficient. To see this, observe first that in any non-
competitive equilibrium, almost all top 2κ students are assigned to either college. Suppose
now that for a given state, there is another assignment that makes both colleges weakly
better off and at least one college strictly better off. Then, it must also admit almost all top
2κ students, or else at least one college is strictly worse off. Therefore, it is a reallocation of
the initial assignment, hence if one college is strictly better off, then the other college must
be strictly worse off. Thus, we reach a contraction. 
Proof of (ii). Suppose that almost all top κ students are assigned to one college, and the
next top κ students are assigned to the other college. Then, any change of assignments by
11since µ(·) is strictly increasing and continuous in s, µ(s) ∈ (0, 1) for almost every state.
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positive measure of students will leave the former college strictly worse off, hence it is Pareto
efficient.
Suppose it is not the case in a non-competitive equilibrium. Note that for a fixed s, there
are some V ′i,V ′′i ⊂ Vi and V ′j ⊂ Vj, i 6= j, all with positive measures, such that v′ < vˆ < v′′
whenever v′ ∈ V ′i, v′′ ∈ V ′′i and vˆ ∈ V ′j. Let i = A and j = B without loss of generality. We




















(If either (1.8) or (1.9) is violated, we can adjust V ′A, V ′′A and/or V ′B by adding or subtracting
a positive mass of students.) Note that the LHS (resp. RHS) of (1.9) is the measure of
students who prefer B (resp. A) in V ′A ∪ V ′′A (resp. V ′B). From (1.8), we have∫
V ′A∪V ′′A
v dG(v)

























where the first equivalence follows from (1.9). The last equivalence shows that the average
value of students who prefer B in V ′A ∪ V ′′A is the same as that of students who prefer A
in V ′B. Thus, in state s, a fraction 1 − µ(s) of students in V ′A ∪ V ′′A who prefer B to A can
be swapped with a fraction of µ(s) of students in V ′B who prefer A to B. This reassignment
leaves both colleges the same in welfare and makes all students weakly better of and some
positive measure of students strictly better off. Since this argument holds for all s except
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µ(s) = 0 or 1, the outcome is Pareto inefficient. 
Consider now competitive equilibrium.
Proof of (iii). Recall that there are cutoff states (sˆA, sˆB) such that colleges have a mass of
unfilled seats in a positive measure of states, [0, sˆA) for A and (sˆB, 1] for B, despite the fact
that there are unmatched and acceptable students (inf {VA ∪ VB} > 0 in Lemma 1.1-(ii)).
Assigning those unmatched students to a college with excess capacity improves the social
welfare. Thus, it is college inefficient and Pareto inefficient. 
Proof of (iv). Consider a MME with v˜ < v˜. Fix a state s such that µ(s) 6= 0, 1. For
those students in [v˜, v˜], there is a positive measure of students who are assigned to a college,
say B, but prefer A, and their scores are higher than a positive measure of students who
are assigned to A, even though both colleges prefer the high-score students. Moreover,
students in [v˜, v˜] get zero admissions with positive probabilities even when their scores are
high. Thus, it entails justified envy for a positive measure of states for almost every state.
Student inefficiency follows from that for almost every state, there are two groups of positive
measure of students in [v˜, v˜], one preferring A but assigned to B and the other preferring B
but assigned to A. 
Proof of (v). Consider a competitive equilibrium with v˜ < v˜. Let vB < vA, as depicted
in Figure 1.4, without loss of generality, so college B alon admits students with scores in
[vB, vA] and those with v > vA are admitted by both colleges.
Only the students who are not admitted by either college or admitted only by college B
may have envies. However, the students whom they envy have higher scores. So, no justified
envy arises in every state s, making the outcome fair. For student efficiency, observe that
those students who are admitted by both colleges choose their preferred college. Hence,
they cannot be better off from swapping their assignments with others. Next, those who are
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admitted only by B may prefer A, but there are no students assigned to A who prefer B
to A. Thus, the outcome is student efficient.  
1.4 Evaluation Distortion in the Presence of Multidi-
mensional Performance Measures
The common performance measure in the baseline model is special. In practice, colleges value
multiple dimensions of students’ qualities and performance. Often colleges evaluate students
based not just on academic performance measure but also on other non-academic measure.
Some performance dimensions are more common to colleges than others. For instance, the
SAT scores or grade points average of students are commonly observed and interpreted
virtually the same by colleges. Non-academic performance measures are often rich and
not summarized by objectively agreed indices; and colleges may consider different aspects
and may use their information differently. For instance, some colleges may pay attention to
students’ community service or leadership activities. Others may pay more attention to extra
curricular activities such as musical or athletic talents. So colleges’ evaluation of students
on these dimensions are likely to be less correlated. We show that strategic targeting entails
evaluation distortion placing excessive weight on non-common performances.
To this end, we extend our model as follows. A student’s type is described as a triple
(v, e, e′) ∈ V×E×E ′ ≡ [0, 1]3, where v is distributed according toG(·) with density g(·), and e
and e′ are conditionally independent on v and are distributed according to X(·|v) and Y (·|v),
respectively, which admit densities x(·|v) and y(·|v). We also assume that Xv(e|v) < 0 and
Yv(e
′|v) < 0 for all e, e′ ∈ [0, 1]. That is, a student with higher v has a higher probability to
have higher e and e′. We also assume full support of G, X, Y . College A only values (v, e) and
collegeB only cares about (v, e′). Specifically, we assume college A derives payoff U(v, e) from
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matriculating student with type (v, e, e′), where U is strictly increasing and differentiable in
both arguments. Likewise, college B realizes payoff V (v, e′) from matriculating the same
type of student, where V is strictly increasing and differentiable in (v, e′).
One interpretation is that v is an academic performance measure observed commonly to
both colleges, and e and e′ correspond to different dimensions of extra curricular activities
that the two colleges focus on. Alternatively, v is a student’s test scores of the nation-
wide exam, and e and e′ may represent a student’s performance on college-specific tests or
interviews.12
College A’s strategy is now described as a mapping α : V ×E → [0, 1] with the interpre-
tation that the college admits a student with type (v, e) with probability α(v, e). Likewise,
college B’s strategy is described by a mapping β : V × E ′ → [0, 1]. The enrollment un-
certainty facing college A with regard to a student type (v, e) depends on whether that
student receives admission from college B. But since e′ is conditionally uncorrelated with e,
the probability that student type (v, e) receives admission from B is β(v) := Ee′ [β(v, e′)|v].
Likewise α(v) := Ee[α(v, e)|v] is relevant for college B to assess its enrollment uncertainty.






α(v, e)[1− β(v) + µ(s)β(v)]dX(v|e)dG(v).












Hα(v, e, β(v)) dX(e|v) dG(v) + λ (1− sˆA)κ,
12In Korea, for instance, students take a nationwide exam and each college has its own essay tests and/or
oral interviews. In Japan, there is a nationwide exam called National Center Test (NCT). Public universities







Figure 1.5: College’s Cutoff Locus
where µ := E[µ(s)], sˆA ∈ (0, 1) is such that mA(sˆA) = κ, µ+(sˆA) := E[µ(s)|s > sˆA] and
Hα(v, e, β(v)) := U(v, e)[1− β(v) + µβ(v)]− λ(1− sˆA)
(
1− β(v) + µ+(sˆA)β(v)
)
. (1.10)
We focus on a cutoff strategy equilibrium in which college A admits student type (v, e)
if and only if e ≥ η(v) for some η nonincreasing in v and college B admits student type
(v, e′) if and only if e′ ≥ ξ(v) for some ξ nonincreasing in v. For instance, the shaded area in
Figure 1.5 depicts the types of students college A may admit under a cutoff strategy. Such
an equilibrium is quite plausible here since the use of non-common performance measure
by the colleges lessens their head-on competition and the associated enrollment uncertainty.
Section A.9 provides a condition under which cutoff equilibrium exists.
The question we focus here is whether the colleges may further reduce the head-on
competition and the enrollment uncertainty by placing more weight on the non-common
performance measures relative to their common preferences. Consider college A. (Col-
lege B’s incentive will be analogous.) Inspection of college A’s preference makes it clear
that under the cutoff equilibrium college A must accept student types (v, e) if and only if
Hα(v, e, β(v)) ≥ 0. In particular, the cutoff locus e = η(v) must satisfy Hα(v, η(v), β(v)) = 0
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whenever η(v) ∈ (0, 1). Its slope −η′(v) shows the “relative worth” of a student’s common
performance v in A’s evaluation of the student, as measured in the units of students’ non-
common performance college is willing to give up to obtain a unit increase in her common
performance. The higher this value is, the higher weight college A places on the common
performance. In particular, we shall say that the college under-weights a student’s common
performance v and over-weights her non-common performance e if for all v,
−η′(v) ≤ Uv(v, η(v))
Ue(v, η(v))
and the inequality is strict for a positive measure of v. Suppose for instance U(v, e) =
(1 − ρ)v + ρe, then the condition means that −η′(v) ≤ 1−ρ
ρ
, so the college places a weight
less than 1 − ρ to common performance v and the weight of more than ρ to non-common
performance e.
Theorem 1.5. In a cutoff equilibrium, each college under-weights a student’s common per-
formance and over-weights her non-common performance.
Proof. Suppose there is a cutoff equilibrium with strategy profiles (α, β) where α(v, e) =
1{e≥η(v)} and β(v, e′) = 1{e′≥ξ(v)}, for some η(·) and ξ(·) which are nonincreasing.
Here, we focus on college A, since college B’s behavior is analogous. Since Ue > 0, by the
Implicit Function Theorem, Hα(v, e, β(v)) = 0 implicitly defines η(v). Since µ+(sˆA) > µ, we
must have
1− β(v) + µ+(sˆA)β(v) > 1− β(v) + µβ(v).
Then, Hα(v, η(v), β(v)) = 0 implies that
U(v, η(v)) > λ(1− sˆA). (1.11)
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Next, totally differentiate Hα to obtain:




1− β(v) + µβ(v)
(





Since college B adopts a cutoff strategy, β(v) = 1− Y (ξ(v)|v), we have that
β
′
(v) = −y(ξ(v)|v)ξ′(v)− Yv(ξ(v)|v) > 0, (1.13)
where the inequality holds since ξ′(v) ≤ 0 and Yv(e|v) < 0.13
Further, µ < µ+(sˆA) ≤ 1, so it follows from (1.11) that the RHS of (1.12) is strictly
positive for any v such that η(v) ∈ (0, 1). Hence, for all v,
− η′(v) ≤ Uv(v, η(v))
Ue(v, η(v))
, (1.14)
and the inequality is strict for a positive measure of v. 
1.5 Coordinated Matching: Self-Targeting
So far, we have characterized the pattern of colleges’ strategic targeting and provided exis-
tence and welfare and fairness properties of such equilibria. And we also show that when
students’s types are multidimensional, strategic targeting entails evaluation distortion, that
is, colleges place more weights on non-common performance than on common performance.
In the current and the following sections, we study two common ways for colleges to alle-
13When v and e are independent, β
′
(v) = −y(ξ(v))ξ′(v) ≥ 0. This implies that each college under-weights
a students’ common performance and over-weights her non-common performance at least weakly and one
college does so strictly. Further, together with college B’s condition (total differentiation of Hβ), one can
show that β
′
(v) > 0 for a positive measure of v, generically.
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viate their yield management burden in decentralized matching. We consider the case that
students’ type is single dimensional as in the baseline model.
We begin with students’ self-targeting : Colleges coordinate to limit the set of schools to
which students can apply, thereby forcing students to “self-target” colleges. For instance,
students cannot apply to both Cambridge and Oxford in the UK, and applicants in Japan
can only apply to one public university.14 In Korea, all schools (more precisely, college-
department pairs) are partitioned into three groups, and students are allowed to apply to
only one in each group.
This method alleviates colleges’ yield management problem by improving the odds of
enrollment for the colleges, since students apply only to those colleges that they are mostly
likely to accept when admitted.15 In our model with two colleges, if the number of ap-
plications is restricted to one, colleges face no enrollment uncertainty because no student
admitted by a college will turn down its offer. However, students’ application behavior will
be strategic; thus, the overall welfare effects are not clear a priori.
We now provide a simple model showing students’ application behavior when the students
can apply to only one of the two colleges. To this end, we introduce students’ cardinal
preferences for colleges.16 Each student has a taste y ∈ [0, 1], which is independent of score
v ∈ [0, 1]. A student with taste y obtains payoff y from attending college A and 1− y from
attending college B. Thus, students with y ∈ [0, 1
2
] prefer B to A, and those with y ∈ [1
2
, 1]
14More precisely, public schools may hold three exams. The first one is called “zenki(former period)-exam”
and the last one is called “koki(later-period)-exam”. There are very small number of schools that have exam
between theses two exams. Students can apply to at most one public school at each exam date but the
deadline for registering to the school that a student is admitted at zenki-exam is earlier than the date for
applying the koki-exam.
15Although there is no such restriction in the US, high application fees may serve this role. See Chade and
Smith (2006) and Chade, Lewis, and Smith (2011) for students application decisions subject to application
costs, without aggregate uncertainty.
16Note that this does not alter the previous analyses, because even if students have cardinal preferences,
it is still a weak dominant strategy for students to apply to both colleges in the previous model.
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prefer A to B. To facilitate the analysis, we assume that colleges observe an applicant’s
score v but not her preference y, while each student knows her preference y but not her
score v.17 In reality, even though students submit their records to colleges, they do not
know precisely how they are ranked by colleges. See Avery and Levin (2010) for a similar
treatment.
A student’s taste y is drawn according to a distribution that depends on the underlying
state. For a given s, let K(y|s) be the distribution of y with a density function k(y|s). Then,
µ(s) ≡ 1 − K(1
2
|s) is the mass of students who prefer A to B in state s. We assume that
k(y|s) is continuous and obeys (strict) monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP). That is,





meaning that a student’s taste is more likely to be high in a high state. We further assume
that there is δ such that
∣∣∣ky(y|s)k(y|s) ∣∣∣ < δ for any y ∈ [0, 1] and s ∈ [0, 1], which means that
students’ tastes changes moderately according to states. Each student with taste y forms a
posterior belief about the states,
l(s|y) := k(y|s)∫ 1
0
k(y|s)ds.
Before proceeding, we make the following observations: First, for the students, applying
to a school dominates not applying at all. Second, since students do not know their scores
and their preferences are independent of the scores, students’ applications depend only on
their preferences. Third, since students’ preferences depend on states, the mass of students
applying to each college varies across states. Let ni(s) be the mass of students who apply to
17This also does not alter the previous analyses, because if students do not know their scores perfectly,
then it is a strict dominant strategy for them to apply to both colleges when there is no restriction on the
number of applications (see footnote 7).
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college i = A,B in state s.
Consider colleges’ admissions decisions. Since a college faces no enrollment uncertainty,
a cutoff strategy is optimal. If ni(s) ≥ κ in state s, then college i will set its cutoff so as to
admit students up to its capacity. Otherwise, it will admit all applicants. More precisely,
the cutoff of college i in state s, denoted by ci(s), is given by
ci(s) := inf {c ∈ [0, 1] |ni(s)[1−G(c)] ≤ κ} .
Consider now students’ application decisions. Fix any σ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] which maps from






Clearly, nB(s) = 1− nA(s). A student with taste y has a probability of being admitted by i








for i = A,B. Note that a student with taste y will apply
to A if and only if
yPA(y|σ) ≥ (1− y)PB(y|σ).
or equivalently,
T (y|σ) := yPA(y|σ)− (1− y)PB(y|σ) ≥ 0.
Lemma 1.2. Suppose δ ≤ 1
2
. Any equilibrium involves cutoff strategy where students wit
y ≥ yˆ apply to A and those with y < yˆ apply to B. And such an equilibrium exists.
We defer the proof to Section A.5. By the lemma, we can focus on cutoff equilibrium.




















Figure 1.6: Equilibrium Assignment when κ = 0.4
to A is nA(s) =
∫ 1
yˆ
k(y|s)dy = 1−K(yˆ|s), and similarly nB(s) = K(yˆ|s).
Theorem 1.6. Suppose µ(s) ≥ 1
2
for all s Then, yˆ ∈ [1
2
, 1), where yˆ is the equilibrium cutoff.
The proof is found in Section A.5. Theorem 1.6 shows students’ strategic applications
when college A is more popular than the other for all states. Consider a student with taste y




then it is optimal for her to apply to B. If the student prefers A (y ≥ 1
2
), then there is a
trade-off since her payoff is higher if she can attend A over B, but she believes that she has
a higher chance of admission to B. Thus, if she only mildly prefers A, then she may apply
to B instead of A. We provide a simple example with two states to illustrate the results.
Figure 1.6 depicts the equilibrium assignments of the example.
Example 1.1. Suppose that there are two states a and b with equal probability. Let K(y|a) =
y2, K(y|b) = y and κ = 0.4. Then, we have
yˆ nA(a) nB(a) cA(a) cB(a) nA(b) nB(b) cA(b) cB(b)
0.547 0.701 0.299 0.429 0 0.453 0.547 0.116 0.269
39
Observe that if ni(s) ≥ κ for all s and all i = A,B, then the self-targeting eliminates
colleges’ yield management problem, since each college fills its capacity with the best students
among those who applied to it. However, it does not hold in general because there can be
under-subscription to a college in some state. In the above example, for instance, the mass
of applicants to college B in state a is smaller than its capacity (nB(a) = 0.299 < κ = 0.4).
Let us now consider welfare and fairness properties of the equilibrium outcome. First,
the equilibrium is unfair. That is, justified envy arises in that (i) students who happen to
have applied to a more popular school for a given state may be unassigned even though their
scores could have been good enough for the other school (see Figure 1.6(a)); and (ii) students
who mildly prefer the popular school to the less popular one may be assigned to the latter
college even though they could have been assigned to the popular one (see Figure 1.6(b)).
Second, there can be under-subscription to a college in equilibrium so that its capacity
is not filled even though there are unassigned, acceptable students. By assigning those
students to unfilled seats of a college, both the students and college will be better off. Thus,
the equilibrium outcome is still Pareto, student and college inefficient.
In the next theorem, we provide conditions under which justified envy among students
and/or under-subscription to a college arise. If there is a college that suffers from under-
subscription, then the equilibrium outcome is not Pareto and student efficient as discussed
above.
Theorem 1.7. Suppose µ(s) ≥ 1
2
for all s. Then, there exists a positive mass of students
who have justified envy. Suppose K(yˆ|s) < κ for a positive measure of states s, where yˆ is
the cutoff defined in Theorem 1.6. Then, college B suffers from under-subscription, and the
assignment is Pareto, student and college inefficient.
The first part of the theorem provides a sufficient condition under which justified envy
arises. Observe that justified envy arises whenever cA(s) 6= cB(s). Suppose cA(s) > cB(s).
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Then, the students with scores in [cB(s), cA(s)] and tastes in [yˆ, 1] are not assigned to any
school, even though their scores are good enough to be assigned to college B. Suppose






) are assigned to B, even though their scores are good enough to be assigned to A; and
those with scores in [cA(s), cB(s)] and tastes in [0, yˆ] are not assigned to any school, even
though their scores are good enough for college A. We show in Section A.5 that there is a
positive measure of states in which cA(s) 6= cB(s).
To see the second part of the theorem, recall that for given yˆ in equilibrium, the mass
of students applying to B is K(yˆ|s). Thus, if there is a positive measure of states in which
K(yˆ|s) < κ, college B faces under-subscription in such states (as state a in the above
example). Therefore, the equilibrium outcome is inefficient.
1.6 Sequential Admissions
In this section, we consider sequential admissions using waiting lists, another way of alle-
viating enrollment uncertainty that colleges use in decentralized matching. In France and
Korea, for instance, colleges initially make admission offers to students up to their capacity
limits, filling any declined seats with offers to students on the waiting list.
Even though this method may generate more admission offers and acceptances than
the baseline model or self-targeting, we show that it is not enough to eliminate congestion
altogether, and colleges may still want to engage in strategic targeting.
The main intuition is as follows. Suppose a college, say A, wishes to make admission
offers to the most preferred candidates up to its capacity, who are also sought after by other
colleges, planning to approach the next best students in the case that some of those first
group of students turn its offer down. Often, college A is uncertain if the next best students
are willing to wait for it when a less popular college approaches to them in the first round.
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Each of those students may also be uncertain about the likelihood that college A finds her
acceptable, and hence she may accept the less popular college’s admission offer immediately.
This uncertainty means that when college A is turned down by some of the first group of
students, it may not have the second best group of students available. In fact, the students
who are available at that point are far worse than the second best group of students, hence
college A may wish to directly offer admissions to some of those second group of students
instead of some of the first group of students.
We provide a simple model to formalize the intuition. There are three colleges, A, B
and C, each with a mass κ < 1
3
capacity. There is a unit mass of students with score v,
where v is distributed over [0, 1] according to G(·) as before. All students like A and B better
than C, but C is sufficiently better than not attending any school. Colleges’ preferences are
given by students’ scores, but for each student, there is a probability ε that colleges A and B
find that the student is unacceptable. College C simply likes students according to v’s.
There are two states, a and b. In state i, i = a, b, a fraction si of students gets utility u
from A and u′ from B, and the remaining 1−si students have the opposite preference, where
sa = 1 − sb > 12 . In either state, students get utility u′′ from C, where u > u′ > u′′ and
u′′ > (1 − ε)u. The latter assumption means that even for a small uncertainty about the
students’ acceptability by the better school, the certain utility from college C of a student is
greater than the uncertain utility from the better school. Note that in state a, the mass of




and in state b, the former is smaller than the latter (sb <
1
2
< 1 − sb). Note that A and B
are ex ante symmetric.
Suppose the capacity cost is prohibitively high so that at each time a college makes
admission decisions, it must be sure that the capacity will never be violated. The sequential
admissions game has the following feature. In each round, the colleges make admission offers
to a set of students and wait-list the remaining. The students who received offer(s) from
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college(s) must decide to accept or reject the offer immediately. After the first round, colleges
A and B learn the state, so the game effectively ends in two rounds.
We show that there is no symmetric equilibrium in which both colleges A and B use a
cutoff strategy (i.e., admit the top κ students among those who are acceptable) in the first
round. We then consider a simpler example and analyze equilibrium admission strategies,
which shows that colleges still engage in strategic targeting. The equilibrium outcome of the
example shows that the sequential admissions may entail justified envy and inefficiency.
Theorem 1.8. There is no symmetric equilibrium in which A and B offer admissions to
the top κ students (excluding those whom they find unacceptable) in the first round.
Sketch of Proof. Suppose there is such an equilibrium to the contrary. Then, colleges A
and B will admit all acceptable students with v > vˆ, where vˆ is such that each of A and
B fills its capacity in the popular state, i.e., sa(1 − ε)[1 − G(vˆ)] = κ (or equivalently,
(1 − sb)(1 − ε)[1 − G(vˆ)] = κ), and wait-lists the remaining students. College C will offer
admissions to all of these students (i.e., those whose values are above vˆ), knowing that
exactly measure ε2 of them will accept its offer (since those are not acceptable for both A
and B). It will also offer κ − ε2 admissions to all students with v ∈ [v˜, vˆ], where v˜ is such
that G(vˆ)−G(v˜) = κ− ε2.
The students in [v˜, vˆ] now have a choice to make. If a student accepts C, then she will
get u′′ for sure, but if she turns down C’s offer, then with probability 1− ε the less popular
one between A and B will offer an admission to her (assuming all other students admitted
by C have accepted that offer), and the student will earn the payoff u if she happens to like
the college, or u′ otherwise. Since u′′ > (1− ε)u, she will accept C immediately.
Given this, consider now the incentive for deviation of A. If it does not deviate, there
will be seats left, equal to κ − sb(1 − ε)[1 − G(vˆ)], in the less popular state. Thus, A will
fill them with students whose scores are below v˜ (since those with scores in [v˜, vˆ] are taken
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by C). Suppose now that college A admits a small fraction, say δ′, of (acceptable) students
just below vˆ instead of admitting those who are acceptable and slightly above vˆ, say [vˆ, vˆ+δ],
where δ and δ′ are such that
G(vˆ + δ)−G(vˆ) = G(vˆ)−G(vˆ − δ′). (1.16)
Then, college A benefits from this deviation for sufficiently small δ. The reason is as
follows. The loss from this deviation is that when A is popular, it will get a worse group;
and even in the unpopular state, sb fraction of these students are replaced by the worse
group. But, the gain is that when A is unpopular, it will get a discretely better group of
students for the sa − sb fraction of the vacant seats. Thus, for sufficiently small δ, the order
of magnitude for the gain is greater than that for the loss. We relegate a formal proof for
this to Section A.6. 
We now consider equilibrium admission strategies in a simpler example.
Example 1.2. There are three students, 1, 2 and 3, with scores v1 > v2 > v3, where v2 >
1
2
(v1+v3). There are three colleges, A, B and C, and each of them has one seat to fill. Colleges
value students with score vi at vi, but student 2 has an ε chance of being unacceptable by
either A or B, where ε < v1−v2
v2−v3 . All students like A and B better than C, as in the above
model. Students have a uniform preference (i.e., their preference orderings for colleges are
the same). They receive utility u from A and u′ from B, or u′ from A and u from B with





The timing of the game is the same as before.
Before proceeding on what equilibrium may arise, it is useful to begin with a few observa-
tions. First, colleges never make an admission offer to student 3 before they offer admissions
to 1 and 2 (when 2 is acceptable), since the worst case for them is to have 3, which is always
44
possible. Second, the result of Theorem 1.8 still works in this example. That is, there is no
equilibrium in which both colleges A and B make admission offers to student 1 for sure (i.e.,
they use a cutoff strategy).18
Consider now the following equilibrium. In the first round, college C offers admission to
student 2 for sure, and both A and B admit student 1 with probability p = v1−v2−ε(v2−v3)
(1−ε)(v2−v3)
and student 2 with probability 1− p, whenever they find that 2 is acceptable. Each college
then places the other students whom they do not admit on the waiting list.
Note that p makes the other college indifferent. That is, when a college, say B, offers
admission to student 1, its payoff is
[
(1− p)(1− ε) + 1
2
(1− (1− p)(1− ε))]v1 + 12(1− (1− p)(1− ε))v3. (1.17)
Here, (1 − p)(1 − ε) is the probability that A offers admission to student 2 when she is
acceptable. In this case, student 1 accepts B immediately, or else she will get an offer
from C in the second round (because A offers admission to student 2, and 2 immediately
accepts it). 1− (1− p)(1− ε) is the probability that A offers admission to student 1 (either
when 2 is unacceptable or when 2 is acceptable but A offers admission to 1), in which case B
is accepted by student 1 with probability 1
2
. If B is rejected, then it seeks student 3 in the
second round because student 2 is not available (both A and B happen to make admission
offers to student 1, and C offers an admission to student 2 and is immediately accepted, see
footnote 18).
18Suppose both A and B seek student 1 in the first round. Then, college C will seek student 2 and will
be immediately accepted. (Student 2 gets u′′ if she accepts C. When she declines C, her expected utility is
(1− ε)( 12u+ 12u′′) because the college that was rejected by 1 will offer admission to her in the second round
only when she is acceptable. Since u′′ > (1− ε)( 12u+ 12u′′), it is optimal for her to accept C immediately.)
Given this, if A and B offer admissions to student 1, then each of them gets the payoff 12v1 +
1
2v3. This is
optimal for each of A and B only when 2 is unacceptable. However, if 2 is acceptable for a college, then the
college can deviate to admit her instead and get v2, since v2 >
1
2 (v1 + v3).
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(1− p)(1− ε) + (1− (1− p)(1− ε))]v2 + 12(1− p)(1− ε)v1. (1.18)
If A offers admission to student 1, which happens with probability (1− (1− p)(1− ε)), then
B is immediately accepted by 2. If A also offers admission to student 2, which happens with
probability (1−p)(1−ε), then B will be accepted by 2 with probability 1/2. If it is rejected,
then it will make an admission offer to student 1 in the next round and will be accepted
for sure (both A and B happen to make admission offers to student 2, and C also offers
admission to 2; thus, student 1 is available in the second round, and she prefers B to C).
Equating (1.17) and (1.18), we have
p =
v1 − v2 − ε(v2 − v3)
(1− ε)(v2 − v3) .
Note that p ∈ (0, 1) because ε < v1−v2




Given this, it is clear that C will not make an admission offer to student 1 in the first
round. Suppose that college C does so. Then, even when both A and B happen to make
admission offers to student 2, C will be rejected by student 1, since she will be admitted by
either A or B in the second round and those are preferred than C. Therefore, it is optimal
for C to offer an admission to student 2 with probability 1 in the first round.
This example shows that colleges still engage in strategic targeting in sequential admis-
sions: A and B compete for a better student, and C admits student 2, who may be overlooked
by the competing colleges. The equilibrium assignment may entail justified envy, since it
may be the case that student 1 attends B but she likes A, or that student 2 attends C and
3 attends B. The assignment is also student inefficient, since it is possible that student 1
likes A and 2 likes B, but they are assigned to B and A, respectively.
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1.7 Centralized Matching via Deferred Acceptance
In the last two sections, we have considered two common ways that colleges use to alleviate
their yield management problem in the decentralized matching. In this section, we consider a
centralized matching with a Gale and Shapley’s Deferred Acceptance algorithm (henceforth
DA). Many markets, such as public school admissions and medical residency assignments, are
centralized via such an algorithm. College admissions are also centralized in some countries,
although it is organized in varying degrees.19 We consider the equilibrium allocation under
DA and compare this with the outcome that arises from the decentralized matching.
Suppose that the matching is organized by a clearinghouse that applies Gale and Shap-
ley’s student-proposing DA.20 The algorithm works as follows. Initially, students and colleges
report their preference orderings to the clearinghouse. In the first round, students propose
their favorite college (according to the reported order). If a college has more applicants than
its quota, it tentatively admits a set of students that maximizes its payoff staying within
the quota, rejecting the rest (according to the reported order). In each round, unassigned
students propose their favorite college among those that has not rejected them. Each college
selects a set of students that maximizes its payoff within the quota among those who are
tentatively admitted in the previous round and those who propose it in the current round.
The process ends until no further proposals are made, in which case each student is assigned
to a college that holds her proposal.21
To see this more precisely, consider a state s such that µ(s) ≥ 1 − µ(s). In the first
round, a fraction µ(s) of students proposes college A, and the remaining students propose
19See Chen and Kesten (2011) for Shanghai mechanism and Westkamp (forthcoming) for Germany medical
school matchings.
20The outcome of college-proposing DA is the same as that of student-proposing DA in our model, since
colleges have a uniform rank on students.
21Abdulkadirog˘lu, Che, and Yasuda (2012) and Azevedo and Leshno (2012) provide a model of DA in


















Figure 1.7: Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
college B. Each college tentatively admits the top κ students among the applicants. Thus,
colleges’ cutoffs in this round, denoted by vˆi(s), i = A,B, satisfy µ(s)[1 − G(vˆA(s))] = κ
and (1 − µ(s))[1 − G(vˆB(s))] = κ. Unassigned students then propose another college at
the second round, and again, each college admits the top κ students among those who are
admitted in the first round and those who propose it at the current round. Thus, colleges’
cutoffs in this round satisfy µ(s)[1−G(vˆA(s))] = κ and 1−G(vˆB(s)) = 2κ. Since there are
no more colleges to which unassigned students can apply, the assignment is finalized in the
second round in our model. The process is depicted in Figure 1.7.
Consider now the equilibrium properties of the DA outcome. Under DA, the matching is
strategy proof for the students, so the students have a dominant strategy of reporting their
preferences truthfully (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982). In addition, colleges in our
model also report their rankings and capacities truthfully.
Lemma 1.3. Given the common college preferences, it is an ex post equilibrium for colleges
to report their rankings and capacities truthfully.
The proof in Section A.7 shows that if one college, say B, truthfully reports its capacity
and preference, it is a best response for A to do the same. The reason is that when A manip-
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ulates its capacity or ranking, the possible gain comes from generating a “rejection chain”
(Kojima and Pathak, 2009), i.e., A rejects a positive mass of students by the manipulation,
and those students apply to B, causing B to reject some other positive mass of students.
Then, those student (who are rejected by B) will then apply to A. If those second group
of students are preferred by A over the first group of students, then A could be better off.
However, the common preference of A and B implies that the second group of students are
worse than the first group of students, since B would not otherwise reject the second group
of students.
The matching in the equilibrium involves no justified envy (Gale and Shapley, 1962;
Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999; Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003), and is efficient among stu-
dents (because colleges’ preferences are acyclic in the sense of Ergin (2002)) and Pareto
efficient (an implication of stability). It also eliminates colleges’ yield management problem
completely. Colleges never exceed their quotas (because it is never allowed by the algo-
rithm), and have no seats left unfilled in the presence of acceptable unmatched students (a
consequence of stability).
In fact, given the homogeneous preferences of the colleges, there exists a single cutoff
such that a student is assigned to a college under DA if and only if her score exceeds that
cutoff. In order words, only those with the top 2κ scores are assigned. This outcome is jointly
optimal for the two colleges. In contrast, recall that competitive equilibrium in decentralized
matching entails unfilled seats for colleges in low-demand states and exceeded quotas in high-
demand states, so the assignment is far from jointly optimal. This observation suggests that
at least one college must be strictly better off from a shift from decentralized matching to
centralized matching via the deferred acceptance algorithm. Despite the overall benefit from
switching centralization via DA, it is possible for one college to be worse off. To see this,
consider the following example.





. Then, in a decentralized
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admission, colleges’ payoffs in equilibrium are piA = 0.304 and piB = 0.158. Suppose now
that the DA is in use. Then, their payoffs are piDAA = 0.352 and pi
DA
B = 0.143. Notice that
piDAA + pi
DA
B = 0.495 > piA + piB = 0.462 (overall benefit for the two colleges), pi
DA
A > piA
(college A is strictly better off), but piDAB < piB (college B is worse off).
In this example, college A is more popular than B for any state. Under decentralized
matching, college B has some chance to have high score students (because of colleges’ strate-
gic targeting as we have seen), while it does not under DA. This may explain why college
admissions are remained decentralized in many countries unlike public school matchings. In
the former, colleges have their own interests and preferences over students, whereas in the
latter, schools are treated as “resources” of a society, in which case schools’ preferences are
interpreted as school-priorities that students claim for the schools.
Equilibrium properties of the assignment under DA are summarized in the follow.
Theorem 1.9. Under DA, the equilibrium outcome is fair, Pareto and student efficient,
and jointly optimal among the colleges. However, some college may be worse off relative to
decentralized matching.
1.8 Conclusion
The current paper has introduced and analyzed a new model of decentralized college ad-
missions. In the model, colleges make admission decisions subject to aggregate uncertainty
about students’ preferences and linear costs for any enrollment exceeding the capacity. We
find that colleges’ admission decisions become a tool for strategic yield management, and
in equilibrium, colleges try to reduce their enrollment uncertainty by strategically targeting
students.
We also obtain the welfare and fairness implications of the equilibrium outcomes. We
show that the equilibrium outcome under decentralized matching entails justified envy and
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fails to attain efficiency. We also show that when colleges consider students’ non-academic
performance or extra-curricular activities, the use of these aspects may lessen head-on com-
petition among colleges. However, strategic targeting still entails as colleges placing over-
weights on those non-common performance measure. Our analytical model permits a clear
comparison of the outcomes that would arise (i) when students are forced to self-target (by
the limited set of schools they can apply to), (ii) when admissions are made sequentially, and
(iii) when the market is centralized via DA. Both self-targeting and sequential admissions
may alleviate colleges’ yield management problems but may not eliminate them completely,
and inefficiency and justified envy are still entailed. Centralized matching via DA completely
eliminates the yield management problem and justified envy, and it also achieves Pareto and
student efficiency in our model. We show, however, that it is possible for one college to be
worse off using centralized matching relative to decentralized matching. This observation
may explain why college admissions remain decentralized in many countries.
The model reveals several aspects to be further investigated. As assumed in our model,
it is often the case that colleges have largely homogeneous preferences/evaluations based
on students’ high school GPA and their scores from a nationwide test, such as those in
Australia, Japan or Korea. However, colleges may prefer students who have enthusiasm
or loyalty towards them, because these qualities may predict future donations and alumni
activities (see Avery and Levin, 2010), or colleges may seek diversity in the student body.
Interestingly, students’ idiosyncratic preferences may be one way to coordinate strategic
targeting. If colleges know that “legacy” admits (who have a family history with the school)
are more likely to accept admission offers, they can coordinate on admitting different students
by each admitting their own legacy students, even if these students are objectively lower
quality.
As noted in the paper, colleges under decentralized matching find ways to alleviate their
yield management burden. Although we have considered two common ways, self-targeting
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and sequential admissions, used for this purpose, early admissions may also alleviate the
yield management problem. By admitting a fraction of students early, a college can reduce
uncertainty in the enrollment. Avery, Fairbanks, and Zeckhauser (2003) provide empirical
evidence that matriculation rates in early admissions are much higher than those in regular
admissions (especially in the case of early decisions). Moreover, students are forced to reveal
their preferences during the early admission process, and thus, colleges may have better
information about students’ preferences. This may help colleges to manage the final class
size in regular admissions and may alleviate their yield management problems.
Finally, colleges may encourage students to build specialized human capital or merit/life
experience tailored for their specific requirements. For example, some colleges in Korea fill
a portion of their capacities with students who have a high test score for foreign language
abilities (e.g., TOEFL or TOEIC) or win a mathematics/phisics olympiad or other contests.
Since those requirements are usually far beyond standard high school level, this will cause
students who made the investments to be more qualified for the colleges for whom targeted
investments were made but not for other. This may make students lock in even from the








Keyword advertising is a form of targeted online advertising. When an Internet user enters a
keyword (query) into a search engine, she receives sponsored links along with search results.
When the user clicks on a sponsored link, she is directed to the advertiser’s web site and
the advertiser pays the search engine for that click. Search engines such as Google, Yahoo!,
and Bing generate substantial revenue by auctioning off their ad spaces. The commonly
used auction format in the industry is the generalized second-price (GSP) auction and its
variants.
In general, ads that appear in upper positions on a page garner more clicks than those
appearing in lower positions. This feature is captured by different click-through rates (CTRs)
at each position. Under GSP auctions, each advertiser bids on the per-click price, and
his total payment is the per-click price multiplied by the CTR. The advertiser who has
submitted the highest bid is assigned to the highest position and pays the second highest
bid. The second highest advertiser is assigned to the second highest position and pays the
third highest bid, and so on.1
Two seminal papers addressing GSP auctions are Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz
(2007, EOS hereafter) and Varian (2007). Both analyze a static model in which advertisers
with complete information bid simultaneously. They focus on a refinement of Nash equilibria
and identify a class of equilibria, called locally envy-free and symmetric Nash equilibria
(SNEs henceforth), respectively. They assume that advertisers have no budget constraints.
In practice, however, search engines require advertisers to set their daily budgets. Google,
for example, states how the daily budget influences the placement of the advertisers’ ads as
1An assumption here is that CTRs depend only on the position but not on the advertisers’ identity: the
rankings based on a per-impression bid—per-click bids multiplied by CTRs—are the same as the rankings
based on a per-click bid. In practice, however, the allocation schemes vary across search engines. For
example, Google ranks advertisers according to “quality scores,” which are based on bids, past CTRs, and
the qualities of the advertisers’ landing pages.
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follow:
Your daily budget is the amount that you set for each ad campaign to specify how
much, on average, you’d like to spend each day. Once you set a daily budget for
your campaign, the system will aim to show your ads as much as possible until
your budget is met. When your budget is reached, your ads will typically
stop showing for that day. (emphasis added)2
This statement addresses some important aspects that are overlooked by EOS (2007) and
Varian (2007). First, one’s payment, say bidder i’s, is determined by the per-click price at
his position and exposure time. Once the payment reaches his budget, his ad will be removed
from the page and the next highest bidder, say j, takes this position. Second, under GSP,
bidder i’s per-click price is determined by bidder j’s bid, the next highest one. Thus, bidder
j may benefit by raising his bid to deplete bidder i’s budget. On the other hand, bidder i
may also lower his bid to be slightly less than j’s bid to influence bidder j’s exposure time.
In sum, budget constraints may create an incentive for bidders to change their bids to inflict
higher prices on competitors.
Let us elaborate on this with an example. Suppose that there are two positions and
three bidders and that the auction takes place during one day (24 hours). Let the CTR of
position 1 be 20 and of position 2 be 18. Suppose bidder 1’s per-click bid is 6, bidder 2’s
is 5, and bidder 3’s is 4 so that bidder 1 is assigned to the highest position, bidder 2 to
the second highest position, and bidder 3 fails to win any position. If there are no budget
constraints, both bidders 1 and 2 can stay at their respective positions until the end of the
day. Now suppose that bidders have the same budget of 60. Suppose further that bidder 2




6, because bidder 1 exhausts his budget at time 60
20×6 × 24 (= 12 hours), and then bidder 2
takes the position but still pays the third highest per-click bid. That is, bidder 2 makes
bidder 1 consume only one-half unit of position 1 and takes the remaining fraction of the
position. Similarly, bidder 1 may benefit by lowering his bid to (slightly less than) 5. By
doing so, bidder 1 makes bidder 2 win position 1 initially. However, after bidder 2 leaves the
market at time 60
18×5 × 24 (= 16 hours), bidder 1 moves up to position 1 but pays the third
highest per-click bid.
In this paper, we raise two questions pertaining to the issues mentioned above:
• Question 1: How large should the budgets be in order for SNEs (without budget con-
straints)3 to be sustained as equilibria with budget constraints?
• Question 2: How do budget constraints affect bidders’ bidding behavior and the search
engine’s revenue?
To answer these questions, we consider a model in which the auction is conducted during
a unit time, that represents one “day.” All bidders are endowed with daily budgets and
submit their bids when the day begins. We assume that after placing bids, bidders do not
adjust their bids within that day.4 Once one’s payment reaches his budget, the bidder’s ad
disappears from the page and the next highest bidder takes that position. We assume that
bidders have complete information.








, where N is a set of bidders, such that B̂1j < B̂2j for all j ∈ N . Let
Bj be bidder j’s budget. We first show that for any SNE bidding profile without budget
constraints, if there is a bidder j with Bj < B̂
1
j , then the next highest bidder can benefit
3With a slight abuse of the terminology, let us refer to “SNE without budget constraints” as SNE.
4Sodomka, Lahaie, and Hillard (2012) and Pin and Key (2011) provide empirical evidence showing that
bidders update their bids infrequently. Particularly, Sodomka, Lahaie, and Hillard (2012) show that it is
very rare for bidders to change their bids more than once per day.
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by bidding (slightly less than) j’s bid. Therefore, any SNE bidding profile cannot be an
equilibrium with budget constraints. We then show that B̂2j ≤ Bj for all j ∈ N if and only
if all SNEs without budget constraints are sustainable as equilibria with budget constraints;
that is, bidders consume the entire unit of their assigned positions.
For the second question, it is difficult to solve equilibrium bidding strategies analytically
in a general environment with multiple positions and budget constraints. We consider a
simple environment that has one position and two bidders with the same budget. In fact,
without budget constraints, the one-position GSP coincides with the standard second-price
auction. In the presence of budget, however, it may be the case that the losing bidder
overbids (i.e., bids above his own value) to exhaust the winning bidder’s budgets, so the
search engine’s revenue may be larger than its revenue without budget constraints. We show
that unless the budget is too small, the search engine earns at least as much revenue as from
the standard second-price auction.
There are some papers that study keyword auctions with budget constraints. Zhou and
Lukose (2006) note that a lower placed bidder has an incentive to bid slightly less than
a higher placed bidder’s bid (called “vindictive bidding”). They show that if there are
three or more bidders who are vindictive against each other, then a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium may not exist. However, they only consider an environment with indivisible
positions, whereas in our model, positions are treated as divisible goods. Moreover, we do
not assume a priori that the difference between two adjacent bids is arbitrarily small. Our
first question is under what conditions an SNE can or cannot be sustained as an equilibrium
with budget constraints, and we show that if each bidder j’s budget is at least as large as
B̂2j , then any SNE is an equilibrium with budget constraints.
Bidders’ overbidding behavior has also been studied in the auction literature. Pitchik and
Schotter (1988) and Benoˆıt and Krishna (2001) study sequential auctions with two goods
and budget-constrained bidders. In the first auction, a bidder may overbid to exhaust the
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other bidder’s budget expecting him to be in a stronger position in the second auction. Thus,
the auctioneer may enjoy a larger revenue when bidders are budget constrained than when
they are not.5 Pagnozzi (2006) considers sequential common-value ascending auctions with
two goods and two bidders. He shows that a bidder bids above his budget in the first auction
to deplete his rival’s budget, and the seller benefits from this overbidding.6 Although our
model has a single bidding stage, a similar overbidding arises because of the divisibility of
the position.
Other researches that consider multi-unit auctions with budget constraints include Borgs
et al. (2005) and Hafalir, Ravi, and Sayedi (2012b). They consider mechanisms that sell
multiple copies of a single item. Borgs et al. (2005) show that there is no truthful mechanism
that sells all units to distinct bidders, but they provide an asymptotically revenue-maximizing
truthful mechanism that leaves some units unsold.7 In the same setting, Hafalir, Ravi,
and Sayedi (2012b) provide a new mechanism, called Sort-Cut, to sell all units.8 They
show that in the sort-cut mechanism, bidders cannot benefit from lying about their budgets
or understating their values, but may benefit by overstating their values. Although these
works provide mechanisms that can be used when bidders have budget constraints, those
mechanisms are applicable when there is a single position to be sold, in which the number
of units (copies of the single item) each bidder wins can be understood as a fraction of the
single position. In this regard, Hafalir, Ravi, and Sayedi (2012a) study a model of selling a
5See Example 8 (p.168) in Benoˆıt and Krishna (2001).
6In Pitchik and Schotter (1988) and Benoˆıt and Krishna (2001), overbidding means that a bidder bids
above his own value. Pagnozzi (2006) allows bidders to bid above their budgets, and overbidding means
bidding above one’s own budget.
7The mechanism randomly divides bidders into two groups and uses the market clearing price for each
group as the price offering to the other group.
8The algorithm sorts bidders in decreasing order of their (reported) values, say v1 ≥ · · · ≥ vn, and finds
a cutoff bidder k such that bidders i < k win goods until their budgets are exhausted, the cutoff bidder k
wins the remaining goods, and bidders i > k do not win any good. The cutoff bidder and the amount of his
leftover budget are set to clear the market.
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divisible good to budget-constrained bidders. We also consider a single position GSP with
budget constraints and provide a characterization of equilibrium bidding strategies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the structure of key-
word auctions with and without budget constraints. Section 2.3 characterizes the budget
thresholds when an SNE can be sustained as an equilibrium with budget constraints. Sec-
tion 2.4 discusses bidders’ equilibrium bidding behavior and the search engine’s revenue in
a simple setting, and Section 3.5 concludes.
2.2 Model
In this section, we first briefly review the model in EOS (2007) and Varian (2007) and then
introduce budget constraints.
2.2.1 Model without Budget Constraints
Suppose there is a set of bidders, N = {1, . . . , n}, and a set of positions, S = {1, . . . , s}, for a
keyword of interest. Throughout this paper, we assume that n ≥ s and the reservation price
is zero. Let V = {v1, . . . , vn} be the set of values, where vi is bidder i’s per-click value, and
C = {c1, . . . , cs} be the set of CTRs, where cj is the CTR of position j. Order the positions
such that c1 > · · · > cs and let cs+1 = · · · = cn = 0.9 V and C are given exogenously and
known to all bidders.
Let β = (b1, . . . , bn) be a bidding profile. Under GSP, the bidder who submits the
jth highest bid wins the jth highest position and pays the (j + 1)th highest bid per click.
Suppose bidder j makes the jth highest bid. Then, his payoff is cj(vj − bj+1). Varian (2007)
9In practice, bidders may have different values for different positions (Yenmez, 2013) and CTRs may
depend on which ads are shown in other positions (Jeziorski and Segal, 2012). For simplicity, however,
we assume throughout this paper that each bidders’ per-click value is independent of positions and CTRs
depend only on positions, following EOS (2007) and Varian (2007).
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defines a Nash equilibrium and a symmetric Nash equilibrium. A bidding profile β is a Nash
equilibrium (NE) if
cj(vj − bj+1) ≥ cl(vj − bl+1) ∀ l > j,
cj(vj − bj+1) ≥ cl(vj − bl) ∀ l < j.
(2.1)
We must also have vj ≥ bj+1, or else bidder j would lose money, and bj ≥ bj+1 by the
definition of GSP. A bidding profile β is called a symmetric Nash equilibrium (SNE) if
cj(vj − bj+1) ≥ cl(vj − bl+1) ∀ l, j. (2.2)
Denote the set of SNEs (without budget constraints) by BSNE. A SNE has several
attractive properties. First, any β ∈ BSNE is also a Nash equilibrium.10 Second, under
SNE, the matching is assortative, that is, v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vs. Third, (bj)j∈N is a SNE
bidding profile if and only if (cj−1bj)j∈N is a Walrasian price profile. However, there is a
continuum of SNE bids within upper and lower bounds. That is, for any β ∈ BSNE, bj












bj+1 ≡ bUj , (2.3)
b1 > b2, and bi = vi for all i > s+ 1.
Observe that bUj and b
L
j satisfy cj−1(vj−1 − bUj ) = cj(vj−1 − bj+1) and cj(vj − bj+1) =
cj−1(vj − bLj ), respectively. That is, bUj is the bid at which bidder j− 1 is indifferent between
staying at position j − 1 and moving down one position, and bLj is the bid at which bidder j
is indifferent between staying at his current position and moving up one position. When we
10Since bl ≥ bl+1, we have cj(vj − bl+1) ≥ cj(vj − bl). Thus, the second line in (2.1) is satisfied.
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It is not hard to show that bLLj ≥ bLLj+1 and bUUj ≥ bUUj+1 for all j. The smallest SNE bids
are the same as the locally envy-free equilibrium bids analyzed by EOS (2007), and it is
well known that the smallest price for each position, cj−1bLLj , is the same as the payment for
Vickery-Clarke-Groves mechanism.
2.2.2 Model with Budget Constraints
We now provide a simple model with budget-constrained bidders. Similar to the previous
section, there is a set of bidders, N , and their valuations, V ; a set of positions, S, and
CTRs, C. Let B = {B1, . . . , Bn} be the set of budgets each bidder possesses. The auction
is conducted during the unit time. All bidders submit their bids only once, when the game
starts at t = 0. For the given C = {c1, . . . , cs}, there is a flow of clicks on each position, so
the number of clicks on position j up to time t is cjt. We also assume that V , B and C are
given exogenously and known to all bidders.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the game structure via an example with three positions and four
bidders. Suppose b1 > b2 > b3 > b4 so that bidders 1, 2 and 3 initially win positions 1, 2 and
3, respectively, and bidder 4 fails to win any position. In Figure 2.1(a), bidder 1 drops out at




















are still b3 and b4, respectively. Bidder 2’s budget is so small that he drops out at t2, and
bidder 3 moves up one position again and stays there until t3. Figure 2.1(b) illustrates the
case that all bidders have large enough budgets so that they stay at their respective positions
until the game ends. Note that the allocation in this case is the same as the case without
budget constraints. That is, if each bidder has a sufficiently large budget, then the allocation
in our model coincides with that in EOS (2007) and Varian (2007).
2.3 Budget Thresholds
In this section, we provide an answer to the question concerning under what budget level,
a bidding profile β ∈ BSNE satisfying (2.2) can be sustained as an equilibrium. In order to
avoid a trivial case, we restrict our attention, throughout this section, to β ∈ BSNE with
cjbj+1 ≤ Bj for all j. That is, we focus on the case that if no bidders wish to change their
bids from the given β, then all bidders can stay at their assigned positions until the game
ends. As described in the motivating example in Section 2.1, a bidder may deviate from β

















(b) b′2 = b1 − ε > b2
bidder 2
bidder 1
Figure 2.2: Upward Deviation
Lemma 2.1. Consider any β ∈ BSNE such that cjbj+1 ≤ Bj for all j ∈ N . There is no
profitable upward deviation if and only if Bj ≥ cjbj for all j ∈ N .
Proof. “If” part. Fix any β ∈ BSNE. Suppose Bj ≥ cjbj for all j. Bidder j’s current payoff
is cj(vj − bj+1). Suppose bidder j increases his bid from bj to some b′j such that
b1 > · · · > bj−k > b′j > bj−k+1 > · · · > bj−1 > bj+1
so as to be assigned to position j − k + 1. Note that bidder (j − k)’s per-click payment
becomes b′j and Bj−k ≥ cj−kbj−k ≥ cj−kb′j, hence bidder j − k will stay at position j − k
until the game ends. Bidder j’s payoff from the deviation is at most cj−k+1(vj − bj−k+1), if
he stays at position j − k + 1 to the end of the game. Observe that
cj(vj − bj+1) ≥ cj−k+1(vj − bj−k+2) ≥ cj−k+1(vj − bj−k+1),
where the first inequality follows from (2.2) and the second inequality holds since bj−k+1 ≥
bj−k+2. Therefore, any upward deviation is not profitable for bidder j. 
We defer the proof of the“only if” part to Appendix B.1. However, Figure 2.2 depicts how
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an upward deviation can be profitable if there is a bidder j such that Bj < cjbj. Suppose
there are two positions and three bidders. Let β ∈ BSNE be a bidding profile such that
b1 > b2 > b3. Suppose B1 < c1b1 and consider bidders 1 and 2. Figure 2.2(a) depicts the
allocation under the original bidding strategy, and Figure 2.2(b) depicts the allocation when
bidder 2 increases his bid from b2 to b
′
2 = b1 − . In the latter case, bidder 1 will drop out
at time t = B1
c1b2
< 1 (as ε vanishes), and bidder 2 will then move up. Suppose further that
bidder 2 can stay at position 1 until the end of the game after he moves up to that position.
The shaded areas in the left- and right-hand panels represent the number of clicks that
bidder 2 enjoys from the original bidding strategy and the upward deviation, respectively.
Observe that bidder 2’s payoff is increased from c2(v2 − b3) to [c2 t+ c1(1− t)](v2 − b3).




j , then no β ∈ BSNE is an
equilibrium with budget constraints.
Proof. It follows immediately from Lemma 2.1 since for any β ∈ BSNE, bLLj ≤ bj for all
j ∈ N . 
For a given bidding profile, Lemma 2.1 shows that in order to deter an upward deviation,
each bidder’s budget must be larger than his bid times the CTR of his current position.
Thus, if Bj < cjb
LL
j for some j, then no SNE sustains as an equilibrium with budget con-
straints. However, both Lemma 2.1 and Theorem 2.1 consider only upward deviations but
not downward deviations. In the following example, we show that a bidder may find a
profitable downward deviation even if Bj ≥ cjbj for all j.
Example 2.1. Let c1 = 10, c2 = 5, and v1 = 6, v2 = 4, v3 = 2. The upper and lower bounds
of SNE for bidders 2 and 3 are (bUU2 , b
UU




3 ) = (3, 2).
Suppose B2 = 27, and B1 and B3 are arbitrarily large. Fix any β = (b1, b2, b3) ∈ BSNE.
Note that B2 > c2b
UU














(b) b′1 = b2 − ε < b2
bidder 2
bidder 1
Figure 2.3: Downward Deviation
bidder 1. His current payoff at position 1 is c1(v1−b2) (see Figure 2.3(a)). Suppose he lowers
his bid from b1 to b2 − ε so that bidder 1 is assigned to position 2 and bidder 2 is assigned
to position 1. Bidder 1, however, moves up to position 1 at time t = B2
c1b2
< 1 (as ε vanishes)
since B2 < c1b
LL
2 = 30 ≤ c1b2. His payoff from this deviation is [c2t + c1(1 − t)](v1 − b3)
(see Figure 2.3(b)). Unlike the upward deviation, there is a trade-off: When bidder 1 moves
down to position 2, he incurs a loss due to the smaller number of clicks (c2t+ c1(1− t) < c1);
when he moves up to position 1, however, he pays less per click (v1 − b3 > v1 − b2). One
can show that if all bidders use bLLj , then bidder 1’s payoff decreases from 30 to 22 by the
deviation, but if all bidders use bUUj , then his payoff increases from 10 to 14.6. The reason is
that in the former case, bidder 1 cannot recoup the initial loss after moving up to position 1
at time t = B2
c1bLL2
= 0.9. In the latter case, however, bidder 2’s drop-out time from position
1, t = B3
c2bUU3
= 0.54, is earlier than before, so bidder 1 has enough time to make up for his
initial loss.
Lemma 2.2. Let B̂2j := cj−1b
UU
j . Suppose there is a bidder j such that Bj < B̂
2
j , then
β = (bUUj )j∈N is not an equilibrium with budget constraints.






j − ε. Then, bidder j− 1 is assigned to position j, and bidder j is assigned
to position j− 1. Since Bj < B̂2j , bidder j drops out from position j− 1 at time t = Bjcj−1b′j−1 ,
and then bidder j− 1 moves up to position j− 1. Thus, bidder (j− 1)’s net payoff from the
deviation is
[cjt+ cj−1(1− t)](vj−1 − bUUj+1)− cj−1(vj−1 − bUUj ) > cj(vj−1 − bUUj+1)− cj−1(vj−1 − bUUj ) = 0,
where the inequality holds since cjt+cj−1(1− t) > cj and the equality follows from (2.3). 
We now provide budget thresholds under which any β ∈ BSNE can be sustained as an
equilibrium with budget constraints.
Theorem 2.2. Any β ∈ BSNE is sustainable as an equilibrium with budget constraints if
and only if Bj ≥ B̂2j for all j ∈ N .
Proof. “If” part. Consider any β ∈ BSNE. By Lemma 2.1, there is no profitable upward
deviation, since Bj ≥ cj−1bUUj > cjbj for all j. Now consider a downward deviation. Suppose
bidder j decreases his bid from bj to some b
′
j such that
b1 > · · · > bj−1 > bj+1 > · · · > bj+k > b′j > bj+k+1,
so as to be assigned to position j + k. Then, bidder j + k is assigned to position j + k − 1,
bidder j + k − 1 is assigned to position j + k − 2 and so on. Note that bidder (j + k)’s
per-click payment is b′j and Bj+k ≥ cj+k−1bUUj+k ≥ cj+k−1b′j. Thus, bidder j + k will stay at
position j + k − 1 until the game ends, and bidder j will also stay at position j + k. Bidder
j’s payoff from this deviation is cj+k(vj − bj+k+1), which is smaller than the original payoff
from position j by the definition of SNE, (2.2). Therefore, any downward deviation is not
profitable.
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“Only if” part. Suppose, on the contrary, that there is a bidder j such that Bj < cj−1bUUj .
By Lemma 2.2, the bidding profile (bUUj )j∈N is not an equilibrium with budget constraints,
which contradicts the fact that any β ∈ BSNE is an equilibrium with budget constraints. 
Theorem 2.2 provides the necessary and sufficient conditions under which any β ∈ BSNE
can be an equilibrium with budget constraints. It would be trivial that if all bidders have
sufficiently large amount of budgets, then no deviations are profitable. However, the propo-
sition says that the budgets need not be extremely large as long as it is greater than B̂2j ,
which is the same as the payment of one position above bidder j’s current position if the
highest SNE bids were played.
2.4 Search Engine’s Revenue
In this section, we consider a simple environment in which two bidders with the same
budget compete for a position. We study bidders’ equilibrium bidding strategies and the
search engine’s revenue. Let vi, i = 1, 2, be bidder i’s per-click value, where v1 > v2, and B be
the bidders’ common budget. We normalize the CTR of the position by 1 for simplicity. We
assume that bidders have complete information and that ties are broken in favor of a bidder
with higher per-click value.11 We look for a Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies.
Note that without budget constraints, the one-position GSP coincides with the standard
second-price auction. Thus, the search engine’s revenue is v2 in this case. With budget
constraints, however, the following example shows that the search engine’s revenue may be
larger than v2.
Example 2.2. Let v1 = 8, v2 = 2, and B = 4. Then, b1 = b2 = 5 is an equilibrium. The
search engine’s revenue is 4.
11Our tie-breaking rule can be justified as it produces a limit equilibrium of a game in which there is a
minimum bid increment and a random tie-breaking rule is used.
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In the example, both bidders submit the same bid, and bidder 1 is initially assigned to the
position by the tie-breaking rule. Notice that bidder 2’s bid is higher than his value. That is,
bidder 2 overbids to exhaust bidder 1’s budget so that bidder 1 drops out at time t = B
b2
= 0.8.
Thus, bidder 1’s payoff is t(v1− b2) = 2.4 and bidder 2’s payoff is (1− t)v2 = 0.4.12 Observe
that no bidder has an incentive to deviate. Clearly, bidder 2 has no incentive to change his
bid since b1 > v2. For bidder 1, if he lowers his bid to some b
′
1 ∈ (B, b2), then bidder 2 will
drop out at time t′ = B
b′1
> t = B
b2
. Hence bidder 1’s payoff from the deviation is (1 − t′)v1.
Since (1− t′)v1 < (1− t)v1 = 1.6, bidder 1 does not benefit from this deviation. The search
engine’s revenue is the amount of bidder 1’s payment up to time t; that is, b2 t = B.
Now we provide a formal result generalizing the above example. We show that in any Nash
equilibrium with undominated strategies, the search engine’s revenue is at least v2 unless
v2 > B. Therefore, the search engine may benefit from the presence of budget constraints.
Before proceeding, we make a couple of observations. First, any bidding profile (bi, bj)
such that bi > B ≥ bj, i, j = 1, 2, is not an equilibrium because bidder j can benefit by
bidding b′j ∈ (B, bi).13 This implies that b1 and b2 must be greater or smaller than B at the
same time in equilibrium. Second, if bi > bj ≥ B in an equilibrium, we must have bj = bi− ε
for an arbitrarily small ε > 0 because this expedites bidder i’s dropping out time. By the
tie-breaking rule, this implies that both bids are bunching to the same bid, denoted by b,
















(v2 − b). (2.4)
The next proposition provides a characterization of equilibrium bidding strategies.
12We assume that there is no reservation price, hence bidder 2 pays nothing after moving up to the position.




vj > 0 by bidding
b′j ∈ (B, bi) because bidder i will drop out at time Bb′j < 1.
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Theorem 2.3. Consider equilibrium in undominated strategies.
(i) Suppose B ≥ v1 > v2. (b1, b2) = (v1, v2) is a unique Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Suppose v1 > B ≥ v2. (b1, b2) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if either b1 = b2 ∈
[B, 2v1B
v1+B
] or B ≥ b1 ≥ b2 ≥ v2.
(iii) Suppose v1 > v2 > B. (b1, b2) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if b1 = b2 ∈ [ 2v2Bv2+B , 2v1Bv1+B ].
We defer the proof to Appendix B.2. In the first case, the budget constraints are not
binding, so bidders’ bidding behavior is the same as that under the standard second-price
auction. Hence, the search engine’s revenue is v2. In the last case, the range of equilibrium
bids follows from (2.4). Note that equilibrium bids are greater than B, or else bidder 2 can
benefit by bidding b′2 ∈ (B, v2) so as to win the position. Thus, bidder 1 drops out at time
t = B
b2
, and so the search engine earns B < v2.
The most interesting case is the second. Here, both bidders bid either above or below the
budget at the same time. In the former case, the range of equilibrium bids follows from (2.4),
again. Since b2 ≥ B, bidder 1 drops out at time t = Bb2 , and the search engine’s revenue is
B ≥ v2. In the latter case, bidder 1 does not drop out during the game because B ≥ b2, hence
the search engine’s revenue is simply b2 which is greater than v2 in undominated strategies.
In sum, if v1 > B ≥ v2, the search engine earns at least v2.
The search engine’s revenue in each of three cases is summarized in the follow.
Theorem 2.4. In equilibrium with undominated strategies, the search engine’s revenue,
denoted by R, is
R =

v2 if B ≥ v1 > v2,
[v2, B] if v1 > B ≥ v2,
B if v1 > v2 > B.
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2.5 Concluding Remarks
A generalized second-price auction is a standard format for selling online advertising
positions on search engines. Previous literature has found a set of equilibria—symmetric
Nash equilibria (SNEs)—in a model that does not consider budget constraints. In the current
paper, we provide a simple model with budget constraints and show that bidders may have
an incentive to deviate from an SNE. We characterize budget thresholds under which any
SNE can or cannot be sustained as an equilibrium when there are budget constraints. We
also show that in a simple setting, the search engine’s revenue with budget constraints may
be larger than its revenue without such constraints.
There are several issues driven by budget constraints that are not addressed in the current
paper. First, we have assumed that bidders’ budgets are exogenously given. However, the
budget amount can be an important decision variable for the bidders. For example, a bidder
may want to get a high position for a short time period for a special fire-sale. In that case,
the bidder may submit a high bid and place a small budget amount. Second, a bidder may
click competitors’ ads to deplete their budgets without any interest on their web sites, which
is known as click fraud (Wilbur and Zhu, 2009). Last, in the presence of bidders’ budgets, a
natural question is how to allocate bidders to positions. Goel et al. (2010) consider throttling
algorithms that select a set of bidders who participate in the auction upon the arrival of a
query.14 Their analysis, however, takes the bids and budgets as given and does not consider
bidders’ strategic behavior. The results in Section 2.4 can be understood as an equilibrium
analysis in a restrictive setting when the search engine does not use any throttling algorithm,
and the analyses for other throttling algorithms are needed.
14They consider three algorithms. The first is the non-throttling model, in which all bidders participate
in the auction and a bidder is removed when his budget is exhausted, as in our model. The second is the
strict model, in which the search engine may exclude some bidders with positive remaining budgets. Last,
in the non-strict model, the search engine selects a set of bidders, whose budgets may be exhausted or not,
and gives some clicks for free to those bidders who exhausted their budgets.
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Chapter 3





Firms and governments increasingly rely on procuring goods and services from outside
sources. In particular, they often seek to procure innovations, and the innovative activi-
ties require firms to undertake investments. For instance, when the Department of Defense
procures a weapon system, defense contractors often make R&D investments to produce
prototypes and then participate in the procurement process. In the healthcare system, a
procurer requires suppliers to undertake investments for developing medicines. In general,
the quality of the innovation depends on firms’ investment effort level at the R&D stage.
However, it is often the case that the realized quality of new research is not deterministic of
the exerted effort, hence the realized quality is ex ante uncertain.
In the face of these problems, contests have served as a procurement scheme. Under
a contest, the buyer has an ex post incentive to choose the supplier who offered her the
highest net surplus, and this provides the firms with incentive to exert investment effort.
Two popular contest mechanisms are first-price auction and fixed-prize tournament. In the
auction, the buyer procures the innovation from a firm who offers the most favorable price–
quality combination (called “score”). In the tournament, the prize is fixed by the buyer,
and a supplier who develops the highest quality wins the prize. Intuitively, under an auction
mechanism, firms have means of competition, since a low-quality firm can offer a high net
surplus to the buyer by lowering its price. Hence, the buyer may prefer holding an auction
over a tournament, since the former promotes more competition among the firms than the
latter. However, if the randomness of quality realization is sufficiently large, then an auction
may leave a high rent to firms, so a tournament may be preferred by the buyer.
Besides the choice of a procurement mechanism, the buyer also faces a nontrivial problem
of selecting the number of participants. Since the buyer procures from only one supplier, if
too many firms participate in the procurement process, then they may be discouraged from
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expending their sunk investments, because each of them has a small chance of winning. We
call this an incentive effect.1 This suggests that shortlisting the number of participants—
often to two—can be optimal (Taylor, 1995; Fullerton and McAfee, 1999; Che and Gale,
2003). On the other hand, due to the randomness of quality realization, the buyer may
benefit by inviting many firms, since the chance of having a higher quality increases as
the number of participants increases. We call this a sampling effect. Intuitively, if the
randomness is negligible, inviting only two firms is optimal, since it is enough to make them
compete with each other, and thus firms have incentive to put investment efforts. However,
for sufficiently large randomness, the sampling effect may dominate the incentive effect, so
the buyer may wish to invite as many firms as possible.
In this paper, we consider two contest mechanisms, a first-price auction and a fixed-
prize tournament, and investigate how the incentive and sampling effects operate under each
mechanism. To isolate the trade-off between the two effects, we further restrict our attention
to the environment in which (i) firms invest nonmonetary efforts, (ii) the level of effort and
the resulting quality of the innovation are unverifiable, (iii) the buyer cannot extract up-front
payments from the firms, and (iv) there is no outside market except selling to the buyer.
When the quality is verifiable, the terms of contracts can be made contingent on the
realized quality of innovation. Any optimal mechanism selects the firm who can deliver the
highest quality at a minimal cost (Laffont and Tirole, 1986; McAfee and McMillan, 1987;
Riordan and Sappington, 1987). If the cost associated with innovative activities is observable,
one could imagine various reimbursement schemes (Rogerson, 2003; Chu and Sappington,
2007). However, these prevailing theories may not work well for innovations. First of all, if
investments take the form of nonmonetary effort or opportunity costs, the investment costs
may not be observable. It is also often the case that the quality of innovation provided by
1A number of papers also examine firms’ incentives to invest in cost reduction (Tan, 1992; Piccione and
Tan, 1996; Arozamena and Cantillon, 2004).
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the firms is unverifiable. A third party, such as a court, may not be able to discern the
quality through an audit. With the unverifiable quality, the buyer may use a simple option
contract that requires suppliers to pay an up-front fee (Taylor, 1993). However, this may
not be feasible if the firms have limited liability or liquidity constraints, so the buyer cannot
charge substantial entry fees. Patent systems may not be helpful when the innovation results
do not have an immediate commercial value so that there is no outside market except selling
it to the buyer.
Under such an environment, we develop a simple model. There is a set of potential sup-
pliers, who are ex ante identical. The buyer announces a procurement mechanism, either
first-price auction or fixed-prized tournament, and selects a set of participants (i.e., the num-
ber of participants) in the procurement process. Any participating firm exerts investment
effort and pays the cost of it. And then it draws quality from a distribution which depends
on the effort level. After observing its own quality (which is also observable by the buyer,
but not by the other firms), each firm asks a price if the auction is in use. In the fixed-prize
tournament, each firm asks the same price, namely the prize fixed by the buyer. Finally, the
buyer selects the firm who offers the highest net surplus.
We first consider the first-price auction. We show that when the randomness is large
enough, there is a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium in which all firms put the same level
of investment. Each firm’s price bidding behavior resembles that of the standard first-price
auction: Each firm’s realized quality serves as a “type” of the firm, and its net surplus offer
to the buyer is equivalent to the firm’s “bid.” We also show that it is optimal for the buyer
to invite as many firms as possible in this case, even though individual firm’s investment
level is decreasing in the number of participants. That is, the sample effect dominates the
incentive effect.
However, when the randomness is small, there is no symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium.
Unfortunately, we are not able to fully characterize (mixed-strategy) equilibria in this case.
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Instead, we show that the distribution of a mixed-strategy equilibrium converges to some
distribution as the randomness vanishes, and provide a characterization of the limit distribu-
tion. Based on it, we show that inviting only two firms is optimal for the buyer at the limit.
In Section C.1, we provide an example of a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium with two
firms when the randomness is moderate. This connects the pure-strategy equilibrium and
the limit case.
Next, we consider the fixed-prize tournament. We show that similar to the auction
case, when the randomness is large, it is optimal for the buyer to invite many firms. More
interestingly, the tournament outperforms the auction in this case. In the tournament, the
prize is optimally set by the buyer, which is shown to be zero so that the buyer entirely
relies on the sampling effect. We also consider the limit case of the tournament and show
that inviting only two firms is optimal for the buyer. However, the auction outperforms the
tournament in this case, since the auction promotes competition more than the tournament.
Two prominent works on innovation contests are Fullerton et al. (2002) and Che and
Gale (2003). They suggest that the buyer prefers the first-price auction to the fixed-prize
tournament. Fullerton et al. (2002) compare the auction and the tournament in a stochastic
innovation technology by adopting Taylor (1995)’s model. In Taylor (1995), each firm decides
the number of periods in which it draws a quality from a distribution and pays a fixed cost.
At the end of the last period, the firm who gets the highest quality wins the prize.
Che and Gale (2003) consider a deterministic innovation technology. Under a general
framework, they show that the first-price auction with two firms is optimal among various
contest mechanisms (including the tournament). A crucial difference between our model and
theirs is the randomness on the quality realization. In our model, when the randomness is
large, it is beneficial for the buyer to invite many firms and to use the tournament. Our
analysis of the convergence of the mixed strategies and its characterization at the limit also
shows that the auction with two firms outperforms the auction with many firms and the
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tournament. In this sense, our research complements their work.
Another notable paper that compares the auction and the tournament is by Scho¨ttner
(2008). She considers a situation in which two firms compete with each other, and a firm’s
quality stochastically depends on its investment. She shows that if the innovation technology
involves large randomness, the buyer prefers the tournament to the auction. Thus, our work
is on the same line with hers. However, we do not restrict the number of firms; rather, it
is endogenously determined, and hence we are able to capture the incentive effect, which is
not in Scho¨ttner (2008).
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the model.
Section 3.3 considers the first-price auction. Section 3.3.1 analyzes the symmetric pure-
strategy equilibrium when the randomness is large, and Section 3.3.2 analyzes mixed-strategy
equilibria when the randomness is small and their convergence. Section 3.4 considers the
fixed-prized tournament. The comparison of the buyer’s payoffs under two mechanisms is
also discussed there. Section 3.5 concludes the paper. Proofs are provided in the Appendix
unless stated otherwise. The Appendix also provides a constructive example of a mixed-
strategy equilibrium with two firms when the randomness is moderate.
3.2 Model
A buyer wishes to procure an innovation from a set of (potential) suppliers,M = {1, . . . , N}.
The innovation requires an (nonmonetary) investment x ∈ [0,∞) by the firms with a sunk
cost ψ(x) = 1
2
x2. The quality of an innovation is summarized by q, which depends on the
firms’ investment level. More specifically, if a firm invests x, then its quality q is drawn from
a uniform distribution U [x+ a− δ, x+ a+ δ], denoted by F (q|x), for a given δ and for some
fixed a ≥ δ.2 Notice that δ captures the randomness of quality, and x moves the support of
2Since a ≥ δ, q is nonnegative regardless of the investment level x ≥ 0.
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the distribution. Thus, for a given δ, if a firm puts a higher x, then it has a higher probability
of getting a high quality. The assumption on functional forms is somewhat restrictive, but
it enables us to derive a closed-form solution both in the auction and the tournament, and
therefore we can clearly compare when one of the sample and incentive effects prevails.
In order to procure an innovation, the buyer first selects a set of participating firms in
the procurement process, denoted by N = {1, . . . , n} ⊆ M, where n ≥ 2. After each firm
gets its quality q, it is observed also by the buyer (but not by the other firms). The buyer
solicits prices from the firms in N . Each quality–price combination is called score s := q−p.
The buyer selects at most one firm, and if a firm wins, then it is paid the price it has
submitted. Thus, the winning firm’s payoff is p− ψ(x), and losing firms earn −ψ(x). Given
the unverifiable nature of the innovation, the buyer chooses the firm that offers the highest
score. That is, firm i wins if




{qj − pj}, 0
}
.
In the first-price auction (also called first-score acution, Che, 1993), firm i chooses its
price pi. In the fixed-prize tournament, pi is given by some P ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N , which is
determined by the buyer, so si = qi − P . Therefore, when the tournament is used, there is
no bidding stage and a firm that produces the highest quality wins.
3.3 First-Price Auction
Given a set of participants, N , and a fixed δ > 0, any equilibrium consists of a pair of
investment level and score offering (xi, si)i∈N . Let X δi be the support of firm i’s investment,
where xi := inf{X δi } and xi := sup{X δi }. When xi = xi, firm i adopts a pure strategy in
investment. Let Gδi denote the cumulative distribution function of firm i’s net surplus offer,
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si = qi− pi, and Sδi be the support of it. The aggregate support is denoted by Sδ = ∪i∈NSδi .









j(·) is the probability that firm i wins if it offers si to the buyer,
and qi − si = pi is the firm’s revenue conditional on winning.
3.3.1 Symmetric Pure-Strategy Equilibrium
We first consider a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium and conditions under which such an
equilibrium exists. We then derive the optimal number of participants for the buyer.
Let n be the number of participating firms. Suppose there is a symmetric investment
level x; that is, xi = xi ≡ x for all i. Suppose further that there is a symmetric price offering
strategy p(q) such that s(q) = q − p(q) is strictly increasing.
A firm’s optimal price bidding can be found by
p ∈ arg max pProb(qi − p(qi) ≥ qj − p(qj) ∀j ∈ N \ {i} ).






= F n−1(s−1(si)|x). That
is, the probability of winning, Gδ−i(si), is represented by the quality distribution, F
n−1(q|x),
by the symmetry.
Since p = q−s, the firm’s problem is reduced to finding an optimal score offering strategy.
q ∈ arg max
q˜
(
q − s(q˜))F (q˜|x)n−1.
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Maximizing the objective function yields








It is immediately seen that s is strictly increasing in q, and the price bidding strategy is3








From (3.1), it can be interpreted that q is a firm’s “type,” s(q) is its “bid” in the usual
first-price auction, and p(q) is the degree of “shading,” which depends on the number of
firms. If x is fixed independently of n, then the usual interpretation of “shading” works:
As n increases, it approaches to 0, hence s(q) approaches q. However, as it will be shown
below, the investment level depends on the number of firms.
Now, consider the investment strategy. Suppose all firms except i invest the same level x.








F (q|x)n−1(1− F (q|xi)) dq − ψ(xi),
where the last equality follows from (3.2) and the integration by parts. Note that F (q|x)n−1
is the probability that other firms except firm i have qualities smaller than q, and 1−F (q|xi)
is the probability that firm i has a quality greater than q.
Maximizing Πi(xi) and using the fact that F (·|x) is uniform and ψ(·) is quadratic, we
3If the qualities are observable, then the equilibrium bidding strategy is p(qi) = qi − qj if qi > qj ≥
maxk∈N\{i,j}{qk}. This resembles quality competition in a Bertrand game (Riordan, 2010).
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xi + a− δ x∗i + a− δ xi + a+ δ x∗i + a+ δ
(c) Local Downward Deviation
x∗i + a− δ xi + a− δ x∗i + a+ δ xi + a+ δ
(d) Local Upward Deviation











In order to see whether this is indeed an equilibrium, we check firm i’s deviations from xi.
Let all firms in N except i employ the same investment strategy x∗. Suppose firm i slightly
decreases its investment level such that x∗ − 2δ < xi < x∗ so as to x∗ + a − δ < xi + a + δ
(see 3.1(c)), called local downward deviation (ldd). It is clear that if qi < x
∗ + a − δ, then





F (q|x∗)n−1(1− F (q|xi)) dq − ψ(xi).
Consider now local upward deviation (lud) in which firm i slightly increases its investment
level such that x∗ < xi < x∗ + 2δ so as to xi + a − δ < x∗ + a + δ (see 3.1(d)). Suppose
qi > x
∗+a+δ. Then, firm i knows that its quality is the highest one. The firm would like to
reduce the net surplus offer to the buyer, because there is no loss of probability of winning
by doing so but it increases the price, pi = qi − si. Thus, firm i would offer the score as
if the other firms had attained the highest possible quality, that is, s(qi) = s(x
∗ + a + δ).
Inserting x∗ + a + δ into (3.1) and after some rearrangement, we have firm i’s payoff from












p(q) dF (q|xi)− ψ(xi),
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xi + a− δ x∗i + a+ δxi + a+ δ ≤ x∗i + a− δ
(a) Global Downward Deviation
x∗i + a− δ xi + a+ δx∗i + a+ δ ≤ xi + a− δ
(b) Global Upward Deviation
Figure 3.2: Global Deviations
where p(q) = q − s(x∗ + a+ δ).
Lemma 3.1. Suppose δ ≥ 1
2
. Then, Πlddi and Π
lud
i are strictly increasing and strictly de-









We now consider global deviations in which |xi − x∗| ≥ 2δ. Suppose that firm i decreases
its investment level such that xi ≤ x∗ − 2δ (global downward deviation, gdd). Then, the
highest surplus that the firm can offer to the buyer is si = xi + a+ δ by submitting pi = 0,
but the other firms always can offer sj = x
∗+a−δ ≥ si. Therefore, firm i would be defeated
with probability one, hence it would get a zero payoff; that is, Πgdd(xi, x
∗) = 0.
If firm i increases its investment level such that xi ≥ x∗+2δ so as to x∗+a+δ ≤ xi+a−δ
(global upward deviation, gud), then it would win with probability one. Thus, firm i offers a
surplus to the buyer as if all other firms obtain the best possible quality, i.e., si = s(x
∗+a+δ).





q dF (q|xi)− (x∗ + a+ δ) +
∫ x∗+a+δ
x∗+a−δ
F (t|x∗)n−1 dt− ψ(xi).
Lemma 3.2. Suppose δ ≥ 1
2
. Then, Π∗ > Πgudi (xi;x
∗) for any xi ≥ 0.
The proofs of Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 are found in ??. From the two lemmas, it is clear that
there exists a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium if δ ≥ 1
2
, and furthermore, it is the unique
symmetric equilibrium employing a pure strategy. Figure 3.3 depicts a firm’s payoff function
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(a) n = 2, δ = 1












(b) n = 5, δ = 1
Figure 3.3: Firm’s Payoff
in the symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium when δ = 1. In the left panel, the number of
participants is set to be 2, and in the right panel, it is 5.4 In each panel, the graph of the
payoff function is divided into three regions: The solid line in the left-hand side is the payoff
from the local downward deviation (Πldd), the dashed line in the middle is from the local
upward deviation (Πlud), and the solid line in the right-hand side is from the global upward
deviation (Πgud).
In the equilibrium, the expected surplus offer to the buyer by a firm with quality q is





Hence, the buyer’s payoff for a given n and δ ≥ 1
2
is
R(n, δ) = n
∫ x∗+a+δ
x∗+a−δ




R(n+ 1, δ)−R(n, δ) = 4nδ − n− 2
n3 + 3n2 + 2n
≥ 0
4In the figures, we set a = 0 for convenience.
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, which always holds since n ≥ 2, and the inequality is strict unless
n = 2 and δ = 1
2
. Therefore, the buyer benefits by inviting all firms from the set of potential
suppliers. We summarize these observations in the following proposition.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose δ ≥ 1
2
. For a given n, the unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium
is such that x∗ = 1
n
and s(q) is given by (3.1). It is optimal for the buyer to set N =M.
The above result shows that with a sufficient amount of uncertainty, inviting many firms
is optimal for the buyer; that is, the sampling effect dominates the incentive effect. This
feature stands in a sharp contrast to Che and Gale (2003). In their model, there is no
randomness about quality realization (δ = 0). So, no pure-strategy equilibrium exists5 and
inviting only two firms is optimal.
Note that if the investment level does not depend on n, then inviting more firms increases
the buyer’s payoff, clearly. However, since x∗ is decreasing with n in equilibrium, the overall
effect is less clear a priori. The assumptions of uniform distribution and quadratic cost
function help us disentangle the sampling and the incentive effects on the buyer’s payoff.
From (3.3), R(n, δ) can be decomposed by RS(n) := δ− 4δ
n+1
, which comes from the sampling
effect, and RI(n) := x∗, which comes from the incentive effect. Observe that
∆RS(n) := RS(n+ 1)−RS(n) = 4δ
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
is the “marginal benefit” inviting one more firm, and
∆RI(n) :=
∣∣RI(n+ 1)−RI(n)∣∣ = 1
n(n+ 1)
5Since δ = 0, qi = xi + a. If firm i offers si > 0 with probability 1, then firm i must win with positive
probability in an equilibrium because of the sunk investment. Thus, there is no j ∈ N \ {i} such that sj
is slightly below si, because this is dominated by offering slightly more than si. Then, si is dominated by
s′i = si − .
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is the “marginal cost” of it. When δ = 1
2
and n = 2, those two are the same, but if either
δ > 1
2
or n > 2, then the former exceeds the latter. Therefore, even though the investment
level decreases in n, the buyer is better off by inviting many firms.
3.3.2 Mixed-Strategy Equilibria
In this section, we consider the case that δ < 1
2
. As shown in the previous section, there
is no symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium in this case. Although we are not able to fully
characterize mixed-strategy equilibria in this case, we derive some necessarily conditions and
show the convergence of equilibria as δ vanishes, using those conditions. We also provide a
characterization of equilibrium at the limit.
Consider first the bidding stage for a given q and x. After getting a quality, firm i’s
problem is to choose its price, pi, or equivalently its score, si(qi) = qi − pi(qi). Thus, the




Note that we must have qi ≥ si, or else the firm would risk winning at negative payoff.
Recall that Sδi is the support of si and Sδ = ∪j∈NSδj for a given δ > 0. We begin with the
following observations, whose proofs are in ??.
Lemma 3.3. (i) For any i ∈ N and any 0 < s ∈ Sδi , there exists j ∈ N \ {i} such
that s ∈ Sδj .
(ii) Sδ is a connected interval.
(iii) For any i ∈ N , Gδ−i(·) is continuous and strictly increasing in s ∈ Sδi .
(iv) For any si ∈ int(Sδi ), si is strictly increasing in qi.
The first part of the lemma states that at least two firms offer the same score in Sδ, and
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the second part shows that there is no gap in Sδ. The third part states that the winning
probability of a firm in N is continuous and strictly increasing in its score offering.6 Finally,
the last part of the lemma shows that the score function is strictly increasing in the quality.7
We next show that each firm’s score function is drawn from an interval which is bounded
at most of order δ. Recall that for any x ∈ X δi , qi ∈ [x+ a− δ, x+ a+ δ]. It is convenient to
parameterize q and s in terms of x. Denote q(x) := x+ a− δ and q(x) := x+ a+ δ. Likely,
let s(x) := s(q(x)) and s(x) := s(q(x)).
Lemma 3.4. For any x ∈ X δi , there is an interval of score offering, Sδi (x) = [s(x), s(x)].
Moreover, s(x)− s(x) ≤ δM for some M > 0.
The proof of the lemma is found in ??. We now turn our attention to limit properties
of equilibria. To get the limit distribution of Gδ−i, we derive upper and lower bounds of it
and take the limit of those bounds. Let S0 be the support of score offering at the limit
of δ = 0. (The characterization of S0 will be established below.) For a given s ∈ S0, let
I(s) := {i ∈ N | si = s} be the set of firms whose score offering is the same as s.
Theorem 3.2. Fix any s ∈ S0. For any sequence of equilibria along s for each δ > 0, Gδi (s)
converges to the same distribution G0(s) as δ approaches to 0 for all i ∈ I(s).
Sketch of Proof. The proof involves several steps. We first characterize S0, the limit support
of Sδ. We then show that Gδ−i is bounded above and below. Using this, we derive the limiting
distribution of Gδ−i. Finally, we show the convergence of G
δ
i .
Step 1. We first show that S0 = [a, 1
2
+ a]. To do this, suppose first that firm i wins with
6Since the investment is sunk, the properties are similar to equilibria in all-pay auctions (Baye, Kovenock,
and de Vries, 1996).
7Since pii(si; qi) satisfies strict single-crossing property, by the Monotone Selection Theorem (Migrom and
Shannon, 1994), si is nondecreasing. Furthermore, the differentiability of G
δ
−i implies that si is strictly
increasing in qi (Edlin and Shannon, 1998).
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probability one. Then,




q dF (q|xi)− ψ(xi)
}
is the efficient investment level for the firm. Let s∗ = 1 +a−ψ(x∗) = 1
2
+a be the associated
score offer to the buyer. Clearly, s∗ is the maximum surplus a firm can profitably offer to the
buyer if it wins and δ = 0. Using this, one can show that for a sufficiently small δ > 0, the
supremum of Sδ, denoted by s, is in the δ-neighborhood of 1
2





Similarly, s ∈ [a− δ, a+ δ], where s is the infimum of Sδ. See Lemma C.2 in ?? for a formal
statement and proof. Note that this implies that as δ decreases, Sδ approaches S0 ≡ [a, a+ 1
2
]
since Sδ is an interval by Lemma 3.3-(ii).
Step 2. In this step, we find the limit distribution of Gδ−i. Observe that for a fixed s ∈ int(S0),
Step 1 implies that there exists δˆ > 0 such that s ∈ Sδ for all δ < δˆ. Thus, for any selection
of equilibrium along s for each δ, there always exists a subsequence such that the same firm,
say i, is repeated in the sequence. For the fixed s ∈ int(S0), let
Xδi (s) :=
{
x ∈ X δi |s ∈ Sδi (x)
}
be the set of investment level of firm i such that s ∈ Sδi (x) for given δ > 0.
Next, for any x ∈ Xδi (s), let s(q) be the optimally chosen score for each δ > 0. Since
s, s(q) ∈ Sδi (x) and s(x)− s(x) ≤ δM (by Lemma 3.4), it follows that
[q − s(q)]Gδ−i(s(q)) ≤ [q − (s−Mδ)]Gδ−i(s+ δM) (3.4)
for all q ∈ [q(x), q(x)].
We now derive upper and lower bounds of Gδ−i. For any x ∈ Xδi (s), the firm’s payoff is
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bounded above by (3.4); that is,
∫ x+a+δ
x+a−δ




Suppose now that the firm increases its investment level by ε > 0. Then, we have
∫ x+a+δ
x+a−δ




where the inequality follows from the optimality of s(q).
Combining these two and using the fact that F (·|x) is the uniform distribution, we have
Gδ−i(s+ δM)
[
ε− δM] ≤ ψ(x+ ε)− ψ(x), (3.5)







] ≥ ψ(x)− ψ(x− ε). (3.6)
Now, by taking limit of (3.5) and (3.6), we have the limit of Gδ−i. Lemma C.3 in ??
shows that for any s ∈ int(S0), we have G0−i(s) = ψ′(x0), where x0 is the limit of x ∈ Xδi (s).
Step 3. Finally, we show the convergence of Gδi . Note that Lemma 3.3-(i) implies that there















Since G0−i(s) = G
0
−i′(s) = ψ




to the same distribution at the limit, denoted by G0(s). Therefore,






Thus, we have G0(s) = ψ′(x0(s))
1
|I(s)|−1 . 
Observe that if the buyer has invited only two firms, then |I(s)| = 2 for any s ∈ S0 (by
Lemma 3.3-(i)), hence there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in this case. With more than
two firms, however, there may be an asymmetric equilibrium.8 Nevertheless, we can show
that the buyer benefits by inviting only two firms at the limit.
Theorem 3.3. At the limit, inviting only two firms yields (at least weakly) higher payoff to
the buyer than inviting more than two firms.
Proof. Observe that for any s ∈ S0,
G0(s)|I(s)| = ψ′(x0(s))
|I(s)|
|I(s)|−1 ≥ ψ′(x0(s))2 = G0(s)2, (3.7)
where the inequality holds since ψ′(x0(s)) = G0(s)|I(s)|−1 ∈ [0, 1] and |I(s)| ≥ 2. Notice that
the LHS of (3.7) is the cumulative distribution function of the first-order statistic of payoff
with arbitrary number of firms; and the right-hand of (3.7) is that with two firms. Since the
latter first-order stochastically dominates the former, the buyer collects the highest payoff
by inviting only two firms at the limit. 
The optimality of inviting two firms is intuitive. As the randomness diminishes, the
gain from inviting many firms, i.e., the sampling effect, becomes negligible but the incentive
effect prevails. Hence, to promote the investment level of the firms, the buyer invites only
8|I(s)| can be different from |I(s′)| for some s 6= s′.
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two firms. Although Theorem 3.3 does not describe firms’ equilibrium investment strategies,
they can be derived from the score offering strategies.9 Let K0i be the limiting distribution
of firm i’s investment strategy and X 0i be the corresponding support. Let X 0 = ∪j∈NX 0j .
Then,
K0i (x) = Prob(x
0
i (s) ≤ x) = G0i (sup
{
s : x0i (s) ≤ x
}
),
where the second equality is holds since x0i (·) is increasing in s.10 Suppose |N | = 2 so
that there is a unique symmetric score offering strategy. Since S0 = [a, a + 1
2
], this implies
that both firms’ supports of score offering are the same as S0, which implies X 0 = [0, 1].
Hence, X 0i is the same as [0, 1] for both firms. Therefore, we can precisely define the firms’
equilibrium strategies at the limit.
Corollary 1. Suppose |N | = 2. Then, the unique symmetric equilibrium when δ = 0 is that
for all i ∈ N , K0(x) = U [0, 1], p = 1
2
x and G0(s) = U [a, a+ 1
2
].
The proof of the corollary is in ??. So far, we have shown that the set of mixed-strategy
equilibria converges at the limit and characterized the limit distribution. Characterizing
mixed-strategy equilibrium in the intermediate value of δ, i.e., δ ∈ (0, 1
2
), is a hard task, and
we are only able to construct a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium when there are two
firms. We provide this in Appendix C.1.
3.4 Fixed-Prize Tournament
In this section, we study the case that the buyer uses the fixed-prize tournament instead of
the first-price auction. We also compare the buyer’s payoffs under two mechanisms.
9See also Che and Gale (2003).
10Recall that si(q) is increasing in q. At the limit, δ = 0, q is the same as x+ a. Thus, s is also increasing
in x, so x is increasing in s.
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Recall that firm i wins if qi − pi > max
{
maxj∈N\{i} {qj − pj} , 0
}
. The fixed-prize tour-
nament can be understood as a special case in that pi is restricted to P for all bidders, where
P ≥ 0 is optimally chosen by the buyer. Therefore, there is no bidding stage, and a firm that
has produced the highest quality wins the prize. As it will be seen, the absence of bidding
stage makes the analysis simpler than that of the first-price auction.
Consider the firms’ investment decision. We find a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium.
For a given N , suppose that there is such an equilibrium. Suppose further that all firms
in N except firm i undertake the same investment level x. Then, firm i’s payoff is11
ΠTi (xi) = P
∫ xi+a+δ
xi+a−δ
F (q|x)n−1 dF (q|xi)− ψ(xi),
where n is the number firms in N . Since F (·|x) is uniform and ψ(·) is quadratic, we have











By the firms’ individual rationality, we must also have that P ≤ 8δ2
n
so that ΠT ≥ 0.
In order to see whether this is indeed an equilibrium, we investigate firm i’s incentive to
deviate as before. Consider local deviations. (The analysis for global deviations is similar as
before. Hence, we omit it.)
Suppose firm i slightly decreases its investment level such that xT − 2δ < xi < xT (local
downward deviation). Then, its payoff is
Πldd(xi;x
T ) = P
∫ xi+a+δ
xT+a−δ
F (q|xT )n−1dF (q|xi)− ψ(xi),
11We use superscript T , which denotes “tournament,” to avoid confusion with the auction setting.
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since if qi < x
T +a−δ, firm i will be defeated by other firms for sure. Suppose now that firm i
slightly increases its investment level such that xT < xi < x
T + 2δ (local upward deviation).
Then, its payoff becomes
Πlud(xi;x
T ) = P
[ ∫ xT+a+δ
xi+a−δ






since for any qi > x
T + a+ δ, firm i will win for sure.
Lemma 3.5. Suppose P ≤ 4δ2
n−1 for any given δ > 0. Then, there exists a unique symmetric
pure-strategy equilibrium in which all firms invest xT = P/(2δ).
The condition P ≤ 4δ2
n−1 is necessary for the optimality of x
T . We defer a formal proof to
??. Observe that the investment level increases in P , since for a large amount of prize, the
winning firm’s payoff is high, so the firms become more competitive. However, as δ increases,
the firms’ investment level decreases. This is also intuitive since even if a firm invests a high x,
the firm may get a low quality but cannot compete with other firms by lowering its price as
in the auction case. At the same time, even with a low level of investment, a firm may draw
a high quality and has a higher probability of winning.
The investment strategy in Lemma 3.5, however, is not well defined when δ = 0. We now
show that in this case, there is a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium (of choosing x = q),
denoted byHT (q). Note that a firm with quality (i.e., investment level) q receives an expected









Let q and q be respectively the infimum and the supremum of the support of the distri-
bution. Then, we must have PHT (q)n−1 = ψ(q) and PHT (q)n−1 = ψ(q), which implies that
the support of q is [a, a +
√
2P ]. The proof for the optimality of HT (·) is fairly standard,
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hence we omit it.
3.4.1 Comparison of the Buyer’s Payoffs
We aim to compare the buyer’s payoffs under the first-price auction and the fixed-prize
tournament. But, we have not established the buyer’s optimal prize yet. However, since we
were only able to derive the buyer’s payoff in the cases of δ = 0 and δ ≥ 1
2
in the auction, it
is sufficient to consider optimal P in those two cases for the purpose of comparison.
Suppose δ ≥ 1
2
. Under the symmetric investment strategy, xi = x













Since δ ≥ 1
2
, this implies that the optimal P is zero. Clearly, P = 0 satisfies the condition
in Lemma 3.5, hence there is an equilibrium in which P = 0 and xT = 0. Observe that the
buyer’s payoff is increasing in the number of firms. Therefore, for a large randomness, the
buyer does not elicit any effort from the firms but invites as many firms as possible. That
is, the buyer entirely relies on the sampling effect.
Recall that in the first-price auction, the buyer’s payoff, when δ ≥ 1
2
, is











≥ 0⇔ δ ≥ n+ 1
2n
.
Therefore, for any given n, there is δˆn :=
n+1
2n
such that for any δ > δˆn, the fixed-
prize tournament with zero prize dominates the first-price auction in terms of the buyer’s
payoff. This is intuitive since in the auction, each firm’s price request is increasing in its
quality realization, so the buyer leaves a high rents to the firms when the randomness is
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Figure 3.4: δˆn =
n+1
2n




increases. Thus, for sufficiently large n, the tournament gives the buyer a higher surplus
than the auction. In Figure 3.4, δˆn is depicted for each n = 2, . . . , 14.





q dH(q)n − P = a+ 2n
√
2P
3n− 1 − P
We thus have for a fixed n,
P T =
2n2




It is clear that the buyer benefits by inviting only two firms in this case, since RT is strictly
decreasing in n. Thus, we have P T = 8
25
and RT = a + 8
25
in equilibrium. Optimality of
inviting two firms can be understood as the same reason in the auction: The sampling effect
disappears at the limit, but the incentive effect prevails.
Recall that in the first-price auction, the two firms offer scores uniformly over [a, a+ 1
2
].
Thus, the buyer’s payoff is a + 1
3
, which is higher than RT = a + 8
25
. That is, the auction
outperforms the tournament in this case. Note that even though both mechanisms select
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the firm that offers the highest surplus, they induce different investment levels. Under the
auction, the quality is uniformly distributed over [a, a + 1], whereas under the tournament,
it is uniformly distributed over [a, a + 4
5
]. Thus, the buyer earns a higher payoff under the
auction than under the tournament as shown in Che and Gale (2003).
We summarize the results in the following proposition.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose δ ≥ 1
2
. There is a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium such that
P T = 0 and xT = 0. Furthermore, for a given n, there is δˆn such that for any δ > δˆn, the
fixed-prize tournament outperforms the first-price auction.
Suppose δ = 0. It is optimal for the buyer to invite only two firms, and there is a
symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium such that P T = 8
25




the first-price auction with two firms outperforms the fixed-prize tournament.
3.5 Conclusion
The current paper has studied a procurement problem in which firms undertake invest-
ments and the resulting qualities of the innovative activities are ex ante uncertain. In such
an environment, there are two opposing tensions—incentive and sampling effects—and the
buyer’s payoff depends on the number of participants as well as the degree of the randomness
on the quality of innovation.
We consider two prominent mechanisms, a first-price auction and a fixed-prize tourna-
ment. In each mechanism, the number of participating firms in the procurement process
are determined endogenously. We show that in both mechanisms, when the randomness of
quality realization is large, the buyer does not limit the number of participants but rather
invites many firms. If the randomness vanishes, however, inviting only two firms is optimal.
It is also often argued that holding an auction is advantageous for the buyer over a fixed-prize
tournament. However, our results show that this is not true when the randomness is large.
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In fact, the tournament outperforms the auction in this case.
Although we have assumed specific functional forms for the analytical solution, we believe
that the main intuition the paper carries over more general environment. The current paper






Omitted Proofs in Chapter 1
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1.1
We begin with a couple of claims. We then prove the lemma in the sequence of (i), (iii), (ii),
and (iv).
Claim 1. Suppose VAB has zero measure. Then, mA(s) = mB(s) = κ for all s ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Since VAB is a measure zero set, colleges do not put a positive probability on admitting
the same students; that is, α(v) = 0 for almost every v ∈ VB and β(v) = 0 for almost every
v ∈ VA. Thus, a student will attend a college for sure if she is admitted by that college.
Hence, it is optimal for each college to admit the best students up to the capacity among
those who are not admitted by the opponent college. Therefore, α(v) = 1 for almost every
v ∈ VA and β(v) = 1 for almost every v ∈ VB, so we have mi(s) = κ for all s ∈ [0, 1] and for
all i = A,B. 
Claim 2. Suppose VAB has a positive measure. Then, mA(s) < mA(s′) and mB(s) > mB(s′)
for any s < s′.
Proof. The results follows immediately from the fact that µ(·) is strictly increasing in s. 
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Proof of Part (i). If VAB has zero measure, the proof is immediate from Claim 1. Suppose
now that VAB has a positive measure. Suppose mA(1) < κ. Then, A can benefit by admitting
a mass κ −mA(1) of students. Let m˜A(s) be the mass of students attending A under such
deviation. Then, we have that for any s < 1,
mA(s) < mA(s) + µ(s)[κ−mA(1)] ≤ m˜A(s) ≤ mA(s) + [κ−mA(1)] < κ,
where the first and the last inequalities hold since mA(s) < mA(1) and µ(s) ≥ 0. The second
inequality becomes equality if all of the newly admitted students has been admitted by B,
and the third inequality becomes equality if all of them has not been admitted by B.
Observe that A benefits from the deviation since it admits more students without paying
costs for over-enrollment. Therefore, we must have mA(1) ≥ κ in equilibrium. Similarly, if
mA(0) > κ, then A can benefit by rejecting a mass mA(0) − κ students. Combining these
with Claim 2, we have mA(0) ≤ κ ≤ mA(1). The proof for college B is analogous. 
Proof of Part (iii). Suppose VAB has a positive measure. Since mA(·) is continuous in s
(which follows from the continuity of µ(·)), there exists a unique sˆA such that mA(sˆA) = κ.
Suppose sˆA = 1. Then, A has strict over-enrollment for all states except s = 1, a measure
zero state. Similarly, if sˆA = 0, then A has strict under-enrollment for all states except s = 0.
These contradict to Part (i). Thus, we have sˆA ∈ (0, 1). The proof for sˆB is similar, hence
omitted. 
Proof of (ii). We first show sup {VA ∪ VB} = 1. We then show that VA∪VB is a connected
interval and inf {VA ∪ VB} > 0.
Step 1. sup {VA ∪ VB} = 1.
Proof . Suppose on the contrary c := sup {VA ∪ VB} < 1. We show that a college can
benefit by rejecting some students in favor of those in [c, 1]. Suppose that VAB has zero
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measure. Then, a colleges, say A, can benefit by rejecting a positive mass of students from
the bottom of VA and admits the same mass of students from 1.
Suppose now that VAB has a positive measure. Let [c − ε, c] ⊂ VAB.1 Now, let A reject
students in [c− ε, c] and admit those in [c, c+ δ], where ε and δ are such that
G(c+ δ)−G(c) = µ(sˆA)[G(c)−G(c− ε)]. (A.1)
Then, the mass of student attending A from the deviation in state s, denoted by m˜A(s), is
m˜A(s) = G(c+ δ)−G(c)− µ(s)[G(c)−G(c− ε)] +mA(s)
= (µ(sˆA)− µ(s))[G(c)−G(c− ε)] +mA(s), (A.2)












v µα(v)β(v) dG(v)− λEs[m˜A(s)− κ|s > sˆA](1− sˆA),
and hence,

















where the inequality follows from that the fact that α(v), β(v) ≤ 1 and (A.2).
1If there is a positive mass of students in Vi \ Vj , then college i can benefit by replacing these students
those in [c, 1]. Thus, there is no loss generality to assume that [c− ε, c] ⊂ VAB .
99
























> c [G(c+ δ)−G(c)]− µ c [G(c)−G(c− ε)]
= c [G(c)−G(c− ε)](µ(sˆ)− µ),
where the first equality follows from the integration by parts and after some arrangement,
and the last equality follows from (A.1).
Therefore,












where the inequality holds since
∫
sˆA




[µ(s)− µ(sˆA)] ds =
∫ sˆA
0
[µ(sˆA)− µ(s)] ds ≥ 0.
This proves that A can benefit from such a deviation. 
Step 2. VA ∪ VB is a connected interval.
Proof . Suppose on the contrary that there is gap in VA ∪ VB. The proof is analogous to
Step 1, where [c, 1] is now replaces by the gap in VA ∪ VB. We omit the details. 
Step 3. inf {VA ∪ VB} > 0
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Proof . Suppose VAB has zero measure in equilibrium. Then, we have inf {VA ∪ VB} = c,
where 1 − G(c) = 2κ from Step 1, Step 2 and Claim 1. Since κ < 1
2
, we have the desired
result.
Suppose now that VAB has a positive measure in equilibrium. Suppose inf {VA ∪ VB} = 0
to the contrary. Then, we have mA(s) +mB(s) = |VA ∪ VB| = 1 for all s ∈ [0, 1], where the
last equality follows from Steps 1 and 2. Observe that since mA(0) ≤ κ ≤ mA(1), we must
have mB(1) ≤ 1− κ ≤ mB(0). Adding this to mB(1) ≤ κ ≤ mB(0), we have that
mB(1) ≤ 12 ≤ mB(0). (A.3)
Similarly, we also have
mA(0) ≤ 12 ≤ mA(1). (A.4)
Since inf {VA ∪ VB} = 0, at least one of vA and vB is zero. Suppose vA = λ(1− sˆA) = 0.




if vB = 0, then sˆB = 0 and so mB(0) = κ, which contradicts to (A.4).  
Proof of Part (iv). The proof follows from Claim 1 and the fact that VA ∪ VB = [c, 1]
where c = G−1(1− 2κ) (from Part (iii)). 
A.2 Non-Competitive Equilibrium
In this section, we show that when κ < 1
2
is not too small or λ > 1 is not too large, there does
not exist an non-competitive equilibrium. The reason is as follows: Suppose, for instance,
µ = 1
2
, κ > 1
4
and v ∼ U [0, 1]. Suppose further that the worst type college A has is less than
1
2
, and the best type of college B has is 1. Then, regardless of λ, A can benefit by rejecting
sufficiently small mass of students from the bottom and accepting the same mass of students
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close to one, because those newly admitted students will accept A with probability close to
1
2
, and the (average) value of those students is discretely better than that of students rejected
by A. Furthermore, A will never have over-enrollment from this deviation. The first part
Lemma B1 generalize this observation and show that for κ not too small it is profitable. (In
the proof, we do not require the restrictive assumptions made in the above example.)
Of course, this is just one way to deviate. The other way of deviation is to accept more
of those close to one than those A rejects at the bottom. But, the profitability of such
deviation now depends on λ. The second part of Lemma B1 shows that for λ not too large,
it is profitable.
Lemma B1. Suppose that VAB has zero measure. Then, we have the followings:
(i) There is κˆ < 1
2
such that for any κ > κˆ, one college has an incentive to deviate.
(ii) There is λˆ > 1 such that for any λ < λˆ, one college has an incentive to deviate.




v dG(v), i = A,B.
Now, let ci = inf {Vi} and ci = sup {Vi}.
Proof of (i) . Let cA = inf {VA ∪ VB}, without loss of generality. Then, cA = G−1(1 − 2κ)
by Lemma 1.1. We show that college A has an incentive to deviate. Suppose that A rejects
students in [cA, cA + δ] but accepts those in [cB − ε, cB], where ε and δ are such that
G(cB)−G(cB − ε) = G(cA + δ)−G(cA). (A.5)
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= µ(s)[G(cB)−G(cB − ε)] + κ− [G(cA + δ)−G(cA)],
where the second equality follows from that mA(s) = κ for all s.
Let sˆA be such that m˜A(sˆA) = κ (provided sˆA ∈ [0, 1]), i.e.,
µ(sˆA)[G(cB)−G(cB − ε)] = [G(cA + δ)−G(cA)].
Since µ(·) is strictly increasing, (A.5) implies A is never over-demanded in a positive measure







v dG(v) = µ
∫ cB
cB−ε
































(cA + δ)G(cA + δ)− cAG(cA)− δG(cA)
]
= [G(cB)−G(cB − ε)][µ cB − cA − µ ε− δ], (A.6)
where the first equality follows from the integration by parts, and the last equality follows
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from (A.5). Observe that if µ >
cA
cB
, then (A.6) is strictly positive for sufficiently small ε
and δ, hence p˜iA > piA. Note that since cA = G
−1(1 − 2κ) and mi(s) = κ for all s and i,





G−1(1− κ) . (A.7)
Since the RHS of (A.7) is continuous in κ and converges to zero as κ approaches to 1
2
, there
is κˆ < 1
2
such that for any κ > κˆ, µ >
cA
cB
for any given µ.
Proof of (ii) . Let cB = sup {VA ∪ VB}, without loss of generality. Then, cB = 1 by
Lemma 1.1. We show that college A has an incentive to deviate. Suppose A rejects students
in [cA, cA + δ] but admits students in [1− ε, 1], where ε and δ are such that
η [1−G(1− ε)] = G(cA + δ)−G(cA) (A.8)







g(v) dv = µ(s)[1−G(1−ε)]+κ− [G(cA+δ)−G(cA)].
Let sˆA be such that m˜A(sˆA) = κ, i.e., µ(sˆA)[1 − G(1 − ε)] = [G(cA + δ) − G(cA)]. Then,
µ(sˆA) = η by (A.8), i.e., sˆA = µ
−1(η) = 1− cA.























µ(s)ds− [G(cA + δ)−G(cA)](1− sˆA)
]
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and the net payoff from the deviation is












µ(s)ds− [G(cA + δ)−G(cA)](1− sˆA)
]
















where the second inequality follows from the integration by parts of the first two terms of
the RHS of the first equality, and the last equality follows from (A.8).





> 0, then (A.9) is strictly positive
for sufficiently small ε and δ. Note that








µ(s) ds+ (λ− 1) η cA,






µ(s) ds (since sˆA < 1). Thus, there exists λˆ > 1 such that
for any λ < λˆ, p˜iA > piA.  
A.3 Proofs of Theorem 1.2
Suppose on the contrary that v˜ ≤ v˜ in competitive equilibrium. Suppose further that
vB ≤ vB ≤ vA ≤ vA, (A.10)
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without loss of generality. For given sˆA and sˆB in equilibrium, the mass of students attending
each college is
mA(s) = µ(s)[1−G(vA)],
mB(s) = (1− µ(s))[1−G(vA)] +G(vA)−G(vB).
Notice that we must have vA ∈ (0, 1) in equilibrium, since if vA = 1, then mA(s) = 0 for any
s ∈ [0, 1], and if vA = 0, then vB = vB = vA = vA = 0. This implies that sˆA < 1 (or else,
vA = vA = 0) and sˆA > 0 (or else, vA = λ ≥ 1). Since sˆA < 1, (A.10) becomes
vB ≤ vB ≤ vA < vA,
i.e., the last inequality becomes strict, or equivalently,









In equilibrium, we must have that
mA(sˆA) = µ(sˆA)[1−G(vA)] = κ, (A.12)
mB(sˆB) = (1− µ(sˆB))[1−G(vA)] +G(vA)−G(vB) = κ. (A.13)
From (A.12), 1−G(vA) = κµ(sˆA) . Substituting this into (A.13), we have that
G(vA)−G(vB) = κ
(





Since vA > vB by (A.11), we have that
µ(sˆA) + µ(sˆB) > 1⇔ µ(sˆB) > 1− µ(sˆA) = µ(1− sˆA),
where the last equality follows from the symmetry of µ(·). Since µ(·) is strictly increasing,
this implies that sˆB > 1− sˆA. Therefore, λ sˆB > λ (1− sˆA) which contradicts to (A.11).
A.4 Proofs of Theorem 1.3
Lemma A.1. T is continuous on S.
Proof. Fix any sˆ = (sˆA, sˆB) ∈ S. Then, α(·; sˆ) and β(·; sˆ) are given by (1.4) and (1.5). Note
that vA and vA are continuous in sˆA, and vB and vB are continuous in sˆB. Now let
v := min {vA, vB} , v˜ := max {vA, vB} , v˜ := min {vA, vB} , v := max {vA, vB} .
For given sˆ, T (sˆ) = s˜, where s˜ = (s˜A, s˜B) ∈ S satisfies that
s˜A = inf
{
s ∈ [0, 1]
∣∣∣ ∫ 1
0
α(v; sˆ)[1− β(v; sˆ) + µ(s)β(v; sˆ)]dG(v)− κ > 0
}
,
if the set in the RHS is nonempty, or else s˜A ≡ 1, and
s˜B = sup
{
s ∈ [0, 1]
∣∣∣ ∫ 1
0
β(v; sˆ)[1− α(v; sˆ) + (1− µ(s))α(v; sˆ)]dG(v)− κ > 0
}
,
if the set in the RHS is nonempty, or else s˜B ≡ 0.
Consider now any sˆ′ = (sˆ′A, sˆ
′
B) ∈ S. Then, for such sˆ′, α(·; sˆ′) ≡ α′ and β(·; sˆ′) ≡ β′ are
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given by (1.4) and (1.5), and
v′ := min {v′A, v′B} , v˜′ := max {v′A, v′B} , v˜′ := min {v′A, v′B} , v′ := max {v′A, v′B} .
Again, s˜′ = (s˜′A, s˜
′
B) ∈ S is defined by T .
Next, let
v1 := min {v, v′} , v2 := max {v, v′} , v3 := min
{
v˜, v˜′} , v4 := max{v˜, v˜′} ,
v5 := min {v˜, v˜′} , v6 := max {v˜, v˜′} , v7 := min {v, v′} , v8 := max {v, v′} ,
and consider a partition of [0, 1] such that
V1 = (∪i=2,4,6,8[vi−1, vi]) ∩ [0, 1], V2 = [v4, v5] ∩ [0, 1], V3 = [0, 1] \ (V1 ∪ V2).
Consider now α and α′. For any v ∈ [0, 1], we have
∫ 1
0





|α′(v)− α(v)| 1Vi(v) dG(v),
where 1Vi(v) is 1 if v ∈ Vi or 0 otherwise.
Observe, first, that by the continuity of vi and vi, i = A,B, there is a δ1 > 0 such that







Second, for any v ∈ V2, the continuity of α0(·), given by (1.2), implies that there is δ2 such
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that ‖sˆ′ − sˆ‖ < δ2 implies




Lastly, for any v ∈ V3, α′(v) and α(v) are either 0 or 1 at the same time, hence we have that
|α(v′)− α(v)| = 0. (A.16)
Now, let δ = min {δ1, δ2} and suppose ‖sˆ′ − sˆ‖ < δ. Then, we have
∫ 1
0
|α′(v)− α(v)| dG(v) =
∫ 1
0
|α′(v)− α(v)| 1V1(v) dG(v) +
∫ 1
0











where the equality follows from (A.16) and the inequality follows from (A.14) and (A.15).
Similarly, we also have that
∫ 1
0






α′(v)[1− β′(v) + µ(s)β′(v)] dG(v)−
∫ 1
0













|α′(v)− α(v)| dG(v) + (1− µ(s))
∫ 1
0
|α′(v)β′(v)− α(v)β(v)| dG(v) (A.19)
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where the first inequality holds since α′(v), β(v) ≤ 1, and the last inequality follows from
(A.17) and (A.18). Therefore, if ‖sˆ′ − sˆ‖ < δ, then
∣∣∣∣∫ 1
0
α′(v)[1− β′(v) + µ(s)β′(v)]dG(v)−
∫ 1
0
α(v)[1− β(v) + µ(s)β(v)]dG(v)
∣∣∣∣ < ε. (A.20)
Similarly, we also have
∣∣∣∣∫ 1
0
β′(v)[1− α′(v) + (1− µ(s))α′(v)]dG(v)−
∫ 1
0
β(v)[1− α(v) + (1− µ(s))α(v)]dG(v)
∣∣∣∣ < ε.
(A.21)
Combining (A.20) and (A.21), we conclude that there is δ > 0 such that for any ε > 0,
if ‖sˆ′ − sˆ‖ < δ, then ‖s˜′ − s˜‖ < ε. Since sˆ is chosen arbitrary, T is continuous on S. 




















Consider any feasible α and α′. Note that for η ∈ [0, 1], the first part of (A.22) is linear in α,
∫ 1
0




vα(v)[1− β(v) + µ(s)β(v)]dG(v) + (1− η)
∫ 1
0
vα′(v)[1− β(v) + µ(s)β(v)]dG(v).























α(v)[1− β(v) + µ(s)β(v)]dG(v)− κ, 0
}
+ (1− η) max
{∫ 1
0
α′(v)[1− β(v) + µ(s)β(v)]dG(v)− κ, 0
}
.
Therefore, we have piA(ηα + (1 − η)α′) ≥ η piA(α) + (1 − η)piA(α′). That is, piA is concave
in α. 
Lemma A.3. V (·) is concave in t for any t ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Observe that α(v; t) is linear in t, since for any t, t′ ∈ [0, 1],
α(v; η t+ (1− η) t′) = (η t+ (1− η) t′)α˜(v) + (1− (η t+ (1− η) t′))α(v)
= [η t α˜(v) + η (1− t)α(v)] + [(1− η) t′α˜(v) + (1− η) (1− t)α(v)]
= η α(v; t) + (1− η)α(v; t′). (A.23)
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Therefore, we have
V (η t+ (1− η) t′) = piA(α(v; η t+ (1− η) t′)) = piA(η α(v; t) + (1− η)α(v; t′))
≥ η piA(α(v; t)) + (1− η) piA(α(v; t′))
= ηV (t) + (1− η)V (t′),
where the second equality follows from Lemma A.2 and the inequality follows from (A.23).

Lemma A.4. V ′(0) ≤ 0.
Proof. Let
W (t, sˆA(t)) :=
∫ 1
0






α(v; t)[1− β(v) + µ(s)β(v)] dG(v)− κ
]
ds
and denote it by
V (t) := W (t, sˆA(t)).
Observe that














W2(t, sˆA(t)) = λ
[ ∫ 1
0




Notice that W2(0, sˆA(0)) = 0 (by definition of sˆA). Therefore, we have
V ′(0) = W1(0, sˆ(0)) =
∫ 1
0
(α˜(v)− α(v))Hα(v, β(v)) dG(v) ≤ 0,
where the inequality follows from local incentives. 
A.5 Proofs for Section 1.5
Proof for Lemma 1.2. Fix any σ. To prove the optimality of the cutoff strategy, we show
that T ′(y|σ) > 0 for any y. Note that
T ′(y|σ) = PA(y|σ) + PB(y|σ) + yP ′A(y|σ)− (1− y)P ′B(y|σ)






























where the inequality holds since
ky(y|s)













∣∣∣ky(y|s)k(y|s) ∣∣∣ < δ. Similarly,

















where the inequality holds since
ky(y|s)












Therefore, we have that T ′(y|σ) > 0 since δ ≤ 1
2
.
It remains to show that there exists an equilibrium in cutoff strategy. Let yˆ be a cutoff.
Then, we have nA(s|yˆ) =
∫ 1
yˆ

















T (y|yˆ) := yPA(y|yˆ)− (1− y)PB(y|yˆ).
Note that













> 0 and l(s|0) ≥ 0 for all s, and l(s|0) > 0
for a positive measure of states. Similarly, T (1|yˆ) > 0. By the continuity of T (·|yˆ), there is
a y˜ such that T (y˜|yˆ) = 0. Moreover, such a y˜ is unique since T ′(y|yˆ)∣∣
y=y˜
> 0.
Next, let τ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be the map from yˆ to y˜, which is implicitly defined by
T (τ(yˆ)|yˆ) = 0 according to the Implicit Function Theorem (since T ′(y|yˆ)∣∣
y=y˜
> 0). Since
PA(y|·) is nondecreasing and PB(y|·) is nonincreasing yˆ, τ(·) is decreasing. Therefore, there
is a fixed point such that τ(yˆ) = yˆ, and hence there is yˆ such that T (yˆ|yˆ) = 0. 
Proof for Theorem 1.6. Suppose yˆ < 1
2




























where the first inequality holds since yˆ < 1
2
. Thus, a student with taste yˆ applies to B, which
is a contradiction.
Suppose now yˆ = 1. Then, nA(s|1) = 1−K(1|s) = 0, so PA(y|yˆ) = 1 for any y. Hence,
T (1|1) = PA(1|1) = 1, which contradicts to the fact that T (yˆ|yˆ) = 0. 
Proof of Theorem 1.7. We show that there is a positive measure of states in which
cA(s) 6= cB(s). Suppose on the contrary cA(s) = cB(s) for almost all s. Recall that equilib-












Since G(·) is strictly increasing, if cA(s) = cB(s), then we must have either ni(s) < κ for all
i = A,B (so that cA(s) = cB(s) = 0) or nA(s) = nB(s) ≥ κ.
First, we cannot have ni(s) < κ for all i in equilibrium, since this means that all applicants
are admitted by either college, and this contradicts to 2κ < 1. Second, suppose nA(s) =
nB(s) ≥ κ. This implies that K(yˆ|s) = 12 for all s (recall that nA(s) = 1 − K(yˆ|s) and
nB(s) = K(yˆ|s)). However, by (1.15), we have K(yˆ|s′) < K(yˆ|s) for all s′ > s. Therefore,
we reach a contradiction again. 
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A.6 Proof of Theorem 1.8





























where v˜ is such that
(1− ε)[G(v˜)−G(v˜)] = κ− sb(1− ε)[1−G(vˆ)]. (A.24)
and the second equality follows from sa = 1− sb.
Consider now its payoff under the deviation. Notice first that those students in [vˆ− δ′, vˆ]
accept college A, since they prefer it over C. Therefore, A’s payoff under the deviation is






































(1− ε)[G(v˜)−G(vˇ)] = κ− (1− ε)[G(vˆ)−G(vˆ − δ′)]− sb(1− ε)[1−G(vˆ + δ)],
that is, vˇ is set to meet the capacity in the less popular state given that the students in
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[vˆ − δ′, vˆ] will attend it for sure in any state. Observe that vˇ > v˜, since
(1− ε)[G(v˜)−G(vˇ)] = κ− sb(1− ε)[1−G(vˆ)]− sa(1− ε)[G(vˆ)−G(vˆ − δ′)]
= (1− ε)[G(v˜)−G(v˜)]− sa(1− ε)[G(vˆ)−G(vˆ − δ′)], (A.25)
where the first equality follows from the fact sa = 1 − sb and (1.16), and the last equality
follows from (A.24). Thus, we have
2(pidA − piA)


































































where the second equality follows from the integration by parts, and the third equality
follows from (1.16). The inequality holds since
∫ vˆ











. Hence, using (1.16) again, we get
2(pidA − piA)
1− ε ≥ [G(vˆ)−G(vˆ−δ
′)
]





Therefore, for sufficiently small δ, we have pidA > piA.
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A.7 Proof of Lemma 1.3
Suppose college B truthfully reports its ranking and capacity. We show that it is a best
response for A to do the same.
Observe first that it is a dominant strategy for A to report its capacity truthfully. Clearly,
A has no incentive to over-report its quota, or else it will pay costs for over-enrollment,
which is not profitable since λ ≥ 1 and v ∈ [0, 1]; that is, each student beyond the (true)
capacity brings about a cost higher than her value. Suppose A under-reports its capacity.
Apparently, A will have a positive mass of unfilled seats, a part of loss. The possible gain
from this deviation comes from that it causes a “rejection chain,” that is, A rejects some
students (who could be assigned to A if A had not underreported its quota), and those
students apply to B, causing B to reject some other students, who then apply to A. If those
second group of students are more preferred by A over the first group of students, then A
could be better off. However, the common preference of A and B implies that those second
group of students are worse than the first group of students, since B would not otherwise
reject the second group of students.
Suppose now thatA has changed its rankings for students. Then, there exists some value vˆ
such that a positive mass of students with scores above vˆ are reported to be less preferred
to some positive mass of students with scores below vˆ. If the first group of students were
not able to be admitted by A for all states when A reports its ranking truthfully, this does
not change A’s payoff. However, when those first group of students were able to be assigned
to A for a positive measure states under truthful report, A’s deviation causes a rejection
chain. The common preferences of A and B, again, implies that this is not profitable for A.
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A.8 Extension: More than Two Colleges
Our main model in Section 3.2 considers the case with two colleges. In this section, we
show that our analysis extends to the case with more than two colleges. While the extension
works for any arbitrary number of colleges, we provide the result for the three-college case for
expositional simplicity. It will become clear that the method also extends to larger numbers.
Let σi : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be college i’s admission strategy, where i = 1, 2, 3. In each state
s ∈ [0, 1], let µijk(s), where i, j, k = 1, 2, 3, denote the mass of students whose preference
ordering is i  j  k. Define the following notations.
• µij(s) := µijk(s) + µikj(s) + µkij(s) (the mass of students who prefer i to j in state s),










For given σi(·), i = 1, 2, 3, let ni(v) be the probability that a student with score v attends







The student will attend college i if she is admitted only by i, which happens with probability
(1−σj(v))(1−σk(v)); or is admitted by college i and one of the less preferred colleges, which
happens with probability µij(s)σj(v)(1 − σk(v)) + µik(s)σk(v)(1 − σj(v)) in state s; or is
admitted by both of the other colleges but prefers i the most, which happens with probability
µij,k(s)σj(v)σk(v) in state s.
Thus, for a given profile of admission strategies, σ = (σi)i=1,2,3, in equilibrium, the mass
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v σi(v)ni(v) dG(v)− λ
∫ 1
0






Recall that in the two-school case, the monotonicity of µ(·) yields cutoff states (sˆA, sˆB)
that trigger over-enrollment for each college, and the set of over-demanded states for each of
them is a connected interval, (sˆA, 1] and [0, sˆB). To establish the existence of a maximally
mixed equilibrium (MME), we have projected the admission strategies to a simpler (state)
space, which allows us to use the Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. However, with more than
two colleges, we do not know the structure of the set of over-demanded states in general,
so we cannot directly define a map from cutoff states to cutoff states. Nonetheless, the
main idea of the proof can be carried over, although to do so requires us using a fixed point
theorem (Schauder) in a functional space.
Define a subdistribution Fi : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], i = 1, 2, 3, such that Fi(0) = 0 and
Fi(s) := Prob
(
mi(t) > κ for t < s
)
. (A.28)
The subdistribution of college i places a positive mass only on the states in which college i
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is over-demanded. Observe that Fi(·) is nondecreasing and
0 ≤ Fi(s′)− Fi(s) ≤ s′ − s, ∀ s′ ≥ s.2
Let Fi be the set of all such subdistributions and F := ×3i=1Fi. (It will become clear that
these subdistributions will play a similar role to the cutoff states in int two-school case.)























is college i’s marginal payoff from admitting a student with score v. The first part of the RHS
of (A.30) is college i’s expected benefit, and the second part is its the expected cost. Note
that this marginal payoff depends on the subdistribution Fi, as ni(v) is a constant for given
admission strategies (σi)i=1,2,3 (by (A.27)) and ni(v) is evaluated by the subdistribution.
Consider now college i’s marginal payoff. First, Hi(v, 0, 0) is its marginal payoff from
2The second inequality holds because
Fi(s
′)− Fi(s) = Prob
(
mi(t) > κ for t < s
′)− Prob(mi(t) > κ for t < s)
= Prob
(
mi(t) > κ for s < t < s
′)
≤ Prob(s < t < s′)
= s′ − s.
3Note that since Fi is Lipschitz continuous, so it is absolute continuous. Thus, the integration is well
defined. Observe also that (A.29) does not involve max {·, ·} in the cost (see (A.26) for comparison), as the











Hi(v, 0, 0) < 0
Hi(v, 0, 1) < 0 < Hi(v, 0, 0)
Hi(v, 1, 0) < 0 < Hi(v, 0, 1)
Hi(v, 1, 1) < 0 < Hi(v, 1, 0)

























⇒ σi = 0 σi = 1
Figure A.1: College i’s Admission Decision
admitting a student with score v who is refused by both of the other colleges. Second,
Hi(v, 1, 0) and Hi(v, 0, 1) are college i’s marginal payoffs from admitting a student with
score v who is admitted by college j (k) but rejected by k (j, respectively). Lastly, Hi(v, 1, 1)
is the marginal payoff from a student with v who is admitted by both of the other colleges.
Using what we have so far established, (A.30) is decomposed as follow:
Hi(v, σj(v), σj(v)) = (1− σj(v))(1− σk(v))Hi(v, 0, 0) + σj(v)(1− σk(v))Hi(v, 1, 0)
+ (1− σj(v))σk(v)Hi(v, 0, 1) + σj(v)σk(v)Hi(v, 1, 1).









i , 1, 1) = 0, Hi(v
10
i , 1, 0) = 0, Hi(v
01
i , 0, 1) = 0, Hi(v
00
i , 0, 0) = 0.
That is, v11i (v
00
i ) is the threshold score that makes college i indifferent from admitting or
not a student who was admitted (or refused) by both of the other colleges. Likewise, v10i and
v01i are the threshold scores that make college i indifferent from admitting or not a student
who was admitted by only one of the other colleges.
Similar to the two-school case, Hi(v, σj, σk) partitions the students’ type space as depicted
in Figure A.1.4 Each college admits a student with score v such that Hi(v, 1, 1) > 0 and




rejects a student with score v such that Hi(v, 0, 0) < 0. That is, each college admits a
student whose score is high enough so that its marginal payoff from admitting the student is
positive even when she is definitely admitted by both of the other colleges; and each college
rejects a student whose score is low enough that its marginal payoffs from admitting the
student is negative. Where Hi(v, 1, 1) < 0 < Hi(v, 0, 0), each college admits a student with
v if Hi(v, 1, 0) > 0 or Hi(v, 0, 1) > 0; that is, the college’s marginal payoff from admitting
the student is positive only when she is admitted by one of the other colleges. This shows
that colleges engage in strategic targeting for those intermediate range of scores.
Randomization may emerge for some students. For students with v such that
max
i=1,2,3
{Hi(v, 1, 0), Hi(v, 0, 1)} < 0 < min
i=1,2,3
{Hi(v, 0, 0)} ,
all three colleges engage in mixed-strategies, where the mixed-strategies satisfy
Hi(v, σj(v), σk(v)) = 0 ∀i, j, k = 1, 2, 3.
For students with v such that Hk(v, 0, 0) < 0 and
max {Hi(v, 1, 0), Hj(v, 1, 0)} < 0 < min {Hi(v, 0, 0), Hj(v, 0, 0)} ,
college k does not admit such students, but colleges i and j engage in mixed-strategies
satisfying
Hi(v, σj, 0) = 0 and Hj(v, σi, 0) = 0.
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Figure A.2: Admission Strategies
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Note that, as in the two-school case, there are many ways that colleges could coordinate
(even in a mixed-strategy equilibrium). Hence, we consider the maximally mixed-strategy
as before and provide the existence of such equilibrium.
For a given profile of subdistributions (Fi)
3
i=1, let σ := (σi)
3
i=1 be the profile of admission
strategies that satisfy the local conditions described above. Then, such σ in turn determines
a new profile of subdistributions, (Fi)
3
i=1 via (A.28). Next, we define T : F → F , a self-map
from the set of subdistributions to itself, where F = ×3i=1Fi. The existence of equilibrium
is achieved when T has a fixed point (on the functional space of F).
As mentioned earlier, the idea of proving the existence of equilibrium is similar to the
idea of Theorem 1.3, projecting the strategy profile into a simpler space. The difference is
that in the two-school case, the strategy profiles are projected into the state space, but in
the general case, they are projected into the set of subdistributions F .
Theorem A.1. There exists an equilibrium with maximally mixed-strategies.
We first show that F is a compact and convex subset of a normed linear space, and
T : F → F is continuous. Then, T has a fixed point by Schauder’s fixed point theorem.5
We then show that the identified strategies in the previous step do indeed constitute mutual
(global) best responses. We provide a formal proof in the next subsection.
A.8.1 Proof of Theorem A.1
For given (Fi)i=1,2,3, consider colleges’ strategy profile (σi)i=1,2,3 which satisfies the following
local conditions:
• σi(v) = 1 if H1(v, 1, 1) > 0, i = 1, 2, 3.
5Schauder’s fixed point theorem is a generalization of Brouwer’s theorem on a normed linear space. It
guarantees that every continuous self-map on a nonempty, compact, convex subset of a normed linear space
has a fixed point (see Ok, 2007). In our framework, CB([0, 1]), the space of the continuous and bounded
real maps on [0, 1], is a normed linear space, and F is a nonempty, compact, convex subset of it.
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• σ1(v) = 0 if H1(v, 1, 1) < 0, H2(v, 1, 1) > 0, H3(v, 1, 1) > 0.
σ2(v) = 0 if H1(v, 1, 1) > 0, H2(v, 1, 1) < 0, H3(v, 1, 1) > 0.
σ3(v) = 0 if H1(v, 1, 1) > 0, H2(v, 1, 1) > 0, H3(v, 1, 1) < 0.
• σ1(v) = 0, σ2(v) = 1, σ3(v) = 1 if

H1(v, 1, 1) < 0
H2(v, 1, 1) < 0, H2(v, 0, 1) > 0
H3(v, 1, 1) < 0, H3(v, 0, 1) > 0
• σ1(v) = 1, σ2(v) = 0, σ3(v) = 1 if

H1(v, 1, 1) < 0, H1(v, 0, 1) > 0
H2(v, 1, 1) < 0
H3(v, 1, 1) < 0, H3(v, 1, 0) > 0
• σ1(v) = 1, σ2(v) = 1, σ3(v) = 0 if

H1(v, 1, 1) < 0, H1(v, 1, 0) > 0
H2(v, 1, 1) < 0, H2(v, 1, 0) > 0
H3(v, 1, 1) < 0
• σ1(v) = 1, σ2(v) = 0, σ3(v) = 0 if

H1(v, 1, 1) < 0, H1(v, 0, 0) > 0
H2(v, 1, 1) < 0, H2(v, 1, 0) < 0
H3(v, 1, 1) < 0, H3(v, 1, 0) < 0
• σ1(v) = 0, σ2(v) = 1, σ3(v) = 0 if

H1(v, 1, 1) < 0, H1(v, 1, 0) < 0
H2(v, 1, 1) < 0, H2(v, 0, 0) > 0
H3(v, 1, 1) < 0, H3(v, 0, 1) < 0
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• σ1(v) = 0, σ2(v) = 0, σ3(v) = 1 if

H1(v, 1, 1) < 0, H1(v, 0, 1) < 0
H2(v, 1, 1) < 0, H2(v, 0, 1) < 0
H3(v, 1, 1) < 0, H3(v, 0, 0) > 0
• σi(v) = 0 if H1(v, 0, 0) < 0, i = 1, 2, 3.
• σi(v)’s satisfy H1(v, σ2(v), σ3(v)) = H2(v, σ1(v), σ3(v)) = H3(v, σ1(v), σ2(v)) = 0, if
max
i=1,2,3
{Hi(v, 1, 0), Hi(v, 0, 1)} < 0 < min
i=1,2,3
{Hi(v, 0, 0)}
• σi(v) and σj(v) satisfy Hi(v, σj, 0) = 0 and Hj(v, σi, 0) = 0 if Hk(v, 0, 0) < 0 and
max {Hi(v, 1, 0), Hj(v, 1, 0)} < 0 < min {Hi(v, 0, 0), Hj(v, 0, 0)}
Now, let CB([0, 1]) be the space of continuous and bounded real maps on [0, 1]. Then,
CB([0, 1]) is a normed linear space, with a sup norm ‖·‖, i.e., for any F, F ′ ∈ CB([0, 1]),
‖F − F ′‖ = sup
s∈[0,1]
|F (s)− F ′(s)| .
Lemma A.1. F is compact and convex.
Proof. We first show that Fi, i = 1, 2, 3, is closed. To this end, consider any sequence {F ni },
where F ni ∈ Fi for each n, such that ‖F ni − Fi‖ → 0 as n→∞. We prove that Fi ∈ Fi.
Observe first that Fi is nondecreasing. To see this, note that Fi(s
′)− Fi(s) < 0 for some
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s′ > s otherwise. But then,
‖F ni − Fi‖ ≥ max {|F ni (s′)− Fi(s′)| , |Fi(s)− F ni (s)|}
≥ 1
2
(|F ni (s′)− Fi(s′)|+ Fi(s)− F ni (s))
≥ 1
2





which is a contradiction. Likely, for s′ > s, we must have that Fi(s′) − Fi(s) ≤ s′ − s. To
see this, suppose on the contrary that Fi(s
′)− Fi(s) > s′ − s. Then,
‖F ni − Fi‖ ≥ max {|Fi(s′)− F ni (s′)| , |F ni (s)− Fi(s)|}
≥ 1
2
(|Fi(s′)− F ni (s′)|+ |F ni (s)− Fi(s)|)
≥ 1
2
|Fi(s′)− Fi(s) + F ni (s)− F ni (s′)|
≥ 1
2
|Fi(s′)− Fi(s)− (s′ − s)|
> 0,
which is a contradiction again. Combining these, Fi ∈ Fi, proving that Fi is closed.
Next, we prove that Fi is compact. Note that for any Fi ∈ Fi and s, s′ ∈ [0, 1],
|Fi(s′)− Fi(s)| ≤ |s′ − s| ,
Hence, Fi is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant K, and hence it is equicontinuous
and bounded. By the Arze`la-Ascoli theorem,6 Fi is compact.
6Arze`la-Ascoli theorem gives conditions for a set of C(T ) to be compact, where C(T ) is the space of
continuous maps on T and T is a compact metric space. A subset of C(T ) is compact if and only if it is
128
Next, we prove that Fi is convex. Observe that for any Fi, F ′i ∈ F and s, s′ ∈ [0, 1], for
and η ∈ (0, 1),
(ηFi + (1− η)F ′i )(s′)− (ηFi + (1− η)F ′i )(s) = η(Fi(s′)− Fi(s)) + (1− η)(F ′i (s′)− F ′i (s))
≤ η(s′ − s) + (1− η)(s′ − s)
= s′ − s,
which proves that Fi is convex.
Since Fi is compact and closed, so is its Cartesian product F = ×3i=1Fi (with respect to
the product topology). 
Lemma A.2. T is continuous.
Proof. The proof involves several steps:
Step 1. vjki ’s are continuous on F1, F2, F3.
Proof . We first show that vjki ’s are continuous in Fi. Fix any Fi ∈ Fi and ε > 0. Take
δ = ε/2. Then, for any Fi, F
′
i ∈ Fi such that ‖Fi − F ′i‖ < δ, we have that






∣∣∣∣µij,k(1)[Fi(1)− F ′i (1)]− ∫ 1
0
µ′ij,k(s)[Fi(s)− F ′i (s)]ds
∣∣∣∣
≤ 2 ‖Fi(s)− F ′i (s)‖
< ε,
where the third equality follows from the integration by parts and Fi(0) = F
′
i (0) = 0, and
the first inequality holds since
∫ 1
0
µ′(s)ds = µ(1)− µ(0) ≤ 1. 
closed, bounded, and equicontinuous.
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Step 2. σi’s in mixed-strategies are continuous.
Proof . Consider, at first, students with score v such that
Hk(v, 0, 0) < 0, (A.31)
Hi(v, 1, 0) < 0 < Hi(v, 0, 0), (A.32)
Hj(v, 1, 0) < 0 < Hj(v, 0, 0). (A.33)
That is, college k puts zero probability for those students (by (A.31)), and colleges i and j
use mixed-strategies σi and σj which satisfy Hi(v, σj, 0) = 0 and Hj(v, σi, 0) = 0.
Now, let Ji : [0, 1]
2 × [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] such that
Ji(Fi, Fj , σi, σj) ≡ Hi(v, σj , 0) = v
[
(1− σj) + µijσj(v)
]− λ ∫ 1
0
[
(1− σj) + µij(s)σj(v)
]
dFi(s),
Jj(Fi, Fj , σi, σj) ≡ Hj(v, σi, 0) = v
[
(1− σi) + µjiσi(v)
]− λ ∫ 1
0
[
(1− σi) + µji(s)σi(v)
]
dFj(s).
Then, σi and σj are the solution to Ji = 0 and Jj = 0 in terms of Fi and Fj. Observe that




= −Hi(v, 0, 0) +Hi(v, 1, 0) < 0,
where inequality follows from (A.32). Similarly, we also have by (A.33)
∂Jj
∂σi


























Since ∆ji 6= 0, the Implicit function theorem implies that there are unique σi and σj such
that
Ji(Fi, Fj, σi, σj) = 0 and Jj(Fi, Fj, σi, σj) = 0.
Furthermore, such σi and σj are continuous.
Consider now the case that H1(v, σ2, σ3) = H2(v, σ1, σ3) = H3(v, σ1, σ2) = 0 when
max
i=1,2,3
{Hi(v, 1, 0), Hi(v, 0, 1)} < 0 < min
i=1,2,3
{Hi(v, 0, 0)} . (A.34)
Similar as before, let
J1(F1, F2, F3, σ1, σ2, σ3) ≡ H1(v, σ2, σ3) = 0,
J2(F1, F2, F3, σ1, σ2, σ3) ≡ H2(v, σ1, σ3) = 0,
J3(F1, F2, F3, σ1, σ2, σ3) ≡ H3(v, σ1, σ2) = 0.
Observe that
Ji = (1− σj)(1− σk)Hi(v, 0, 0) + σj(1− σk)Hi(v, 1, 0) + (1− σj)σkHi(v, 0, 1) + σjσkHi(v, 1, 1)
= (1− σj)Hi(v, 0, 0) + σj(1− σk)Hi(v, 1, 0)− (1− σj)σkHk(v, 1, 0) + σjσkHi(v, 1, 1).





= −Hi(v, 0, 0) + (1− σk)Hi(v, 1, 0) + σkHk(v, 1, 0) + σkHi(v, 1, 1) < 0,
where the inequality holds since Hi(v, 0, 0) > 0, Hi(v, 1, 0) < 0, Hk(v, 1, 0) < 0 and





















































Using the Implicit function theorem again, we conclude that such σ1, σ2, σ3 exist and
they are continuous. 
Observe that from Step 1 and Step 2, Hi(v, σj, σk), i = 1, 2, 3, is continuous on (Fi)i=1,2,3
for a given s and fixed v.
Step 3. mi(s) is continuous.
Proof . Consider any Fi, F
′
i ∈ Fi such that ‖Fi − F ′i‖ < δ for all i = 1, 2, 3. Let σi and σ′i are
admission strategies of college i which correspond to Fi and F
′
i , respectively. For a given s,











Let X := {v ∈ [0, 1]| |σi(v)− σ′i(v)| ≥ ε/2}. Clearly,
|σi(v)− σ′i(v)| = |σi(v)− σ′i(v)| 1X(v) + |σi(v)− σ′i(v)| 1Xc(v),
where 1X(v) is the indicator function which is 1 if v ∈ X or 0 otherwise.







For v ∈ Xc, it must be the case that either σi = σ′i, or σi and σ′i are the mixed-strategies.








|σi(v)− σ′i(v)| dG(v) =
∫ 1
0
|σi(v)− σ′i(v)| 1X(v) dG(v) +
∫ 1
0







|σi(v)− σ′i(v)| 1Xc(v) dG(v)
< ε,
where the first inequality holds since σi, σ
′
i ≤ 1, and the last inequality follows from (A.35)
and (A.36).
This implies that there exist δ1 such that ‖Fi − F ′i‖ < δ1, for all i, i′ = 1, 2, 3, implies
∫ 1
0





|σi − σ′i| (1− σj)(1− σk) +





Similarly, there are δt, t = 2, 3, 4, such that ‖Fi − F ′i‖ < δt respectively imply that
∣∣σiσj(1− σk)− σ′iσ′j(1− σ′k)∣∣ < ε4 , ∣∣σiσk(1− σj)− σ′iσ′k(1− σ′j)∣∣ < ε4 , ∣∣σiσjσk − σ′iσ′jσ′k∣∣ < ε4 .











That is, mi(s) is continuous on (Fi)i=1,2,3.  
Lemma A.2 proves the existence admission strategies that satisfy the local conditions.
The proof that those strategies are mutual (global) best responses is analogous to that of
the two college case. We briefly summarize it below:
Consider a college, say i. For given σj(·) and σk(·), let σ˜i(v) ∈ [0, 1] be an arbitrary
strategy for v ∈ [0, 1]. Let σ˜i(v; t) be a variation of σi(·) such that for any t ∈ [0, 1],
σi(v; t) := tσ˜i(v) + (1− t)σi(v).










σi(v; t)ni(v) dG(v)− κ, 0
}
ds.
Observe that V (·) is continuous and concave in t. Therefore, we have
pii(σ˜i) = V (1) ≤ V (0) + V ′(0) ≤ V (0) = pii(σi),
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[σ˜i(v)− σi(v)]Hi(v, σj(v), σk(v)) dG(v) ≤ 0 (A.37)
because ifHi(v, σj(v), σk(v)) ≥ 0 for some v, then σi(v) = 1 ≥ σ˜i(v); and ifHi(v, σj(v), σk(v)) ≤
0, then σi(v) = 0 ≤ σ˜i(v); and Hi(v, σj(v), σk(v)) = 0 otherwise.
A.9 The Existence of Cutoff Equilibrium





















Let M be the set of Lipschitz-continuous nondecreasing functions mapping from [0, 1] to
[0, 1] with Lipschitz bound given by δ.
We define an operator T : [0, 1]2×M2 → [0, 1]2×M2 as follows. For any (sˆA, sˆB, α, β) ∈
[0, 1]2 × M2. The third component of T (sˆA, sˆB, α, β) is a function a defined as follows.
First, η(v) is implicitly defined via Hα(v, η(v), β(v)) = 0 according to the Implicit Function
Theorem (since Ue > 0). For v such that η(v) ∈ (0, 1), the same argument as in the proof of
Theorem 1.5 implies that
0 ≤ −η′(v) ≤ Uv(v, η(v))
Ue(v, η(v))
.
Hence, η−1((0, 1)) forms an interval. For v ≤ inf η−1((0, 1)), we extend η such that η(v) = 1
and for v ≥ sup η−1((0, 1)), we set η(v) = 0. We now define α(v, e) := 1{e≥η(v)}. Let
a(v) = Ee[α(v, e)|v]. Then,
a(v) = 1−X(η(v)|v).
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Since η is nonincreasing, a is nondecreasing. Further,
a′(v) = −x(η(v)|v)−Xv(η(v)|v)η′(v) ≤ x(η(v)|v)Uv(v, η(v))
Ue(v, η(v))
−Xv(η(v)|v) ≤ δ.
It thus follows that a ∈M.
The fourth component of T (sˆA, sˆB, α, β), labeled b, is analogously constructed via e
′ =
ξ(v) determined implicitly by Hβ(v, ξ(v), α) = 0, analogously, and belongs to M. This
process also determines B’s strategy β.
The first two components (sˆ′A, sˆ
′




B) = κ, much
as in the earlier proof, using α and β, along with (sˆA, sˆB) as input.
In sum, the operator T maps from (sˆA, sˆB, α, β) ∈ [0, 1]2×M2 to (sˆ′A, sˆ′B, a, b) ∈ [0, 1]2×
M2. By Arzela-Ascoli theorem, the set M endowed with sup norm topology is compact,
bounded and convex. Hence, the same holds for the Cartesian product [0, 1]2×M2. Following
the approach used earlier in Section A.8, the mapping T is continuous (with respect to sup
norm). Hence, by the Schauder’s theorem, T has a fixed point. The fixed point then identifies
a profile of cutoff strategies (α, β) via α(v, e) = 1{e≥η(v)} and β(v, e′) = 1{e′≥ξ(v)}.
Step 2: The cutoff strategies identified in Step 1 form an equilibrium under a
condition.




























, ∀v, e′, e˜, s,
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where µ+(s) := E[µ(s˜)|s˜ ≥ s] and µ−(s) := E[µ(s˜)|s˜ ≤ s].
Since the RHS of each inequality is bounded by some constant, the conditions can be
interpreted as requiring that each college values the non-common performance sufficiently
highly. For instance, if U(v, e) = (1− ρ)v + ρe and V (v, e′) = (1− ρ)v + ρe′, then the LHS
of each inequality will be no less than ρ− γ, where γ := maxv,e,e′ {|Xv(e|v)| , |Yv(e′|v)|}. So
the condition will hold if the RHS is less than ρ− γ.
We now show the cutoff strategies identified by Step 1 form an equilibrium, given this
condition. We show this only for college A, since the argument for college B is completely




≥ 0 whenever Hα(v, e, β(v)) = 0.






=Uv(v, e)− (U(v, e)(1− µ)− λ(1− sˆA)(1− µ+(sˆA))
1− β(v) + µβ(v) β
′
(v)
=Uv(v, e)− U(v, e) 1
1− β(v) + µβ(v)
(
(1− µ)− 1− β(v) + µβ(v)






=Uv(v, e)− U(v, e) µ+(sˆA)− µ























where the second equality is obtained by substituting Hα(v, e, β(v)) = 0, the first inequality
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follows since µ, µ+(sˆS) ≤ 1, the penultimate equality follows from the fact that β(v) =
1− Y (ξ(v)|v), the second inequality follows since the argument in the proof of Theorem 1.5
implies that −ξ′(v) ≤ Vv(v,ξ(v))
Ve′ (v,ξ(v))




Omitted Proofs in Chapter 2
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
“Only if” part. Fix a bidding profile β ∈ BSNE such that cjbj+1 ≤ Bj for all j ∈ N . We show
that if there is a bidder j such that Bj < cjbj, then there is a profitable upward deviation.
Suppose bidder j + 1 increases his bid to b′j+1 = bj − ε. Since Bj < cjbj, bidder j drops out
at time t ≡ Bj
cjbj
< 1 as ε vanishes, and bidder j + 1 moves up one position. Hence, bidder
(j + 1)’s payment is
[cj+1t+ cj(min {t′, 1} − t)] bj+2,
where t′ satisfies [cj+1t+ cj(t′ − t)]bj+2 = Bj+1. The net payoff from the deviation is








(vj+1 − bj+2) ≥ 0 if t′ ≤ 1,
(cj − cj+1)(1− t)(vj+1 − bj+2) ≥ 0 if t′ > 1.
Therefore, bidder j + 1 benefits by increasing his bid from bj+1 to bj − ε.
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B.2 Proof of Theorem 2.3
Proof of (i). The proof is analogous to that of the standard second-price auction. We omit
the details. 
Proof of (ii). The proof involves several steps.
Step 1. Any bidding profile b2 > b1 cannot be an equilibrium.
Proof . If b2 > b1 ≥ B, bidder 2’s payoff is (v2 − b1)Bb1 < 0 because v1 > B ≥ v2. Thus, this
cannot be an equilibrium. If B ≥ b2 > b1, then bidder 1’s payoff is zero. Since v1 > B ≥ v2,
however, bidder 1 can make a positive payoff v1− b2 by increasing his bid to b′1 ∈ (b2, v1). 





Proof . “If” part. Let b := b1 = b2. Note that bidder 1 is initially assigned to the position and
drops out at time t = B
b
≤ 1. Bidders’ payoffs are pi1 = t(v1− b) > 0 and pi2 = (1− t)v2 > 0.1
Suppose bidder 1 decreases his bid to b′1 < b. Then, his payoff from this deviation is
pi′1 = (1− Bb′1 )v1. Observe that pi1 − pi
′
1 > t(v1 − b)− (1− t)v1 = 2v1t− (v1 + B) ≥ 0, where
the fist inequality holds since pi′1 < (1 − t)v and the last inequality holds since t = Bb and
b ≤ 2v1B
v1+B




(v2 − b). Observe that pi2 − pi′2 = (1− t)v2 − t(v2 − b) = v2 + B − 2v2t ≥ 0, where
the last inequality holds that b ≥ B ≥ 2v2B
v2+B
. Hence, no bidder has an incentive to deviate,
and so such a bidding profile is an equilibrium.
“Only if” part. It follows immediately from (2.4) and the fact that B ≥ 2v2B
v2+B
. 
Step 3. A bidding profile B ≥ b1 ≥ b2 is a Nash equilibrium if and only if b1 ∈ [v2, B] and
b1 ≥ b2.
1Notice that v1 − b ≥ v1 − 2v1Bv1+B =
v1(v1−B)
v1+B
> 0, hence pi1 > 0.
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Proof . “If” part. It is clear that bidder 1 has no incentive for a downward deviation, and
bidder 2 cannot benefit by bidding b′2 > b1 since b1 ≥ v2.
“Only if” part. Suppose B ≥ b1 ≥ b2 in an equilibrium. Then, pi1 = v1 − b2 > 0 and
pi2 = 0. If b1 < v2, then bidder 2 will benefit from bidding b
′
2 ≥ b1, since by doing so, he will
earn v2 − b1 > 0. Thus in an equilibrium, we must have b1 ≥ v2. 
Step 4. It is a weakly dominated strategy for bidder 2 to bid b2 < v2.
Proof . There are three cases to be considered: b1 ≥ B > v2, B > b1 ≥ v2, and B > v2 > b1.
In the first two cases, pi2 = 0 for any b2 ≤ v2. Consider the last case, B > v2 > b1. Suppose
b2 < v2. Then, pi2 is v2 − b1 if b2 > b1 or zero if b2 ≤ b1. However, if b2 = v2, then
pi2 = v2 − b1 > 0. Therefore, bidding v2 weakly dominates b2 < v2.  
Proof of (iii). Observe first that B ≥ bi ≥ bj, i, j = 1, 2, cannot be an equilibrium, since
bidder j would increase his bid to b′j ∈ (B, vj) and get a positive payoff, whereas his current
payoff is zero. The proof for “If” part is the same as that in 2 except 2v2B
v2+B
> B. The proof
for the “only if” part follows from (2.4) and the fact that 2v2B
v2+B
> B (since v2 > B). 
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Appendix C
Omitted Proofs in Chapter 3
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Using the uniform distribution and the quadratic cost function, we
get a firm’s payoff from a local downward deviation, where x∗ − 2δ < x < x∗:
Πldd(x, x∗) =





Maximizing this with respect to x yields the first-order condition







and the second-order condition is
−1 + (2δ + x− x)
n−1
(2δ)n
< −1 + 1
2δ
where the inequality is from x∗ − 2δ < x < x∗. Notice that if δ ≥ 1
2
, then the second-order
condition is negative. Therefore, Πldd is increasing in xi, and x = x
∗ is the unique maximizer.
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< −1 + 1
2δ
where the inequality is from x∗ < x < x∗ + 2δ. Notice that if δ ≥ 1
2
, then the second-order
condition is negative. Thus, Πlud is decreasing in x, and x = x∗ is the unique maximizer.
It can be easily shown that Πldd and Πlud are the same as Π∗ at x = x∗, which proves that
Π∗ ≥ max{Πldd,Πlud}. 
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Using the uniform distribution and the quadratic cost function, we
get a firm’s payoff from a global upward deviation, x ≥ x∗ + 2δ:





Notice that 1 = arg maxx Π













because n ≥ 2 and δ ≥ 1
2
. 
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Proof of (i). Suppose there is no such j. Then, there is an ε > 0,
independent of δ, such that Bε(s) ∩ Sδ−i = ∅, where Bε(s) is an ε-neighborhood of s ∈ Sδi ,
and for all s′ ∈ Bε(s) ∩ Sδi , Gδ−i(s′) is the same as Gδ−i(s). Therefore, firm i would reduce
its surplus offer from s to s− ε, which gives the same probability of winning but conveys a
higher payoff conditional on winning. 







i ). By part (i), there must be no other firms offering s ∈ (s′i, s′′i ).
Thus, firm i would offer a score slightly below s′′i , which is a contradiction. 
Proof of (iii). Suppose that firm i puts some mass on s > 0. Then, Gδ−i has an upward
jump at s, which implies that a firm, say j 6= i, can be better off by transferring mass
from an ε-neighborhood below s to some η-neighborhood above s. Thus, there would be no
ε-neighborhood below si in which no other firms put mass. Then, it is not an equilibrium
strategy for firm i to put mass on s. Thus, the continuity of Gδ−i is established. Since there
is no mass point, it is strictly increasing. 
Proof of (iv). We first show that si ∈ arg maxs˜i pii(s˜i; qi) is nondecreasing in qi ∈ Qi, where
Qi denotes the support of q. To see this, consider sˆ, s ∈ Sδi , where sˆ > s, and qˆ, q ∈ Qδi ,
where qˆ > q. Suppose pii(sˆ; q) − pii(s; q) ≥ 0. We want to show that pii(sˆ; qˆ) − pi(s; qˆ) > 0.
Notice that
pii(sˆ; q)− pii(s; q) ≥ 0⇔ q[Gδ−i(sˆ)−Gδ−i(s)] ≥ sˆGδ−i(sˆ)− sGδ−i(s)
and
pii(sˆ; qˆ)− pii(s; qˆ) > 0⇔ qˆ[Gδ−i(sˆ)−Gδ−i(s)] > sˆGδ−i(sˆ)− sGδ−i(s)
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Since Gδ−i(·) is strictly increasing in s, [Gδ−i(sˆ)−Gδ−i(s)] > 0. Since qˆ > q,
qˆ[Gδ−i(sˆ)−Gδ−i(s)] > q[Gδ−i(sˆ)−Gδ−i(s)]
which shows that pii(sˆ; qˆ)− pii(s; qˆ) > 0. Therefore, pii(s; q) satisfies the strict single crossing
property (Migrom and Shannon, 1994). By the Monotone Selection Theorem (Theorem 4′),
si(qi) is nondecreasing in qi.
Observe now that from part (iii), Gδi (·) is differentiable almost everywhere. The first-
order condition of pii with respect to si is














> 0. By Edlin and Shannon (1998, Theorem 1), si is strictly increasing.
 
For the proof of Lemma 3.4, we first establish a useful lemma.
Lemma C.1. If L : Rn → Rm is a linear map (i.e., additive and homogenous of degree 1),
then there exists a constant M0 > 0 such that ‖L(x)‖ ≤M0 ‖x‖ for all x ∈ Rn.
Proof. Let M = sup {‖L(e1)‖ , · · · , ‖L(en)‖}, where e1, . . . , en is the standard basis for Rn.
Letting x = (x1, . . . , xn),
‖L(x)‖ = ‖x1L(e1) + · · ·+ xnL(en)‖ ≤ |x1| ‖L(e1)‖+ · · ·+ |xn| ‖L(en)‖
≤ M(|x1|+ · · ·+ |xn|) ≤Mn ‖x‖
Taking M0 = nM , we get the result. 
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Proof of Lemma 3.4. For the first part of the lemma, notice that for any given x ∈ X δi ,
q is drawn from F (·|x), which has the support of [q(x), q(x)]. Since q is in this interval and
s(q) is strictly increasing in q, s is also in an interval, denoted by [s(x), s(x)].
Now, we prove the second part of the lemma. Note that s is implicitly defined in (C.1).
Since Gδ−i is differentiable a.e., so is s by the Implicit Function Theorem. Now fix any x ∈ X δi .
Then for any q, q˜ ∈ (q(x), q(x)), |q − q′| < 2δ clearly. By the definition of derivative, this
implies that
|s(q)− s(q˜)− s′(q˜)(q − q˜)| ≤ |q − q˜|
Since |s(q)− s(q˜)| − |s′(q˜)(q − q˜)| ≤ |s(q)− s(q˜)− s′(q˜)(q − q˜)|, we get
|s(q)− s(q˜)| ≤ |s′(q˜)(q − q˜)|+ |q − q˜|
Now set n = m = 1 in Lemma C.1 and take L = s′(q˜). Then there is M0 such that
|s′(q˜)(q − q˜)| ≤M0 |q − q˜|. Therefore,
|s(q)− s(q˜)| ≤ (M0 + 1) |q − q˜|
Define M1 = M0+1, then |s(q)− s(q˜)| ≤M12δ for any q, q˜ ∈ (q(x), q(x)). Now let M = 2M1,
which delivers the desired results. 
Lemma C.2. There exists δˆ > 0 such that for any δ < δˆ, s ∈ [1
2
+ a − δ, 1
2
+ a + δ] and
s ∈ [a− δ,≤ a+ δ].
Proof. Since q ∈ [x+a−δ, x+a+δ] and q ≥ s(q), it is clear that the maximum surplus offer
firm i can make with δ > 0 is s∗ + δ. Therefore, for any x ∈ X δ, s ≡ s(x) ≤ s∗ + δ. Suppose
now that s < s∗− δ. Then, there exists a feasible (xi, si) for some i such that si ∈ (s, s∗− δ]
and q(xi)−si ≥ ψ(xi), because by investing xi = x∗, q(xi)−si ≥ x∗+a−δ−(s∗−δ) = ψ(x∗).
Then, firm i wins with probability 1. Therefore, s∗ − δ ≤ s ≤ s∗ + δ.
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Suppose that s < a − δ. If firm i sets si = a − δ by investing xi = 0, then for any
si ∈ [a− δ, a+ δ], pii(si; qi) ≥ 0. Suppose s > a+ δ. This implies that x > 0. Then, firm i’s
payoff from investing x is
∫ x+a+δ
x+a−δ
(q − s(q))Gδ−i(s) dF (q|x)− ψ(x)
where the first part shrinks to zero as δ goes to zero (notice that the integrand is bounded),
while the second part remains positive. Therefore, for sufficiently small δ, x should be zero.
Since the best possible quality given x = 0 is a+δ and q ≥ s(q), it follows that s ≤ a+δ. 
Lemma C.3. For any s ∈ int(S0), let x ∈ Xδi (s). Then, for all i ∈ N , Gδ−i(s) converges to
G0−i(s) = ψ
′(x0) as δ vanishes, where x0 is the limit of x.
















[ψ(x)− ψ(x− ε)] ,
which respectively imply that
lim
δ→0




Gδ−i(s+ δM)ε ≥ ψ(x0)− ψ(x0 − ε),
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where x0 is the limit of x. Therefore, we have
ψ′(x0) = lim
ε→0







Gδ−i(s+ δM) ≤ lim
ε→0
ψ(x0 + ε)− ψ(x0)
ε
= ψ′(x0).
Since s + δM goes to s as δ approaches to 0, the limit of Gδ−i is well defined. Denote the




Proof of Corollary 1. Let |N | = 2. Then, for all i ∈ N and for any x ∈ X 0, K0(x) =
ψ′(x) = x(s) for any s ∈ S0 (the last equality holds since ψ = 1
2
x2). Since X 0 = [0, 1], this
proves that K0 is the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. Now consider the score offer. At the
equilibrium, x must satisfy the first-order condition:
ψ(x)(x− s)− ψ′(x)
(x− s)2 = 0
Invoking the strict monotonicity of x0(s),






Since s = q− p = x+ a− p and p = 1
2
x, it follows that s = 1
2
x+ a and G0(s) is the uninform
distribution over [a, 1
2
+ a]. 
Proof of Lemma 3.5. For the local deviations, it suffices to show that Πlud and Πlud
attain the unique maximum value ΠT at x = xT . The proof for the global deviations is
similar, hence we omit it.
Consider local upward deviation at first. From the first-order condition, we have
P
2δ






















= −1 < 0.
Consider now local upward deviation. From the first-order condition, we have



























(n− 1)− 1 ≤ 0⇔ P ≤ 4δ
2
n− 1 ,
where the inequality holds since P ≤ 4δ2
n−1 . 
C.1 First-Price Auction with Two Firms: n = 2 and
0 < δ < 12
Suppose |N | = 2 throughout this section. Consider a discrete mixed strategy such that both
firms put mass m1, . . . ,mk on investment level x1, . . . , xk for some integer k ≥ 2. Let H(q)





where F (·|xt) = U [xt + a − δ, xt + a + δ]. Let h(q) be the associated probability density
function.
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Corollary 1 shows that at the limit, both firms randomize their investment uniformly over
[0, 1], thus the quality distribution is the uniform distribution over [a, a+1]. In Section 3.3.1,
it is shown that if δ = 1
2
, then the unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium is that the




, so that the quality distribution is the uniform distribution
over [a, a + 1]. A natural way of constructing an equilibrium from these observations is to
make H(q) as close as possible to the uniform distribution.
Consider the strategy that satisfies the follows. (i) k = 2s for any 1
2(s+1)
≤ δ < 1
2s
, s ∈ N;




(1− 2δk + δ2k(k + 2)), x2 = 1
2
(1 + 4δ − δ2k(k + 2)) (C.2)
xt =

x1 + (t− 1)δ if t ≥ 3 is odd
x2 + (t− 2)δ if t ≥ 3 is even
. (C.3)


























Notice that xt’s defined (C.2) satisfy
0 ≤ x1 < x2 < · · · < xk
x1 + δ = x3 − δ, x2 + δ = x4 − δ, · · · , xk−2 + δ = xk − δ,
x1 + xk = 1, x2 + xk−1 = 1, · · · , xs−1 + xs = 1.
It is immediate to see that xk ≤ 1, and xt’s are symmetric around 12 . It is also easy to
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see that the weights put symmetrically. That is, mi’s in (C.4) satisfy
m1 = mk, m2 = mk−1, · · · , ms = ms+1.



















And if s is an even number, then
s∑
t=1




















t=1mt = 1 for any s.




H(q)[1− F (q|xt)] dq − ψ(xt) (C.5)
In equilibrium, {(xt;mt)}kt=1, must satisfy
• Indifference: Π(xt) = Π(xt−1) for all t = 2, . . . , k.
• Optimality : Π(xt) ≥

Π(xtd) for xtd ≤ xt
Π(xtu) for xtu ≥ xt
.
It is tedious to show that the strategy defined above is indeed an equilibrium. We omit
a formal proof for this. Instead, we provide some numerical examples in Figure C.1.1










. In each of them, there are three
1We set a to be zero in the figure.
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subfigures. The first column depicts h(q), the second compares H(q) (the solid line) with
the uniform distribution (the dashed line), and the last column depicts a firm’s payoff. In
each graph, the horizontal axis is the level of investment, x. Observe that H(q) uniformly
converges to the uniform distribution and the firms’ payoff shrinks to zero as δ vanishes.
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• δ = 1
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Figure C.1: h(q), H(q) and Firm Payoff
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